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PREFACE
This paper examines currently one of the most contentious provisions 
in international trade in agriculture: primary prodiict export 
subsidies. The discussion is within the context of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade whereby I consider the provision 
which deals with this , . In attempting to examine the export
subsidy provisions of the General Agreement in a juristic study I 
consider two questions to measure the export subsidy provisions 
effectiveness. Firstly I consider the provisions nature and form 
so to understand the type of obligation entered into by the 
Contracting Parties.
Secondly, I consider the Contracting Parties utilization of export 
subs idles whether they honour the obligation and its effect
on international agricultural trade.
The methodology is an analysis of the export subsidy provision in 
chronological order. It allows an overall appreciation of the 
structure finally chosen for the General Agreement, a method of 
comprehending the Contracting Parties view of the obligation and 
the elements which measure the obligation. This chronological 
approach also allows me rfti^ssior^tfnthe compatability of export 
subsidies with the aims of the General Agreement so that the paper
may comment on the structure for international trade in agriculture.
The analysis of the export subsidy provisions takes me back to an 
era in which agriculture received special treatment. I attempt to 
understand why this economic tool has been maintained as one of the 
prime national policies of many Contracting Parties although it is 
considered a major barrier to the principles of economic liberalism. 
The initial negotiations show the structure proposed to achieve a 
liberalisation of agricultural trade and with the demise of the 
Havana Charter the only pillar really left to support such an aim 
is the discouragement of export subsidies in Article XVI:3 of the 
General Agreement and Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies. I 
discuss in very great detail the negotiations of the obligation 
so as to understand the nature of that obligation. Also, I discuss 
in great detail the elementswlueKmeasure that obligation. This is an 
attempt to understand what the measure is supposed to achieve.
The analysis of the measure of the obligation is extensive because 
from the form of the obligation it is difficult to unravel what 
it takes for an inequitable share to arise. Although the obligation 
lacks clarity of purposes and a precision in its language it has 
remained from the 1958*s virtually unaltered. These negotiations 
show the conflicting approach not between North-South nations but 
traditional primary exporting nations and industrialized countries 
in the utilization of such measures. Contracting Parties of every 
hue use this form of intervention.
The paper then moves onto discuss types of intervention which 
have resulted in dispute settlement procedures under the General 
Agreement of Tariff and Trade. My analysis initially compares the 
petition between the negotiations and the Panel's findings. This 
initial analysis also discusses the Panel's methodology in 
approaching complaints about export subsidy measures. Although 
support for the provision was well grounded in the, g initial 
complaints the results : . have been overstated. analysis
of Panel findings on complaints not only compares the negotiations 
w ith the f indings but includ es * S C  n £ -  
independent research on the primary commodity in question. That 
analysis sho-s up the problem of Article XVT:3 and Article 10 not 
being a norm capable of legally binding obligations. Since the 
norm is only a broad hortatory statement it requires not only 
further diplomatic negotiations but must accommodate the intervention 
which it sanctions.. These latter Panel complaints question the 
possibility of Article XVI:3 and Article 10 to achieve a liberalization 
of international agricultural trade since the utilization of this 
type of intervention cannot be restructured under those provisions.
This links to further discussion on whether liberalization can occur.
The paper finally questions whether agricultural liberalization can 
occur from such pillars as Article XVI: 3 of the General Agreement 
and Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies by discussing a link. The
link is one of commodity surpluses generated by national autarkic 
policies which requires export subsidies to dispose of the surplus 
and results in trade restrictions. The tra.de restrictions affect 
particulary on the traditional primary product producers of all 
Contracting Parties and not the industrialized countries. This 
link is discussed and it does not lead to a conclusion tha.t the 
pillar of Article XVI: 3 and Article 10 achieve agricultural 
liberali ation but rather the Contracting Parties are still unable 
to deal in any framework with international agricultural trade.
The operation of the export subsidies provisions of the General 
Agreement can provide a forum to establish an international framework 
but it cannot do so unless Contracting Parties wish it to occur.
The effectiveness of the provision since it is a broad hortatory
-7
statement lies with the Contracting Parties.
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CHAPTER 1
The Havana Charter Negotiations on Export Subsidies 
A. The Special Treatment of Agriculture
Agricultural trade has been singled out as deserving special 
treatment in the formulation of intemationa.1 trade rules. This 
discussion describes the reasons why agriculture received such 
special treatment. In this discussion I am relying heavily on 
commentators^ who described the negotiations to the Havana 
Charter.
The inter-war years are described appropriately as the watershed
years for agricultural special treatment. During the inter-war
years a movement'towards special measures of agricultural
2
protection occurred • Apparently this was not the case oefore the 
First World War international trade in agricultural
products was ‘ in the main- not ' . restrained by
protection devises. An example is the cane and sugar beet trade 
which relied on the lowest cost to the consumer as the principle 
criteria for determining the supply of such a commodity. Cane and 
sugar beet has historically been one of the most important primary 
commodities traded internationally and so gives a good indication.
1. W.A.B. Brown: The Hnited States and the Restoration of World 
Trade (1950)» Gardner: Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (1956);
R.E. Hudec: ‘The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy 
(1975); and C. Wilcox: A Charter for World Trade.
2. W.A.B. Brown supra p 39*
Brown noted that in a publication titled "A Post War Foreign Trade 
Program for American Agriculture" published by the United States 
Department of Agriculture in 1945y • ' A. r "■ the
direction in which agriculture was moving as follows:
"far■reaching measures of government intervention were 
introduced in an effort to maintain or expand domestic 
production without regard to repercussions on other 
countries or on the world as a whole. In agricultural 
.importing countries one strong motive for such policies 
was the desire for self sufficiency in basic foods incase 
of attack, and one result of this was to retard the 
production of protective foods in some countries ... most 
of the importing countries of continental Europe including 
France, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and 
Switzerland not only used tariffs to stimulate the 
production of agricultural staples in their relatively 
inefficient areas but also resorted to more rigid import 
limitations such as milling regulations, import quotas, 
licences, embargoes, and exchange discriminations.
Some importing countries made less extensive use of direct 
trade restrictions, but protected their producers by other 
means which had a similarly restrictive effect on trade.
'The United Kingdom, for example, paid its farmers the 
difference between the market price and a goal price on 
the bulk of its marketing of grain and sugar. All such 
measures affected the exporting countries and encouraged
exchange depreciation and export subsidies on their part. 
Agricultural exporting countries also turned to agricultural 
price and income support measures which in some ca-ses held 
domestic prices above world prices. Such support included, 
for example in Argentina, the offer of purchases of wheat, 
linseed and c o m  at fixed prices; in Brazil the cotton 
loan program; and in Australia the regulation of domestic 
price of wheat flour and the restriction of the quantities 
of domestic dairy produce and dried fruit salable in the 
home market. In some countries like New Zealand, government 
became monopoly buyers, reselling for export at a loss if 
this was necessary to maintain prices to producers”.
The movement towards protectionism was worldwide. We know that in 
Germany and -i-taly the policy of agricultural protectionism was 
the result of dictatorship which to retain a satisfied
farmer. So the motive for those countries was political .gamin.
Is this the motive for the governments of the Inited States and 
United Kingdom? In specific detail I will examine some of the 
measures Introduced in the United States and the United Kingdom 
which brought about the special treatment» ' i. . t.km-
y % supra p39“40*
In the United States agricultural production had expanded
during the First World War to meet the drop of production in
Continental Europe. With Continental Europe*s production
resuming normal levels in the 1920’s the United States farmers
found it increasingly difficult to dispose of their agricultural
surpluses. Also the onset of the 1920's saw decline in agricultural
prices which did not occur Twith industrial goods prices.
American commercial policy was always characterized by tariffs
and equality of treatment for foreigners^ so the United States
in order to protect agriculture and provide relief to farmers
enacted protective tariffs through the Emergency Tariff of 1921,
the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 and the Hawely Smoot Tariff in 
5
1930 • A.lthough the tariffs assisted United States farmers in 
their domestic market it did not assist them in their export 
markets or lead to a reduction of production.
During this period the United States administration were also
r 6actively lobbied by their farmers for assistance -f6Vtheir exports • 
The various measures adopted by the United States administration of 
President Hoover included marketing measures and more Importantly 
large scale American foreign lending through which the marketing 
organizations exported primary commodities. With the passage of 
the Hawely Smoot Tariff, the ending of large scale American 
foreign lending, the spread of protectionism across Europe.and 
the onset of the depression; the disposal of American agricultural
4* C. Kreider: The Anglo American Trade Agreement (1943) p15«
5# see C. Kreider supra note 4 p17» pp219-236, and W.A.B. Brown 
supra note 1 pp21-36.
6. W.A.B..Brown supra note 1 p22.
7surpluses was actute •
It Is noticeable that the policy of the United States government
in the 1920*s did not include any form of production control, so
impliedly we can conclude that the farmers were a very effective
; i i v i  sector in the Administration, By the 1930’s a production
policy was inevitable with the actute problems facing the American
farmer. The Roosevelt Administration therefore I^  farmers
returns by a combination of voluntary restraints on production
coupled with cash payments to farmers, stronger import controls,
8export subsidies■and a trade agreement program • The reliance
on production control and the export subsidies were the striking
difference in ’Hteit’policy, The policies were enacted irfethe
Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933 and the Soil Conservation
Allotment Act 1936, The Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933 Q u % 0\''.eSted 
c?-f- ^  c \ »' " H i e •. .
for a domestic market price and a world market price* I L f  k a s& S  cy e
...
products exported would receive a subsidy. Section 12(b) of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933 provided that all funds appropriated 
under this/^ct, including all processing and related taxes, 
should be available (among other things) "for expansion of 
markets and removal of surplus agricultural products'* * In 1935 
the authority to subsidize exports was expanded under Section 
32 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act so that the Secretary 
of Agriculture could spend ”30 per cent of the gross customs 
receipts of the country to encourage the export of
7, C. Kreider supra note 4 p220,
8. ibid p219-236.
agricultural commodities and to cover losses incurred in the
export of those commodities". It was not only possible to
subsidize the exportation of primary commodities but also such
products as wheat flour and cotton textiles under Section 32 of
9
the Agricultural Adjustment Act . Under this legislation 
reportedly the items to receive export subsidies were wheat flour,
cotton and cotton products, nuts, pears, prunes, butter and
. 10tobacco •
The first export subsidy occurred in 1933-34 on wheat,but only
to limited markets. In 1936 the wheat export subsidy applied
11
only to those exports to the Phillipines • In 1938 a radical
expansion occurred under the Ciuspices of the United States Federal
Surplus Commodity Corporation whoi: bought wheat as a monopoly
buyer and'resold I tvto alt exporters at a price which would ensure it
moved abroad. The radicaliZation was that the scheme was
12 13extended worldwide rather than only selected markets . Brown 
notes that this export subsidy program continued for a reasonable 
duration,(occassionally it was suspended because of a domestic 
shortage of wheat either due to drought or that the surplus 
mountains had been disposed of). The export subsidy for wheat 
was defended on the grounds that practically every other wheat 
exporting country was using a subsidy program and that the United 
States Department of Agriculture thought it would be a convenient 
means of setting up an international wheat agreement^.
9. ibid p220.
10. ibid p 220.
11. ibid p221•
12. ibid p221•
13. W.A.B. Brown supra note 1 p26.
14* C Kreider supra note 4 p225.
The second export subsidy • program carried out by the United
States executive was in cotton, hi July 1939 an export subsidy of
1.5 cents per pound of cotton, later raised to 4 cents, and
subsidy ' on cotton products . begtJQi. It was
officially asserted that the purpose of this program was to
"assure the United States its fair share of the world trade in
cotton and to do so by restoring the normal competitive position
of American cotton in world markets, the United States [having]
no intention of seeking more than its fair share of cotton exports
as measured by the traditional position which it has occupied
15in the cotton markets of the world".
Within this paper mention must be made about the special 
measures of import restriction enacted in the United States 
as it puts into perspective the export subsidy program. Section 
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933 as Amended in 
1935 granted to the President authority to limit imports 
whenever any commodity was being imported in sufficient volume 
to interfere with the operation of any agricultural adjustment 
program. The only limitation imposed was that imports from one 
country could not be reduced to less than 50 per cent of the 
annual imports from that country for the period 1928-1933* This 
special piece of legislation will be mentioned in a later 
context.
The United States export subsidy policy was maintained after
15* ibid p26.
World War II yet the policy of acreage and production control 
was not. It was Impossible to again seek a reduction in agricultural 
production after World War II because of the prominence of the 
farming sector in American politics. The agricultural policy 
after World War II was one of organised, sustainable and 
possibly unrealistic abundPince"^.
The United Kingdom prior to the depression did not encourage
domestic agriculture, with the exception of sugar and hops.
Agriculture in the United Kingdom only provided -§• of British
17food supply from 1924 to 1927 • The policy was to import cheap
food rather than produce it. The United Kingdom government 
response to the depression was not to follow a relentless program 
of protectionism like in America because quite simply it did not 
have a surplus problem. It was not until the 1930's,when the 
Conservative Party was returned to power after electoral promises, 
did the United Kingdom government shift from this policy. The 
Conservative Party was concerned about the prosperity of the 
farmer. The policy shift was from free trade in agriculture to 
, a protective system. The United Kingdom government 
introduced the Horticultural Products Act 1931 which provided a 
protection for domestic producers of fresh fruits, vegetables 
and flowers by the imposition of high tariffs.
16. W.A.B. Brown supra note 1 p2%
17- C. Kreider supra note 4 p108.
This abandonment of free trade was embodied by the preferences 
in the Ottawa Agreement Act 1932 between the United Kingdom and 
its dominions. It established an elaborate and reciprocal 
system of trade preferences. Agricultural commodities of the 
Commonwealth were, for the most, exempt from duty on entering 
the United Kindgom while the United Kingdom government undertook 
to maintain duties at specified rates on food imports from 
foreign countries. It provided inequality of treatment to non­
commonwealth producers. Finally the last instrument of protectionism 
was the Agricultural Marketing Act 1933 which provided for
(1) the imposition of quotas on imported primary products, and
(2) steps for the efficient reorganization of the industry 
by means of agricultural marketing schemes.
An export subsidy scheme was promoted in the United Kingdom.
R.J. Hudson, the Minister of Agriculture, backed by the landed
interests in the Conservative Party urged for agricultural
18expansion, even if it required resortivjfco export subsidies .
The justification put forward for an export subsidy policy was 
national security. No legislation was promoted to effect an 
export subsidy scheme.
The special treatment given to agriculture in international 
trade is the result of the political, social and economic 
instability of the inter-war period. This brief analysis of the 
legal instruments which effected the special treatment for 
agriculture does allow me to draw conclusions. The United Kingdom
18. R. Gardner supra note 1 p34«
and the United States moved in the same direction - towards 
protectionism. Both cited the prime motive to he • maintaining 
or raising the income of farmers and the rural population 
generally.
Is the utili; ation of export subsidies on agricultural products
a legitimate response for such motives? I consider the
utilization of export subsidies were not necessary to maintain
or raise the income of the farmers and rural population. Tariffs
in the United States and the United Kingdom did ensure for
domestic producers protection against foreign imports and a
rise of their income. With regard to the motive of self
sufficiency and security of supplies export subsidies does not
assist those objectives. The utilization of export subsidies
was required only to move the actute surpluses ® The motivation
for this in the United States was the Administration not wishing
to alienate its farming sector. Therefore political gain
was the prime motive for export subsidy schemes in the United
States as well as in Germany and Italy. One must also suspect
that the concern for moving surpluses abroad had to do with
19receiving valuable foreign exchange. The commentators do
not at any point justify the moving of agricultural surplus
by the policy of export subsidies, rather it is described as
20
a short term measure until an alternative could be found •
The problem is that those export subsidy programs initiated to
19* W.A.B. Brown supra note 1 and C. Kreider supra note 4*
20. C. Kreider op. cit. p225*
overcome the fall in agricultural prices internationally become 
permanently integrated into the general fabric of society and 
on the whole have remained.
When it came to collaboration between the United Kingdom and
the United States on international financial problems, during
World War II, proposals to create an international trade policy
after the war were considered. It was part of a larger effort
to prevent a recurrence of the unstable world policies which
had plagued the 1930's* The United States in the Anglo-
American negotiations adhered to a policy of economic liberalism
which was enunciated as foreign trade should be handled by free
enterprises without government control. It was considered that
agriculture, industry and monetary policies must be consistent
21with the requirements of economic liberalism . The United States 
also had a moralistic approach to international trade policy o 
They considered a "free trader is an individual who believes that 
tariff protection is sufficient and that duties should be fairly
22stable and should be subject to the most favoured nation principle"
So certain measures like tariffs were labelled as "fair" trade 
policy - for they worked in the price mechanism. On the other 
hand quantitative regulations were considered "unfair" because
it
they were based on direct government intervention. This approach 
was reflected in the Atlantic Charter 1941 and the Mutual Aid 
Agreement 1942 where both countries agreed to move away from a 
protectionist stance to a multilateral one. Article VII of the 
Mutual Aid Agreement reflected the moralistic approach to free 
trade by stating definitive rules on, interalia, the reduction
21. K. Knock: International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967 
(1969) p7.
22. ibid p8.
of tariffs and other barriers and the elimination of all forms of
discriminatory treatment* The extent to which Article VII
objectives were to be tested concerns us in only two ways. First,
there would be a process of tariff and preference bargaining with
the results imbodied into a General Agreement on Tariff and Trade.
Lastly, there negotiations to complete a Charter of
the International Trade Organization with a campaign to win approval
23
of the International Trade Organization in both countries • In
the negotiations .. :s > : agriculture, Brown^ noted, that
both the United Kingdom and the United States realised the problem
of cyclical price fluctuations and high cost capacity would again
cause world surpluses and unstable prices in primary commodities.
Voiced by the United States was A  concern that in accordance
with the principles of economic liberalism all forms of government
intervention had to be eliminated in the trade rules and if such
intervention had to be tolerated it was to be within very restrictive 
25
constraints so that the instability within the inter-war years 
could not occur again.
23* R* Gardner supra note 1 p159«
24# W.A.B. Brown supra note 1 pages 50 and 55* 
25* K. Knock supra note 21 pages 33“34*
B. The Proposals for the I.T.Q. Charter
Although special treatment in agriculture had occurred in the
national policies of many countries during the inter-war years
the intention of United Kingdom and the United States in the
reconstruction of international trade in the post World War II
years was that all international trade should be on the same
footing. Gardner states that in the informal negotiations no
special let out had been agreed upon for international trade 
26in Agriculture • Yet in the joint statement in 1945 under the
title "Proposals for an International Conference on Trade and
Employment" it provided an exception for agricultural trade 
27internationally • The insistance an exception for
agricultural trade came from the United States Department of 
28Agriculture • The Proposals were short in length, used very 
general language and were designed to reverse the trend of 
economic isolation. It affirmed the principle of an unconditional 
most favoured nation treatment and required rules of conduct on 
indirect protection. The perceived problem for international 
agricultural trade in the Proposals was with quantitative 
restrictions from which it was exempt.
The Proposals led to the formulation of a Preparatory Committee 
for United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in
26. R. Gardner supra note 1 p149«
27* W.A.B. Brown supra note 1 p56«
28. R. Gardner supra note 1 page 149*
February 1946* A ’’Suggested Charter” was submitted by the 
United States Secretary of State Clayton. Secretary of State 
Clayton said in the foreword to the ’’Suggested Charter" that it 
was put forward simply as a basis for discussion and was
29designed to clarify possible obscurities in the 'Proposals’ •
The "Suggested Charter" reflected the United States position 
towards trade policy for industry and agriculture. With respect 
to trade policy for industry it was typically a free trade 
approach, i.e. wanted trade to be competitive, efficient, 
progressive, non-discriminatory and non-political. However 
with respect to agriculture its stance was one of limited 
government intervention in the market to meet its national needs.
The Commercial Policy Chapter of the "Suggested Charter" dealt 
with agriculture in two methods:
(1) the agriculture exception to the ban on quantitative 
restrictions and a section on export subsidies;
(2) commodity agreements.
The "Suggested Charter" had a sharp distinction between export 
subsidies, which consisted of special payments or bonuses by a 
government in the sale of a product abroad at a lower price than 
the home price,. Therefore it would capture markets which could 
not be obtained under ordinary competitive conditions. The 
other type of subsidy consisted of special payments, again by 
governments which would have the ;ffect of increasing exports 
or diminishing imports, but * not result in a difference
29* Gardner op. cit. p14.
between the selling price of the product on the domestic or 
foreign markets. At the Preparatory Committee the latter were 
referred to as domestic subsidies. This is called the two-price 
system and suited the special American support programs. The 
position of the United States delegation was that domestic 
subsidies were preferable to import restrictions or tariffs. If 
they cause serious injury to other countries there should be 
consultation. A determination of injury was therefore required 
in the "Suggested Charter" before consultation became obligatory^. 
Nothing beyond consultation was provided in the case of domestic 
subsidies.
The United States proposal^ provided a ban on export subsidies 
for agricultural and non-agricultural commodities alike. In the 
consideration of the products export price, allowance had to be 
taken for differences in conditions of sale, taxation or other 
differences affecting price comparability. The "Suggested Charter" 
however provided an escape clause to suit the American dilemma 
with respect to agriculture. The "Suggested Charter" proposed 
that where a burdensome world surplus had developed or was likely 
to develop in a specific product, export subsidies were permitted. 
Those countries with a burdensome world surplus were initially 
required to consult on measures to increase consumption and, 
reduce production through the diversion of resources from 
uneconomic production. A commodity agreement was envisaged
30. According to Brown op. cit. p117-118 this was dropped in the 
Geneva draft.
31• U.S. Department of State Publication 2398, September 1946.
between the governments of those countries. However if this 
measure did not succeed or even appeared unlikely to succeed the 
obligation to notify, consult and refrain from subsidization 
was waived. The obligation in the United States draft was that 
domestic and export subsidies were required to be notified to 
the intended I.T.O. The escape clause was worded such that the 
obligation to consult on domestic subsidies was waived in a situation 
of world burdensome surplus.
Not withstanding the ban on export subsidies nor the waiver in 
the "Suggested Charter" the United States proposed that it was 
all subject to an undertaking that no one could use a subsidy 
to acquire a share of world trade in that product in excess of 
the representative period and account being taken of special 
factors. The United States draft provided that it was to be the 
member granting the subsidy whom would initially select the 
initial representative period and weigh the special factors.
The member was only to consult promptly upon request in regards 
for an adjustment of the previous representative period and a 
re-evaluation of the special factors. The United States "Suggested 
Charter" envisaged all export subsidies should be eliminated 
after three years.
I consider the "Suggested Charter" proposals for export subsidies 
were not reconcilable with the espoused principle of economic
liberalism. The draft provision in recognising the reality 
of governments resorting to export subsidies in a situation of 
world surplus took account of how demand and supply in that 
primary commodity should be satisfied. The accounting of 
satisfying world requirements was by government intervention 
and no place existed for free competition, efficient production 
or non-discriminatory treatment towards such international trade 
The satisfaction of world requirements was still left in the 
hands of governments of individual countries. Although the 
"Suggested Charter" did not expressly refer to primary products 
there can be no doubt that was the prime consideration of the
32
United States in suggesting the proposal. According to Hudec , 
the United States considered that its problem with agricultural 
trade lay in the exception of where there was already chronic 
oversupply on world markets. Since the United States was 
subsidizing those exports then according to the escape clause 
it would be left to the United States to make the determination 
about meeting the requirement of more than an equitable share
of world trade. So the subsidizing country was left to freely
33decide whether market conditions fitted the exception. Brown 
says this was the major issue on export subsidies. Therefore 
the resolving of instability in international agricultural trade 
did not occur with the "Suggested Charter".
32. R.E. Hudec supra note 1 p15*
33* W.A.B. Brown supra note 1 p118.
C. Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment, London 1946.
At the London Conference in 1946, the Preparatory Committee considering
the "Suggested Charter" were confronted on its primary commodity
policy "with an effort by the Pood and Agriculture Organisation
to separate agricultural commodities from other commodities and
commodity policy from trade policy by setting up a comprehensive
buffer stock, surplus disposal and relief operation under a
World Pood Bank. It was the United States position that a common
policy should apply to agricultural and non-agricultural commodities,
and that commodity policy should be kept in relation with commercial
policy under the I.T.O. This position was accorded general
34support by the Preparatory Committee". The discussion in
London was whether export subsidies were more harmful than production
subsidies, the special problems with respect to primary products
and income stabilization schemes, and the relation between
35subsidies and commodity agreements .
In relation to income stabilization schemes the Preparatory 
CommitteeQC cepted the proposal by New Zealand and other countries 
that domestic price stabilization schemes would be exempt from the 
definition of export subsidy so long as it did not result in 
export prices being lower than domestic prices. This was the 
main modification from the"Suggested Charter".
34* C. Wilcox: A Charter for World Trade (1949) P42*
35* United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the 
First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference 
of Trade and Employment E/PC/t/C#^37 pp8-12.
At London^the special treatment for export subsidies in primary 
products became clear. The Preparatory Committee moved to 
eliminate the provision requiring members to consult on adopting 
production or consumption measures to deal with burdensome world 
surplus. The London draft provided instead that in any case 
where a member considered that its interest is seriously prejudiced 
by subsidization of a primary commodity or where a member cannot 
meet the time for eliminating its export subsidy, it would be 
deemed a "special difficulty". A special study was to be undertaken 
which could lead to a commodity agreement. However if this proved 
unsuccessful the obligation to notify, consult and refrain from 
subsidization would be waived. Therefore the drift i^ v{"K c. , .
subsidies primary products was to encourage inter­
governmental commodity agreements.
The agriculture question was also an issue with respect to
quantitative restrictions at the London Conference. The "Suggested
Charter" proposed an exception to quota prohibitions for agriculture.
This meant that the special exception of agriculture from quota
prohibitions could be employed to shield a weak Agricultural system]
from all competitive pressure. "This was particularly resented by
less developed countries and other primary producing countries
hom were themselves prohibited from using quantitative restrictions
to protect their fledging industries, while industrial producers
were allowed to use this devise to protect their local producers
from the very type of imports most likely to be produced in less
36developed countries and primary producing countKes" • The
36. J.H. Jackson: World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969) p318.
United Kingdom supported those countries demands and pressed hard 
for the deletion of this reference. The United States would not 
move and its view prevailed.
D. Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. Lake Success. 
New York 1947 and Second Session of the Preparatory Committee 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment.
Geneva. 1947*
37The Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee made changes 
to the London Draft. Amongst the changes was the insertion of 
the words "directly or indirectly" as regards subsidies. This 
made it clear that the provision was not only confined to export
70
subsidies -per se in the trade of- the product concerned • Another 
change included a definition of the term "primary commodity".
The main concern at the Lake Success meeting was to do with 
"burdensome world surplus".
The Drafting Committee thought that where measures proved unsuccessful 
to deal with a burdensome world surplus the obligation to notify 
and consult should not be relinquished but that the obligation 
to eliminate export subsidies could be waived. The delegations 
of Canada and New Zealand reserved their position on this matter, 
as they feared that this "might provide an escape for subsidizing
37. E/PC/T/34.
38. See Article 25, 26 and 28 of the Havana Charter and Article 
XVI GATT.
countries taking such an attitude that not agreement could he
reached in which case they would be free to act as they
39wished without regard to their obligation" to eliminate 
export subsidies* They considered the provisions for respect*VC 
share*,*of trade to be open to abuse.
At the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee at Geneva 
Canada proposed that a member should not be allowed to 
regain its liberty to impose export subsidies on primary 
commodities except as a result of a determination by the 
Organisation that the subsidy was necessary, would not stimulate 
exports unduly and would not injure other members^. The United 
States on the other hand, proposed that the undertaking not to use 
subsidies to increase the member's share in world trade should
A *1
apply to all subsidies and not export subsidies • Other countries 
were not willing to give such an undertaking even if the United 
States accepted the Canadian proposal. Brown^ considered this 
a manoeuver in a debate which was really concerned with the 
question of whether the Charter should deal more severely with 
subsidies chiefly employed by the United States (subsidies 
involving a two-price system). The United States position was
40.-W.A.B. Brown supra note 1 p118.
41 - ibid.
42. ibid.
that it could not go further than the London Draft in penalizing
the particular form of subsidy used by itself. The other
delegations pointed out that in the case of a burdensome surplus
there was no limit in the London Draft the extent to which
importing countries could grant subsidies to maintain their
production provided they did not export. Also if an export subsidy
should occur as an adjunct of a price stabilization scheme
it was permitted. In addition countries customarily exporting
the bulk of their output of the production could at very little
cost convert what was really an export subsidy into a domestic
subsidy by subsidizing the entire output. All of these were
subsidies used by other countries. They were subject only to
consultation. In contrast a direct subsidy on exports only
(the type used in the United States) was banned by the London
Draft unless reinstated after efforts to reach a multilateral
solution had failed. While attempts were being made to find a
multilateral solution (preferably a commodity agreement) all
countries were free to use subsidies to maintain or even increase
their share in world trade, except countries using export subsidies. 
43The United States had accepted an obligation to refrain from 
using its type of subsidy till the multilateral effort had been 
given a fair trial. It would not agree to a further delay in 
order to obtain the consent of the Organization to a resumption 
of its liberty of action.
Canada^, vigorously supported by Brazil, insisted that the basic
distinction between domestic and export subsidies was sound and
should be maintained. Export subsidies^ they maintained^were bad
and gave rise to trade warfare. They gave an advantage to industrial
countries since the countries most likely not able.to afford
to subsidize at all were exporters of primary commodities.
Moreover when exports were only a small part of the total output
it was easy to grant a very large export subsidy, whereas it was
not so easy to subsidize the total output. These were the grounds
put forward for a severe ban in the Charter on export subsidies
by less developing countries and primary producing countries.
The position of developing countries is worthwhile repeating
again vis a vis the industrial countries of the North. The
industrialised countries favoured domestic subsidies, per se. as
a better means for economic development rather than quota
restrictions or tariffs. Domestic subsidies were considered less
objectionable to industrialized countries Jbe^ ccic-tf-e-
interalia, because the costs were more easily ascertainable,
they were paid out of a general fund and the burden was more 
45equitable •
The Committee tightened the waiver for export subsidies. The 
Geneva test i provided that in the case of failure to work 
out a solution through the commodity agreement technique, a member 
desiring to continue a subsidy on a primary commodity in burdensome 
surplus should apply to the Organisation for an extension. The
44. ibid.
45. C. Wilcox op. cit. p126 and W.A.B. Brown op. cit. p98-99
conditions under which the Organization would grant -’an? extension 
were specified. Though prior approval was somewhat tempered
it was prior approval nevertheless and on this point the United 
States entered its only formal reservation to the Geneva Draft^. 
The period of grace for the elimination of export subsidies was 
also shortened from three to two years.
E. Havana Charter: Final Act of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Employment, Havana, 1948.
The United States delegation considered that the defeat it 
suffered at the Geneva session would have great repercussions 
in Congress and therefore attempted at Havana to reverse the 
Charter section on export subsidies for primary commodities.
The main feature of its proposal was a complete exemption for 
export subsidies on primary commodities from the limitation of 
the Charter. A representative of the United States Department 
of Agriculture justified this proposal in the Senate as follows:
,f¥e know the great effort which our government has devoted 
to the breaking down of the barriers to trade throughout 
the world. We also know that price supports for farm commodities 
here in the United States also requires a certain degree of 
protection through tariff or other trade barriers. Without
46. ibid.
them foreign producers might flood our domestic markets 
with our government buying the domestic production. In 
addition it tends to become difficult to export farm 
products without an export subsidy. These trade barriers 
are in conflict - although not wholly irreconcilably - with 
our repeated declaration of a national policy which seeks 
international co-operation in reducing trade barriers.
As long as this conflict exists the best hope of reconciling 
it without increasing the burden on the United States 
taxpayer is in the possibility that international agreements 
can be negotiated for individual commodities concerned.
Such agreements could recognise the special problems of 
such commodities and, in effect, lift them out of general 
consideration of international trade practices for the 
duration of the agreement. In this way they could preserve 
the' principle of international economic collaberation 
without sacrificing agricultural interests”^ .
This statement is excellent in confirming the conflict' which existed 
in the negotiations., for rules on international trade in agricultural 
goods. The idea of a multilateral treaty which allowed the free 
interchange of commodities was a reaction to the depression between 
the inter war period and the two world wars. It was called 
economic liberalism and was based on growth to bring global 
prosperity.
47* Statement by Carl C. Farrington, Chairman Price, Policy and 
Production Adjustment Committee and Assistant Administrator 
of Production and Marketing, March 1948*
The concept of economic liberalism was supported by the United 
States Department of State^who along with the British^were 
pushing for an International Trade Code of Conduct. Associated 
with economic liberalism were the concepts of "free enterprise" 
and "free trade". For "free trade" the United States advocated 
a policy identical to its trade policy of the 1930's - tariffs 
protection and duties should be stable and should be subject to 
the most favoured nation principle rather than free trade in the 
laissez faire sense. The United States Department of State 
considered "free trade" should be universal in all trade, i.e. 
agricultural, industrial and monetary and it should be handled 
by free enter-prise • Thus the great debate on how much government 
intervention there should be in global trade. The United States 
Department of State were proponents of there being no role for 
government intervention but were unable to carry this proposal 
for agricultural trade. The Americans could not present a 
uniform view on a code of. conduct for agricultural and industrial 
commodities.
The above statement confirmed that in the United States the 
Department of Agriculture^ view prevailed when it came to trade 
rules for agriculture. Remembering that the level of intervention 
in the United States for agricultural products was of a high 
order. As a result of the farming lobby in the United States 
the Department of State was not able to affect any change of 
its status quo.
The Department of State wished to build multilateral trade on 
liberal economic principles but its own policy on agriculture was 
based on protectionism. The United States Department of 
Agriculture, from the above statement considered government 
intervention should play the role rather than free enterprise.
All the methods suggested decisions not to be made in
the market place but in politics. So the proposal for agricultural 
trade to be entirely through commodity agreements was a volte-face 
to the principles of economic liberalism in the Charter. T-fc shows 
the depth of influence agricultural interests in the United 
States had. It was vigorously attacked in the United States 
by the Department of State. The United States Department of 
Agriculture also argued that domestic policy was a sovereign 
affair of the United States ^ • - ' ■ " Tt is worthwhile
to note here that the kind of economic liberalism advanced in 
the multilateral negotiations' never commanded universal consensus. 
The fact that there would be a compromise in the provisions relating 
to primary commodities only meant that the forces favouring such 
rules were on the balance stronger than those opposing such rules.
jJQ
According to Brown*^ the United States did not actively 
participate in the debate &  Canada, which had led
the forces arrayed against the original proposals of the 
’’Suggested Charter” offered a way out of the dilemma. Canada 
agreed to reconsider the whole section u v h i c ; provide an 
effective release for the subsidies desired by the United States^ 
provided that the following principles were observed* the 
exception should not be so wide as to permit serious harm to 
the interests of other exporting countries, it should be so 
formulated as to facilitate resort to commodity agreement 
techniques, and there should be safeguards so that no export 
subsidy could be used to expand trade beyond the share of a 
country in a reasonably expected period. It was on these 
principles that a draft acceptable to the United States was 
drawn up*
As the preceding review of the Charters negotiation on primary 
commodities export subsidies has shown /yyttJYs'jfori
compromises. The Charter embodies three ideas, firstly, 
subsidies in general are not the appropriate means of dealing 
with the special problems of international trade in primary 
commodities. Second, that any subsidy affecting international 
trade is a matter of international concern. Thirdly, that 
subsidies on primary products shall be subject to an international 
standard.
48. supra Brown p146 - 147*
Article 25 of the Havana Charter contains the obligation to 
notify subsidies in general and to discuss the possibility of 
limiting subsidization. Article 26 of the ^avana Charter contains 
the provision for the general elimination of export subsidies 
as proposed in the "Suggested Charter" by the United States. It 
is Article 27 which addresses the point of special treatment for 
primary commodities.
Article 27s2 of the Havana Charter imposes the general obligation 
on members granting a subsidy to "co-operate at all times in efforts 
to negotiate" commodity agreement. The three permitted exceptions 
for which members can grant export subsidies are:
(a) where a non-member grants a subsidy which affects a 
members exports cf that product, a member may subsidize 
their export to offset it: Article 26:4* This was 
identical to the provision in the Geneva draft.
(b) in a casewtefca member "considers that its interest 
would be seriously prejudiced by compliance with 
Article 26, or if a member considers that its interest 
are seriously prejudiced by the granting of any form of 
subsidy the procedures under Chapter VI may be followed". 
Under Chapter VT of the Havana Charter, which deals with 
commodity agreements, a member can be exempted provisionally 
from the general ban on export subsidies but is still 
subject to the obligation in Article 28: Article 27:3*
(c)/
(c) a member who consider their interest seriously prejudiced 
may apply to maintain export subsidies on primary 
commodities without prior approval or a determination 
of the Organization where Chapter VI procedure has failed 
or does not promise to succeed: Article 27:5. This was 
the.waiver provision that altered considerably from the 
Geneva draft on burdensome world supply. It is still 
subject to Article 28.
In the case of these three permitted exceptions members were under
an obligation to promptly give notification and enter into
consultations with other members and to seek agreement not to
use such subsidies to obtain more than an equitable share of the 
49world market . If no agreement w,<* S’ reached the Organization had' 
the power to determine what constituted an equitable share and 
the member would have to conform to this determination.
The phrase "equitable share" was first used specifically in
Article 28 of the Havana Charter. A similar concept referring
to representative share had been present throughout the draft
50texts since the United States Suggested Draft • I found no 
explanation for the use of "equitable" in Article 28 of the 
Havana Charter and I only presume that the concept was required 
to allow for fluidity in primary commodity trade on the world 
market. This would mean that the world market share is not as
49* supra. Article 28(1), (2) and (3)s Article 27(5)•
50. E/conf 2/C3/51 P111.
rigid, as possible with the interpretation of "representative 
share", thus allowing for developing countries to obtain a 
share in the world market for commodities*
Article 28 of the Charter outlines what the Organization can 
take into account in determining what constitutes an equitable 
share. In general it can take into account any factor which 
may affect the world trade in the commodity. In particular 
it specifies such factors as:
(1) members share of world trade in a representative period.
(2) whether a members share is so small that its effect 
is to be of minor significance.
(5) degree of importance of the external trade in the
commodity to economy of member granting, and to members 
materially affected by it.
(4) existance of price stabilization schemes which do not 
involve an export subsidy within meaning of Charter.
(5) desirability of gradual expansion of production for
export in areas to satisfy world market requirements
51in the most effective and economic manner.
The scope of these exceptions was dependent on how "prejudice" 
is defined. "In all: of the/ 1 three permitted exceptions the 
definition embraced two kinds of injury, and the exception 
therefore was a very broad one. It could be resorted ■/*£> £3^  
member that considers its interests would be seriously prejudiced
51. supra. Art. 28.
by compliance with the obligation to use export subsidies and
second, by a member that considers its interests are being
seriously prejudiced by any form of subsidy including export
52
subsidies granted by another member'1 •
The estimate of injury did not have to be submitted to the 
55
Organization . If the export subsidy continued they were however 
subject to the general rule of consultation and' specifically 
to the requirement that they may not be used to gain for any 
member using more than its equitable share in world trade#
Two types of subsidies were excluded by definition from export
subsidies# The first type is the use of proceeds of taxes levied
on domestic products, but not like products when exported to make
54
payments to the producers in general of the products • The
55
second type is the domestic stabilization scheme which was in 
the London draft# The latter was however subject to initial 
approval by the Organization and upon the failure of the Havana 
Charter was to become important.
Comparing the Suggested Charter and the Havana Charter provisions 
on export subsidies we notice changes to the form and nature 
of the obligation. The Havana Charter permitted more exceptions 
from the general rule and excluded by definition a particular 
kind of scheme. The structure remained similar, except for the 
waiver, of intergovernmental consultations, internal adjustments
52. Brown opi cit. p2l6.
53. supra. Article 28(1), (2) and (3) and Article 25* '
54. Article 26(2) Havana Charter.
55• Article 27(1) Havana Charter.
and commodity agreements. As to the nature of the problem (resolving 
upon principles of economic liberalism satisfaction of world 
requirements in a situation of surpluses) I consider the Havana 
Charter did achieve results. By this I mean that the Organization 
parameters in the prior determination of what is an equitable 
share included concepts based on efficient production and non­
disc rim inatory treatment. Clearly there was no place in international 
trade in agriculture for free enterprise but on the other hand 
constraints were placed upon governments. The accommodation of 
government intervention was upon the basis of prior approval 
from the Organization. So in international trade for primary 
products the obligation for attaining stability was taken out 
of the hands of governments.
F. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1947 and the 
Non-ratification of the Havana Charter.
The GATT negotiations were an extension of the ITO preparatory
sessions. In those negotiations the effective power of the
United States, the United Kingdom and France meant that they
were able to make GATTfs substantive obligations a bit more
to their liking than the parallel Havana Charter. This is
because GATT was only intended to deal with the reduction of
tariffs. The United States was unhappy with the manner in
which export subsidies were dealt with in the Havana Charter, so
those obligations-were excluded from the first working draft
56of the General Agreement •
Brazil and New Zealand objected to the omission of the export
subsidy obligations at the Lake Success meeting in February 1947*^
Chile in September 1947» at the Geneva meeting attacked the
omission of these rules - the United States argued that export
subsidies involve only third country competition and had
no place in a single tariff agreement. The matter was re-opened
briefly at the post Havana meeting in March 1948* There
the United States took the position that there had been an
understanding at Geneva not to include subsidy provisions until
58the ITO came into force • The GATT general provisions were to
56. R.E. Hudec supra note 1 p50.
57. supra page 49 footnote 19*
58. ibid.
be "temporary" and would be suspended by the ITO Charter provisions.
The most important reason why the export subsidy was not carried
into GATT p / *b  • that the United States delegates
did not have the executive authority from the government to permit
59any undertaking with regard to export subsidies.
The various dissatisfactions of small countries coalesced around
the proposal to omit all of the ITO Commercial Policy obligations
from GATT, except for the most favoured nation clause and a
general nullification and Impairment provision to protect tariff
concessions. In the second post Havana conference those smaller
countries, after considerable concessions, succeeded in
60incorporating a commercial policy section into GATT.
The Commercial Policy Section was incorporated into Part II of 
GATT which upon entry into force of the Charter was supposed to 
be suspended.
The initial Article XVI of GATT was much shorter than the Chapter 
provisions. There was no elaborate distinction betwen export 
and other subsidies and no special treatment of subsidies on 
primary commodities. Section A of Article XVI of GATT was only 
the'general provision Article 25 of the Charter except that 
in GATT a determination of injury must be made by contracting 
parties acting jointly, whereas^under the Charter,consultation 
could only be had by any member that considers its interests 
are prejudiced.
59. Jackson op. cit. p570.
60. Hudec op. cit. p51.
The Havana Charter was signed on the 23 March 1948 by United 
States Secretary of State Clayton but required ratification by 
the Senate and Congress. As noted earlier the conflict in the 
United States with its multilateral principles and agricultural 
program was eventually to lead to the f a l l  ... of the ITO.
As discussed earlier Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
1948 (United States) authorised the application of quantitative 
restrictions to imports which threatened to interfere with 
domestic agricultural programs. The United States administration 
considered that Section 22 would conform with the ITO Charter 
and GATT and succeeded in getting Congress to amend the 
Section with the following words l!... no proclamation under this 
Section shall be enforced in contravention to any treaty or 
other international agreement to which the United States is or 
hereafter becomes a party11. However by 1949 Congress were a£ain 
renewing and broadening price legislation and amended Section 22 
such that virtually all agricultural commodities became subject 
to possible import controls. As a result the United States was 
soon applying quota’s on the importation of a number of agricultural 
commodities which were not subject to equally restrictive domestic
production or marketing limitations. Congress then removed the
--
self-denying ordinance and with the Magnusson Ammendment it 
provided eventually in Section 22 that "no trade agreement or
61. Gaxdner op. cit. p374
other international agreement here to fore or hereafter entered
into by the United States shall be applied in a manner
62inconsistent with the requirements of this Section,” It also
made the general declaration that the renewal of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreement Act should "not be construed to determine or
indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the
Executive Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs 
6 3and Trade" . So renegotiation was required for the ITO Charter 
before it could be adopted before Congress, however not so for 
GATT.
A S a result the protectionist philosophy of the
agricultural sector of"t w c - s withdrawn,
. Congress. In the meantime the United Kingdom 
government had not presented for Parliamentary approval the 
ITO Charter until action was taken by the United States.
Therefore the Charter was never put into operation. The Charter 
did not seek to oppose agricultural stabilization but merely to 
obtain commitments to minimize the discrimination and protectionism. 
It was now left to GATT, which both the United States and the 
United Kingdom had signed the Protocol of Provisional Application 
of GATT to deal with export subsidies.
62. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Section 8(b).
63. Section 10 of the Act 1948»
CHAPTER 2
The Rise of Article XVI;5 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
A. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947
As I mentioned in the last Chapter at the initial application
-j
of the General Agreement Article XVI only contained its present 
day Section A of Article XVI . This was the Hew York/Geneva text 
before it was amended at Havana. Ho elaborate distinction was 
made between export subsidies and other subsidies, there was no 
reference ’f'O special treatment for primary commodities and the 
resolution of a burdensome surplus required only notification 
and consultation if the subsidy threatened the interests of other 
Contracting Parties.
In September 1948, a .forking- Party was established to consider the
question of substituting the provisions of the ^vana Charter into
Part II of the General Agreement. The Contracting Parties pursuant
to Article XXIX:1 of the General Agreement had undertaken to apply
3
the principles of the Havana Charter relating to export subsidies 
to the full extent of their sovereign authority. Brazil at the 
Working Party proposed that the General Agreement include Articles 
26, 27 and 28 of the Havana Charter. The Working Party Mfelt in 
view of the practical difficulties they could not recommend such
1. GATT BISH) Vol. I p39-40.
2. GATT BISID
3. A GATT BISID Vol. I.
a move at this s t a g e " W h a t  the Working Party agreed to was the
drafting changegto Article 25 of the Havana Charter should he
inserted* So the words "increase exports" in line 2 of Section A
of Article XVT were included* The intention of this was to include
the concept of maintaining exports at a level higher than would
otherwise exist in the absence of a subsidy. The other change
was that consultation would only proceed upon the request of a
5
Contracting Party if prejudice was alleged . Since there was no 
institution created there could prior international
determination of prejudice*
Article XVI reflected the principles of economic liberalism that 
no differentiation should be made between agricultural and industrial 
goods. If global wealth was to succeed universally then the 
principles of economic liberalism should be the guiding principles 
multilaterally. This shows that in the negotiations towards GATT 
the powerful forced of the United States Department of State were 
working. So it is fair to assume that the balance of forces was 
for the elimination of export subsidies* This effects the 
Contracting Parties understanding of the extent of the obligation - 
does it have legal binding effect or is it a hortatory rule?
This point is examined in greater detail in Chapters 3 to 5 when 
I discuss the complaints under Article XVI:3 handled by the Panel.
4* B GATT BISID Vol. II p43 para. 24* 
5* GATT BISID Vol. I p44 para. 29.
Digressing for a short while, mention must he made of the United
States agricultural waiver in GATT to understand why there was
a lack of response to arguments /fc. liberali-2i& „ agricultural
£
trade. As outlined in the previous chapter the United States
had various methods in its domestic legislation which could insulate
its domestic market from agricultural imports. This domestic
legislation affected the drafting of Article XVI and the
quantitative exception for agriculture in Article XI of GATT.
As described earlier Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act 1948 authorised whatever import restrictions necessary to
prevent interference with any farm support measures, whether or
not domestic production was being controlled. Whereas Article XI
of GATT only allowed quotas on imports when domestic production
was being restrained to the same extent. Section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act 1948 was again amended in 1951 to
establish precedence for domestic legislation. United States
Congress realised with this amendment it might cause the
United States to breach GATT. Therefore the United States
undertook to obtain a waiver from the Contracting Parties of
GATT in order to remove any possible inconsistency between the
obligations of itself to GATT and that Section as to permit
n
fulfillment of the Congressional mandate • So at the 1954/55 
Review Session the waiver was granted to the United States. The 
waiver, pursuant to Article XXV:5 waived United States obligations 
under Article II and XI to the extent '’necessary to prevent a
0
conflict with Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 1948” •
6. see Chapter 1 Section*B page 7*
7. GATT 3rd Suppl. BISID p142.
8. GATT 3^d Suppl. BISID 32 (1955)• Decision of the Contracting 
Parties of GATT March, 1955*
The waiver did not specify a time limit or provide, for its 
reconsideration after the elapse of a time period. The waiver 
required the United States T& annually to report on the action 
it had taken pursuant to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act 1948 arid reserved for other Contracting Parties the right for 
consultation. The United States has retained the waiver to date 
and has had the benefit of it from the rules of GATT for a series 
of agricultural products, including dairy products, sugar, cotton 
and peanuts.
U. The 1954-55 Review Session
At their Ninth Session in 1954/55 the Contracting Parties again 
turned to a review of Article XVT of the General Agreement. A 
Working Party was established to consider proposals for Article 
XVI, surplus disposal of primary commodities and the disposal of 
non commercial stocks.
9Among the interesting proposals submitted to the Working Party were 
the following. South Africa proposed that the obligation to consult 
should no longer arise from a determination by "Contracting Parties". 
Rather a Contracting Party considering that serious prejudice to
9. GATT W9/104 p4.
its interests is caused or threatened would give rise to limiting
the subsidy. This is the same point which was addressed at the
Havana meeting j . the 1948 Working Party(  established by GATT)and
goes to the prior determination of a prejudice by a subsidy. Whereas
in the Havana Charter the International Trade Organization dealt
with the prior approval no such obligations were included into
Article XVI:1. Denmark proposed the total prohibition of all
export subsidies after a transitional period. This was consistent
with the United States Department of State ideology crfr international
trade. Australia and New Zealand however favoured the incorporation
of Article 27 and 28 of the Havana Charter, whereas Norway and
South Africa o n l y t o  incorporate . Article 2751 of the 
10
Charter • Prance proposed that subsidized products should not
11
be offered at bdlow current prices • I have included these proposals 
to show the continuing diversity of opinion amongst the largest 
exporters of temperate primary commodities towards export subsidies. 
These proposals did not carry the weight of the United States.
The United States proposed a prohibition o r \ all export subsidies
with the exception of agricultural products to which an equitable
12 13 share would apply • According to Kung the United States claimed
that its export primary products had been discriminated against
for a long period of time in most importing countries, and as a
result its relative position in world trade had decreased. The
10. GATT W9/20.
11. GATT W9/102.
12. GATT W9/103.
13. see E. Kung Das Allgeneine Ab Komme Uber Zolle and Handel (GATT)
(1955) pp180-181•
United States demanded that this worsening of its position should
he rectified and that export subsidies should be permitted at least
for those commodities in which it had to struggle with surpluses,
Kung^ claimed that this was justified. The Contracting Parties
agreed to the differentiation between primary and non-primary 
15commodities, Rom points out pertinently Mthat this argumentation
seems strange since the rectification of a worsening of United
States position requires an adjustment of a limited period, while
16the exception of primary products is a permanent one" . The motive 
for the differentiation should follow from those same motives 
which gave rise to the defunct provisions in the Havana Charter,
If Kung is correct in describing the reasons put forward for the 
United States proposals then surely the underlying motive is one of 
balance of payments rather than raising the income of farmers. During 
the inter war period the United States used the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act 1933 initially as a devise to export wheat and cotton 
from those displacedn*#/k-ef-S due to unfair import restrictions (the 
commentators make no reference to the use of export subsidies 
by any other country except Argentina wheat exports). The United 
States export program we-s continued when it was realised it improved 
their balance of payments. After World War II the Department 
of Agriculture espoused the continual use of export subsidies 
to firstly deal with balance of payments and secondly to 
dispose of surplus production. Agriculture had become
14* E. Kung supra p180.
15. M. Rom nGATT Export Subsidies and Developing Countries”
J.W.T.C. 1968 p544 footnote 32.
16. supra p544.
the United States a significant earner of foreign exchange and 
the Administration were not interested in any alteration to a 
successful program.
I think this conclusion can he drawn and it reflect the United
States was only concerned about its own national interest. The
United States proposal received -support from the United Kingdom
but onlyfo,* primary goods under a domestic stabilization scheme (\v\cA. itvi's
subject to the prior approval of the Contracting Parties after 
17a transitional period • West Germany totally supported the 
United States proposal. The Working Party remit was also
about surplus disposal and the liquidation of 
non-commercial stocks. The negotiations towards the Havana Charter 
showed that export subsidies was only one part of a system to deal 
with liberalisation of agricultural products. Although the Working
Party received proposals on the liquidation of non commercial
18 19stock and surplus disposal with the majority of the Working
Party favouring inclusion of such articles, the United States
was not in a position to agree to such commitments in the General
Agreement. Although Resolutions on the Disposal of Surpluses and
Liquidation of Strategic Stocks were adopted by the Contracting
20 21 Parties it never led to anything • Therefore GATT was left
with one portion of the intended proposal to deal with the
liberalization of primary commodities. The Working Party report
17. GATT W9/104.
18. see Chile and Australia proposal in L272/Add 1 and W9/78.
19* see Australia proposal in W9/50.
20. GATT 2nd Suppl~. BISID p50 - 51.
21. see GATT L/301 and L/320 which confirms that the progress of 
an interim Working Party report in the field of commodity 
agreements was never persued.
was adopted by the Contracting Parties, so thus the Protocol 
Amending Part II and Part III of the GATT was included in the 
General Agreement*
In stating . I consider the General Agreement has only one 
portion of what was intended to be a comprehensive set of trade 
rules on agriculture, I discuss in Chapter 5 and 6 of this paper 
the consequences of this* I contend that there is a direct link 
between commodity surpluses and restrictions on trade. GATT
only deals with export subsidies I question whether it is 
effective j/v the problems of commodity surpluses
and restrictions on trade.
C. Article XVI:1
The first obligation in Article XVI: 1 upon the Contracting Parties 
is to notify the extent, nature and effect of subsidies they grant 
or maintain, which operate directKj or indirectly to increase 
exports or reduce imports on primary products. As already mentioned 
in Section A that the phrase "increase exports" was intended to 
include the concept of maintaining exports at a level higher than 
would otherwise exist in the absence of the subsidy. A Panel on 
Subsidies established in 1958 was of the opinion that it is not
sufficient to consider increased exports or reduced imports only
in a historical sense but rather what would happen in the absence 
22of a subsidy •
The other obligation in Article XVT:1 is for a subsidizing Contracting
Party to discuss the possibility of limiting the subsidization in
any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the
interests of a Contracting Party is caused or threatened by
subsidization. As already noted in Section A of this paper it was
agreed that consultations should proceed upon a request of a
Contracting Party when it considers that prejudice is caused or
threatened. Although Article XVT:1 was not ammended to make this
explicit, this is what Article 25 of the Havana Charter provided.
So a prior international determination of prejudice would not be
required before subsidizing Contracting Parties had to consult on
the possibility of limiting the subsidization. The consequence of
this is whether a subsidizing Contracting Party need only discuss
*
the theoretical possibility of limiting the subsidization or whether
more is expected, by way of action* ; At the London Conference
of the Havana Charter the drafters reported that the word ’'limiting11
should be "used in a broad sense to indicate maintaining the
subsidization at as low a level as possible, and the gradual reduction
25in subsidization over a period of time where this is appropriate” •
22. GATT 9th Suppl. BISID p191 para 10.
23* United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of the 
First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference 
on Trade and Employment. E/PC/T/33 (London 1946).
D. Article XVI: 5
In order to achieve a discussion of Article XVI:3, adopted by the 
Contracting Parties^ at the 1954/55 Review Session, I have 
approached the Article by firstly discussing those words like 
"primary products" and "subsidy" which go to the root of the Article, 
Then I approach the core obligation of the Article by initially 
analyzing the words "equitable", "world export trade", "representative 
period", "special factors" amongst other words.
- primary products
It was considered Important at the Review Session to define the 
term "primary products" because of the permissive nature of the
25rules on export subsidies. An Interpretative Note to Article XVI 
was added to clarify primary products as "any product of farm, forest 
or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which had under­
gone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for
26marketing in substantial volume.in international trace" • The
questions of when does a primary product become a processed product
and whether the primary product component of a processed product
may be subsidized were partially answered at the Review Session.
1 ’ .. 'v. I  he former
q u e s t i o n j s c o m p r o m i s e  b S ' the Interpretative Note.
\t\e~ ' United States had voiced the problem of its own cotton
V/vV U ai'I''
textile processing . considered to be a primary product.
Other Contracting Parties did not agree, so the compromise was
24* GATT supra note.
25* see GATT Ad. Article XVI.
26. ibid.
built in# Since cotton is sold in substantial volumes internationally
other than textiles, textile would not be included in the definition.
The United States subsequently appended its signature to the
Declaration on the understanding that it would not prevent a
27
continuation of its cotton export subsidies • This shows that in
the negotiation process that the United States is not prepared to
accept any compromises on agricultural liberal aV^ation when it affected
U»on(p( be-
i t s  own domestic sector. The Interpretative Note 4  regarded by 
the United States as a hortatory statement therefore one
doubts the attempt to define legally binding rules when there is 
no consensus about their applicabili-j-^  0
- subsidy and domestic stabilization scheme
What is the nature of "subsidy" in Article XVI:3? We know from 
Article XVT :1 that the term "subsidy" includes domestic, export 
and production subsidies because the provision states the nature 
to include "any form of income or price support, which operates 
directly 6^ indirectly to increase exports ... or to reduce imports". 
Article XVI:3 however states that the nature "operates to increase 
the export of any primary;product". The domestic subsidy is 
excluded from Article XVI:3 because the equitable share obligation 
applies only to world export trade. Whereas production and export 
subsidies : affect international trade in primary commodities
; v t l i e  within Article XVI:3« This follows Articles 27 and 28 
of the ^avana Charter# The exemption of a price stabilization 
scheme was reintroduced in Article XVI:3 in the 1954/55 Session.
27# Status of Multilateral Protocols of which Director General 
acts as Repository (19^7) P42 -01.
The exemption of a price stabilisation scheme was initially 
opposed in the Havana Charter by the United States because it 
complained that there would be no limits on exporting countries* 
Article 27(1) of the Havana Charter provided that the ITO had a 
role in such equalisation schemes. The ITO had to determine that 
the system resulted, otujq£so designed as to result at times in 
an export price higher than the domestic price. The ITO was also 
to determine that the system operated, o r ^ s o  designed as not 
to stimulate exports unduly or seriously injure other members.
The Havana Charter Article 27(1) obligation was a -priori; that is^ 
for the member to obtain approval for its price stabilisation 
scheme from the ITO prior to its implementation. The Working 
Party in GATT adopting Article 27(l) of the Havana Charter changed 
the obligation to one being a forteriori. A new further clause 
was added which stated that if the price stabilization scheme is 
"wholly or partly financed by government funds in addition to 
funds collected from producers no exemption would apply". Contracting 
Parties no longer had to get prior approval for their schemes and 
such schemes could be altered to ensure that they were totally 
financed out of producer funds. A price equalisation scheme can 
therefore be exempt regardless of whether it results in export 
prices which are lower than domestic prices at times or if it operates 
to stimulate exports and obtain a greater share of world trade so 
long as it is not financed from government funds. The role for 
Contracting Parties is substantially reduced in comparison to the 
ITOaa^ work backwards from the effect to
the cause of such a scheme. The Interpretative Note was fundamentally
28different from Article 27 of the Havana Charter. Jackson 
considers the Interpretative Note to he borrowed from the Havana 
Charter, :hence^>e-.treats it in a descriptive manner. Dam^ does 
not discuss the point. The exemption of domestic price 
stabilization shemes is of fundamental importance to the autarkic 
policies of Contracting Parties. The actual form which these 
schemes takes is discussed extensively in Chapters 3 and 5* 
those Chapters I tie in the operation of these domestic stabilization 
schemes with the question of agricultural liberalization.
- equitable share
It has been suggested in some quarters that in negotiations for
Article 28 of the Havana Charter the word ,,fair,, was initially
proposed in preference to '’equitable1' and that a difference exists
between these two words. Those* quarters suggest that "fair" was
too absolute and did not provide as dynamic and flexibleqponcept
as "equitable". The same quarters have suggested that this
debate was carried over to Article XVT:3. All the primary source
material available to myself and the commentators offer no
suggestion of such a debate in either the General Agreement or the
Havana Charter. As earlier noted the concept in the United States
proposal was "representative share" but in the Havana Charter
"equitable" was utilised to meet the arguments suggested against
30
"fair" above. Wilcox in his treatise on the Havana Charter
28. J.H. Jackson. World Trade and the Law of GATT (19&9) P395«
29. K. Dam. The GATT (1970) p142 - 144.
30. C. Wilcox. A Charter for World Trade (1949) p129 - 130* This 
view is supported by J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of 
GATT (1969).
discusse & Ithe.twoconcepts as if they are interchangeable*
Semantically a fair share is the same as an' equitable one. The
problem with norm isibecause at has to be dynamic it will be
subjective. This point was raised by France who; . felt that the
concept was difficult to apply.. France proposed a criterion that
would provide that there should be no distortion of normal commerce
and subsidized products should not be offered at below current 
31market prices • The French basic point is valid. The criterion 
they suggested leaves open what is normal commerce in agricultural 
trade when supposedly every temperate agricultural exporter is 
using countervailing duties, export subsidies and quantitative 
restrictions. Whatever the label, the obligation cannot be 
rigid because the Contracting Parties did not wish to ban export 
subsidies on primary commodities. The concept of being dynamic 
does not lend itself to be legally binding since it has to follow 
the principles of economic liberalism which themselves are not 
clearly definite in nature and form.
- world export trade
The word:, "export" was inserted into the phrase at the behest
of the United States. In Article 28(l) of the Havana Charter
32reference was only made to "world trade". France in the Beview 
Session proposed that the words "world trade" should be construed 
as meaning also individual markets because they thought Article
31. GATT V9/102.
32. -GATT Doc. S.R. 9/41 p6 (1955).
XVI:3 would lose all value if it did not preclude such subsidies 
from destroying the position of another exporter in an individual 
market. This view was supported by major primary commodity 
exporters (Australia, Uruguay, Canada and Italy). Australia was 
particularly outspoken in supporting France on this concept. 
Australia went further and said that the phrase would be weak 
unless it referred to individual markets. Those Contracting 
Parties thought that the danger of export subsidies was greater 
in individual markets and it was possible to argue that not with­
standing damage done by subsidization in individual markets a 
country's share of world exports was not increased. Australia
considerable difficulty in securing any limitation of
33subsidies on primary products with the U.S. formula . The United 
States refused to accept the individual market concept. Although 
no reason is offered whi^ ' they refused to accept the concept, in 
looking back at the Havana Charter debate we can draw the reasons. 
With respect to their cotton exports program the use of a subsidy 
was defended on the basis of restoring the United States to its 
traditional position in the world. So if the United States had been 
displaced in a commodity in which there was no growth in trade, 
it would be unable to recapture a share of its exports since 
the effect would only be in the individual market. Further 
since it was earning large foreign exchange reserves from trade 
in agriculture it did not want its penetration dented. If the 
aim of Article XVT:3 is to restrict export subsidies then
33* supra p3.
the proposal of the other Contracting Parties was justified. That
proposal would lead to the elimination of export subsidies because
any increase in an individual market share would be unfair. Those
temperate primary producers wanted penetration into individual
markets upon the basis of free competition by efficient producers
34not upon the basis of government intervention. Jackson is
descriptive in his treatment on the use of this word "export11 and
offers no analysis at all on the conclusions of the Review Session.
Even when Jackson puts it into the context of the French Assistance
35on Exports of Wheat and 'Wheat Flour the analysis is again 
36descriptive. Danr in his analysis concludes that because of
the drafting history, referred to in this paragraph, it is not
conclusive that "export" does not refer to trade in a product in
37an individual market. Dam makes no specific reference to the 
negotiations to making this point. I consider Dam's conclusion 
cannot be sustained on the basis of the negotiations at the 
Review Session. The conclusion from the negotiations was that in 
assessing market shares the only reference point for an equitable 
share was the export "world trade". This was the United States position.
- having
7Q
Danr considers that there is a problem with the word "having" 
in the second sentence of Article XVI:3. Dam's argument is that
34* J.H. Jackson supra note 28 p394*
35. GATT 7th Suppl• BISID p46 (1.955).
36. K. Dam. The GATT (1970) p143.
37. ibid.
38. K. Dam supra p142.
the term "having" suggests that an increase in the subsidizing 
Contracting Party's share need not be established if the 
subsidizing country preserves a larger share than it would otherwise, 
have. Dam considers that this conclusion would follow "a fortiori 
from the accepted interpretation of the "increase exports" language 
in Section A r°f Article XVIJ which a,s we have seen, makes that 
which would happen in the absence of a subsidy crucial"^. Jackson^ 
does not mention any problem with "having". I do not understand 
Dam's argument and express skepticism about it in light of the 
negotiations for the Havana Charter. I see no problem with "having".
- previous representative period
The term "previous representative period" is used also in Articles
XI and XII of the General Agreement. It has been understood that -H\e,p-eV*-o*s’{
with Articles XI and XII Cs e, three preceding years for
which trade statistics are available. The suggestion was that
with regards to Article XVI:3 that period should also be the three
preceding years. At the Review Session a number of developing
countries expressed concern that the concept "previous representative
period" might lead to a rigid status quo. Brazil and Turkey stated
that the criteria could prevent an exporting country, which had no
exports during the previous representative period from establishing
39* ibid.
40. J.H. Jackson supra note 28 Chapter 15 p3^5“399«
its right to obtain a share in the ,trade of the product concerned. 
An Interpretative Note was adopted which provides ’’the fact that 
a Contracting Party has not exported the product in question 
during the previous representative period would not itself preclude 
that Contracting Party from establishing its right to obtain a
A 1
share of trade in the product concerned" • For the developing 
countries it is pragmatic that they be shown some flexibility if 
global economic growth is the aim of the General Agreement. This 
would accord with free trade principles which would allow changes 
to occur in a dynamic market. The problem of the Interpretative 
Note as adopted is that it applies to all newcomers - whether 
developed or developing countrieseTs-frhi’^  . justified in free 
trade principles? AWe, U. <\<T ^
Q t o & S  fk ^  - for example,
a newcomer might be the United States in the export of butter.
There is no end to suchc\questions. MeAce ^  t. a  IC ( j \ fvo ^  ;i $
- special factors
At the 1954/55 Review Session no discussion took place between the
4-ofc>e_
Contracting Parties on what the Working Party considered*"special 
factors" ;. The Working Party said that in determining what 
are "equitable shares", sight should not be lost of:
(a) the desirability of facilitating the satisfaction of 
world requirements of the commodity concerned in the 
most effective and economic manner, and
41, see GATT Ad, Article XVI para 3
(b) the fact that export subsidies in existence during the 
selected represented period may have influenced the 
share of trade obtained by various exporting nations^.
Point A of the "understanding'1 comes from Article 28:4(e) of the 
Havana Charter but omits substantial portions. Article 28:4(e) 
addresses the situation of expansion in demand forctprimary 
commodit:, in the world market. The International Trade 
Organization, in determining what an equitable share for a Contracting 
Party subsidizing exports, in an expansionary market had to consider 
whether that expansion was sustainable. If the expansion was 
sustainable then it was only to be met through the most effective 
and economic manner. Point A addresses a different situation - that 
is the meeting of world demand in a commodity by :; ' r z ' 
efficient and economic methods. By being different I mean^it 
addresses the satisfaction of world requirements In all situations,
i.e, if the market is expanding, stable or declining. The world, 
demand has still to be met by efficient and economic methods.
This goes to the root of the arguments for economic liberalisation 
of agriculture. The argument of economic liberalisation is that 
export subsidies lead to an inefficient allocation of the world's 
agricultural resources. This is the standard component in analyses 
of agricultural liberalization by the advocates for free trade.
Thus according to Point A, to meet world requirements it should 
be satisfied not by export subsidies. This would make sense from 
the negotiations of the Havana Charter, the proposals put forward 
to the Working Party in 1954/55 and the concept of economic liberalism.
42. GATT 3rd Suppl. BISID at 226 para 19 (1955).
Also omitted from Article 28;4(e) was the words "therefore of
limiting any subsidies or other measures which might make that
expansion difficult"• Phegan says that these omitted words from
Point A constituted a "reinforcement of the general aim of
eliminating export subsidies when such subsidies distort an
exporting country’s share of world trade, without these words the
43clause could have opposite effect" • Phegan makes no explanation 
of this point and says in his footnotes that this has not happened
A A
in actual practice • What does Phegan mean? I agree that these
words in Article 28:4(e) did constitute a reinforcement of the
general aim of eliminating export subsidies*' But that was obvious
from the phrase* Those omitted words from Article 28:4 spelt out
in plain English that export, subsidization and other measures which
might artificially meet the expansion in world demand were not
entitled rer se to claim a share of that expanding market demand
if it would create difficulties* Of course according to the principles
of economic liberalism it would always create difficulties since it
was an inefficient allocation of resources* Without those omitted
words from Article 28:4(e) Point A should not have an opposite
effect because of the principle of economic liberalism* What Phegan
is wrong in is admitting that this has not happened in practice*
45Point A was not included in the Interpretative Notes and was only 
a statement by the Working Party of the 1954/35 Heview. If under
43* C* Phegan "GATT Article XVI:3: Export Subsidies and Equitable 
Shares" Journal of World Trade Law (1982), p251 at p154*
44* ibid.
45* see GATT Article XVI Ad.
the consultation procedures of Article XVT:1 or dispute settlement 
procedures of Article XXIII no notice was taken of Point A then 
satisfaction of world requirements by subsidized production would 
occur. This is what has happened in practice as evidenced in my 
discussion in Chapter4 Another point about the omission of those 
words from Article 28:4(e) of the Havana Charter is that i b  A
irwfi'iffc/ — criterion for determining what share K
subsidizing member should have in the exceptionf,
.... ‘ ;  ^ These omitted words were redundant
because the General Agreement makes no a priori determination and 
only discourages all export (or production) subsidies which obtain 
a more than equitable share of world trade. Jackson^ and Bam^ 
again simply outline Point A and treat it in a descriptive manner.
Point B of the Working Party Understanding also comes from the
A O
Havana Charter. As mentioned earlier , Article 26:4 of the ^avana 
Charter permitted members to subsidize their exports in primary
4-9products to offset export subsidies of non-member countries. Pam 
50and Jackson^ have no opinion about this Working Party Understanding
51and ' treat it descriptively. Phegan is of the opinion that
Point B is of the equivalent to Article 26:4 and states "that it
is an invitation to multiply trade restrictions by implicitly
exempting subsidization where it has been employed to counterbalance
52the same practice on the point of others" •
46. J.H. Jackson supra note 28 p39&*
47* X. Bam supra note 36 p143*
48. see Chapter 1 Section 3 p29.
49* X. Bam supra note 36 u143*
50. J •H. Jackson supra note 28 p296.
51. C. Phegan supra note 43 p294«
52. ibid.
Since Phegan does not justify his opinion in terms of a non- 
Contracting Party-Contracting Party situation I do not think 
he is correct. GATT would not support an all out trade war 
situation of the type envisaged by Phegan. The General Agreement 
has provisions which provide for consultation and dispute settle­
ment if serious prejudice arises. This would continue to receive 
support from all Contracting Parties. Also, I do not think it is 
a simple re-write of Article 26:4 of the Havana Charter because 
non Contracting Parties canvas of right, subsidize exports. I am 
of the opinion that Point B address«sthe situation of the use of 
export subsidies by a number of Contracting Parties, but a complaint 
is only brought against one Contracting Party. The fact that 
other Contracting Parties are utilizing export subsidies should 
b<t taken into account. GATT cannot be seen to restrict the practice 
of the Contracting Party complained about _ all other
Contracting Parties practices. This would not be acting in 
accordance with mutual and reciprocal benefits.
53This is one of the problems in the sugar subsidy debate discussed
in Chapters 5 a-nd 6 later on. We have a situation where the
European Economic Community subsidizes sugar exports and complaints
54were brought against it by Australia and Brazil . I consider 
that in the background many other Contracting Parties were using 
similar practices but not the type of domestic stabilization scheme 
utilized by the European Economic Community, e.g. Australia had
53* see GATT BISID 26th Suppl. p290 and BISID 27th Suppl. p69. 
54* ibid.
55probably in its tied sales discounted the contract price • I do 
not know the answer ■ from Point B and this hypothetical
situation but I do know the result - trade restrictions on 
agricultural products. If Contracting Parties ignore one of 
the more important General Agreements aims to co-operate "in 
developing the full use of the resources in the world" which in 
terms of "economic liberalism" is understood to be free trade 
and free enterprise then the consequences are restrictions on 
trade. This is what the United States did in the sugar subsidy 
dispute by imposing quotas on sugar imports against the background
56of surpluses generated by the European Economic Community subsidies • 
I think in regards my discussion my opinion of Point B is more' 
logical even though you do not know the result from it.
55. GATT BISID 26th Suppl. p290.
56. see Chapter 6.
E. The Theory of International Trade to GATT
GATT’s impetus to international trade was maintained on account
of the worldwide depression in the 1930’s. To ensure a repetition -
of that would not occur, global wealth was considered a necessary
consequence. This was to be achieved by applying the concept of'economic
57liberalism to international trade • The solid principles behind 
the concept of economic liberalism, to advance international trade, 
were "free enterprise" and "free trade". The axiom of "free 
enterprise" has to do with the non-interference by governments in 
the market place. Similarly with "free trade" the axiom is 
understood to be associated with the non-interference by governments 
in the increase of volume erf trade by "free enterprise". Thus the 
theory of international trade would mean "that domestic output will 
by maximized if resources are allocated through private market 
transactions to locations where the highest value is placed upon
CO
them" . These axioms were considered by the promoters of the
Havana Charter and the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade to
59bring global wealth . it has to be constantly remembered that to 
prevent a repetition of the worldwide depression the concept of 
economic liberalism was advanced. The preamble to the General 
Agreement sets out the legitimate aims of the promoters of economic 
liberalism to be:
"in the field of trade and economic endeavour [relationsJ should
57* see W.A.B. Brown: The United States and the Restoration of World 
Trade (1950); R.N. Gardner: Sterling^-Dollar Diplomacy (19&9) p12- 
23; R. Hudec: The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy 
(1975) p4-5; K. Knock: International Trade Policy and the GATT 
■ 1947-67 (1969) p5-9.
58. W.F. Schwartz & E.W. Harper: "Subsidies Affecting International 
Trade" Michigan Law Review, Volume 70 p831 (1972).
59. see the'preamble to the Havana Charter and the General Agreement.
by conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the 
full use of the resources of the world and expanding the 
production and exchange of goods ••• T'^.
The preamble of the General Agreement outlines the contribution of 
Contracting Parties to these objectives shall be made by:
"entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrange­
ments directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce . ••
The promoters categorically stated that agricultural trade was to
62 ibe subject to economic liberalism , .'<>(<*!' as mentioned earlier,
agricultural trade has always been the subject of special treatment
63in government policies . The principal reason for not treating trade 
in agriculture more leniently* both in the Havana Charter and the 
General Agreement, is related to the national support programs.
Since government interference was widespread in agriculture the 
Havana Charter approach was to recognise that intervention and try 
to impose reasonable limits upon it. The policies of the Havana 
Charter intergovernmental commodity agreements, restrictions
on quantitative restrictions and export subsidies. In the General 
Agreement the policies c-fquantitative restrictions and export 
subsidies were only considered for inclusion* .
60. GATT BISID Volume I.
61. ibid.
62. see Chapter 1 Section A pages 10-12.
63. see Chapter 1.
Earlier discussion has told us that export subsidies were associated
with raising the income of producers, ensuring rural population had
a reasonable standard of living and continuing employment, increasing
production for national self sufficiency and national security.
These are similar to the aims in the preamble of the General
Agreement. Thus why are export subsidies not a concept acceptable
to economic liberalism? According to the theory of international
trade (in terms of the axiom of free trade)subsidies lead to e\r-\
64inefficient allocation of world resources • This is the
65 )standard thinking of economists . Economists regard subsidies
as inefficient since they "divert resources to producing subsidized
66
goods rather than other goods of great real value" and such 
distortion reduces the opportunity of global wealth. lith export 
subsidies being associated with the legitimate aim of economic 
liberalism, countries have not been prepared to give up this tool 
of economic policy - thus we have in Article XVI: 3 of the General 
Agreement a moderate response by the promoters to reduce government 
intervention.
The question remains how can real international free trade in 
agricultural products be achievable. The answer I consider lies 
in theqecGj^ feifuo-.of the obligation in Article XVI: 3 of the General 
Agreement^  ^ . the
interpretation of the negotiations cx«>^
•‘•CrbO m  ^  ci"H .
64. W.F. Schwartz &  E.W. Harper supra note 58 p845.
65. see W.F. Schwartz & E.W. Harper supra note- 58, footnote 45, 
and p 846; also H.A. Malmgren: International Order for Public 
Subsidies, Thames Essays No. 11 (1977) p30-69.
66. W.F. Schwartz & E.W. Harper supra note 58 ,p840.
F. Article XVI:5 in its entirety
The Working Party which drafted Article XVI:3 had to utilise phrases 
from the Havana Charter simply "because there was no support 
from ' the Contracting Parties for the elimination of export subsidies 
to achieve the liberalrzation of agricultural trade. When you 
consider that the proposals for the disposal of surpluses and the 
liquidation of non-commercial stocks never resulted in any binding 
obligations then for the promoters of agricultural liberalisation 
they were lucky to achieve a trade rule on export subsidies. Even 
the promoters of Article XVI: 3 were no longer concerned with the 
liberalisation of agricultural trade per se in terms of economic 
liberalism. The problem with the utili; ation of those phrases 
from the Havana Charter, in my opinion, was that they were out of 
context, provided no structure to tackle agricultural liberalisation 
and the purpose of the phrase was never identified.
The phrase which out of context "an equitable share of
world export trade". The Havana Charter f C O  b O  J .
•/eo permitted exceptions CK^\c/
c u e  exemption by definition, was however subject to the criteria 
in Article 28 of the Havana Charter that they were entitled only 
to an "equitable share of world trade". . , . . )' * * *
Export subsidies are now accommodated as a trade rule for 
agriculture. The foundation of the rule is now .a criterion 
from the Havana Charter which : limited the. permitted exceptions
and exemption by definition. The rule no longer addressed the 
question of the overall consequences of such practices. The 
consequences had to be suffered by the Contracting Parties. The 
other concept out of context was the inclusion of the domestic 
stabilization schemes exemption by definition. Since the trade 
rule already accommodated the practice of export subsidies surely 
then the domestic stabilization schemes should ftve-
rule. 3y its exemption it provided a vehicle for no control 
over the practice of export subsidies.
In stating there is no -overall structure for trade in agriculture 
to be liberalized I mean that the General Agreement only addresses 
export subsidies and quantitative restrictions. The result from 
government Interference in the use of a nations resources is the 
generation of surpluses which export subsidies tries to dispose 
of. Article XVI:3 neither limits 1 ; government interference in 
the utilization of a nations resources nor liih.s -fhe. 
on trade which -flou> from export subsidies * , . . , , . '
' j The structure of Article XVT: 3 is for more
government interference in a nations agricultural resources. The 
result must be more restrictions on trade in agriculture internationally^
Finally neither the Working Party nor the Contracting Parties 
addressed the question of what is the purpose of Article XVI:3. In
terms of the preamble of the General Agreement, is Article XVI:3*s 
purpose to "raise standards of living, ensuring full employment 
and steadily growing volume of real income", or is it to be 
concerned with "developing the full use of resources of the world". 
Thus achieving the purposes of global wealth. In other words is 
Article XVT:3 attempting to stabilize returns to producers or 
is it attempting to stabilize the market4 x > j "the Ce>n
Is my pessimism justified? The drafters of Article XVI:3 were 
surely aware of the consequences of the provision. This would go 
to explain the lack of clarity and precision in Article XVI:3. 
Phrases like "equitable share", "world export trade", "previous 
representative period" and "special factors" all allow differ.-e.^ /^' 
interpretations and flexibility in . .. application. The drafters 
of Article X\TI:3 must have considered that in the process of 
consultation and dispute settlement Contracting Parties would 
settle one way or the other I liberalisation of
agricultural trade. The obligation of Article XVI:3 did not require 
political backing, since it was the followed status quo. Could it 
eventually lead to agricultural liberalization on solid principles? 
These questions could be answered by the support the norm of 
Article XVI:3 received.
CHAPTER 5
A Surprise for GATT
A. Past Consultations
A number of consultations have taken place under Article XVT:1 but 
for a variety of reasons, political and practical, they have not 
resulted in the eventual use of the dispute procedure under Article 
XXIII of the General Agreement.
Consultations tinder Article XVI:1 concerning agricultural subsidization
have occurred since 1952. In 1952 the United States export subsidy
on sultana's was called into question by Greece**. In 1953 United
States export subsidies on oranges and almonds were claimed to have
2
prejudiced Italian trade in Europe • In 195& Denmark requested 
consultation with the United States in respect of the latteite 
export subsidies on poultry to the West German market^. In 1957 
Denmark claimed United Kingdom's internal subsidy on eggs caused 
prejudice to Danish markets in the United Kingdom and Europe^. In 
all these consultations the results were unsatisfactory, often in 
many cases the subsidy was withdrawn only to be reintroduced later 
on. Possibly for these reasons,Contracting Parties who suffered 
prejudice started to consider the possibility of using Article XXIII 
of the General Agreement to solve the dispute about export subsidies
1. GATT L/39, L/146 and Add. 1, L/148, SR 7/14, SR 8/12.
2 . GATT L/122, SR 8/12, SR 9/6 , SR 10/3.
3. GATT D/586, SR 11/66.
4. GATT L/627, IC/SR 31.
by claiming nullification and impairment of benefits.
5
B. French Assistance to Ex-ports of Wheat and '//heat Flour
The first and probably the most notable ever dispute settlement 
for a complaint under Article XVT:3 occurred with Australia lodging 
a complaint,that as a result of subsidies granted by the French 
government on export of wheat and wheat flour,they had displaced 
Australian exports and obtained an unfair share of world export trade.
France operated a domestic stabilization scheme and thus Australia
had to show that the scheme was not exempted by definition from the
provisions of Article XVI:3* In the French view, the system was
one of stabilization of domestic prices and returns to producers.
The scheme was operated by the Office Nationale Interprofessional
des Cereales (@NIC) in which a domestic price was guaranteed to the
producers for a "maximum quantum” of wheat^. The production in
excess of the "maximum quantum" was still purchased by OHIO but not
at the guaranteed price, for this the producer received only the
price ONIC could obtain by selling on the world market or at concessional
7
prices on the domestic market . The calculation by ONiC for the 
"maximum quantum" included not only domestic consumption but a margin 
in excess for export. The producer did not receive all the 
guaranteed price5 deductions included taxes, storage and other
5. GATT BIS 3D 7th Suppl. (1958) P46.
6. supra p47 para 4*
7 . ibid.
expenses pins a surplus disposal tax. The surplus disposal tax 
was to cover QNICMs losses on the disposal of the wheat surpluses. 
ONIC also received payment for wheat delivered in excess of the 
"maximum quantum". At this stage the scheme has in theory the
Q
characteristics described in the interpretative note •
The crucial point was what happened when the wheat sold from the
"maximum quantum" for export returned a price lower than the
guaranteed price? ONIC would be in deficit , so where did the
finance for the deficit come from? The Panel considered the
1957-58 cropping season^. In 1957-58 the guaranteed price for wheat
was 3,622 francs per quintal. ONIC was only able to receive, on
export of wheat 1,800 francs per quintal. So ONIC was paying to
each producer 1,566 francs per quintal for wheat in the "maximum
quantum". The 1957 harvest yielded an excess over domestic
requirements of 30 million quintals, of which 21 million quintals
were exported as either wheat or wheat flour . ONIC was in deficit
for that harvest and funded the deficit 20 per cent from the surplus
disposal tax and 45 per cent from the repayment of wheat produced
11inexcess of the "maximum quantum" . The balance, 35 per cent, was 
budgetary appropriations, that is from government funds. The Panel 
said it would be difficult to apportion or link 0NIC*s revenue 
directly with items of expenditure or assess with any precision the 
share of budgetary appropriations in financing the exports. Since 
35 per cent of payments on exports were derived from government
8* GATT Ad. Article XVI.
9 . GATT supra note p51 para 9*
10. supra para 10.
11. supra para 12.
funds some of the losses would have to he covered by the latter. 
Therefore the domestic price equalization scheme of the French
12
could not be within the exemption to paragraph 3 of Article XVI . 
There is no problem with this finding. It does illustrate how 
easy it is to fallowfsV^^the Interpretative Note of Article XVT:3. 
All that France had to do was ensure ONIC’s deficit was entirely 
met by producer funds in the future. Financing export subsidies 
by a non-governmental levy similar to ONIC's also meant that there 
was no obligation to notify other Contracting Parties of the 
scheme. This would make it very difficult for other Contracting 
Parties to become aware of a domestic stabiliii&tion scheme.
The Panel then had to consider the causation question: did the
French subsidy result in them obtaining an inequitable "share of
world export trade" in wheat and wheat flour. The Panel noted the
difficulty with the concept of "equitable share" but recalled with
clarity all the previous negotiations at Havana and the 1954/55
Review Session to assist them with the factors that should be
13taken into account •
Firstly to examine the French trade statistics. The Panel considered 
that the "previous representative period" to be the pre-war period 
of 1934-38 and the post-war period of 1943-58 and included those 
statistics for the part of the year in which the Panel had been 
established^. The Panel used 1934 as the base year for the
12. supra paragraph 13,
13* supra p52-53 paragraph 15*
14. supra p53 para 17 and 19, and p49*
15consideration of the question, why 1934? On niy analysis if you
took the total of the French world exports of wheat and wheat flour
over the representative period the mean average is around 3*2 per
cent and 6.6 per cent respectively for those products. This is
comparable to the actual figures of 1934 and seems reasonable.
16When you view the average mean of world export of wheat and
wheat flour against the complaint period a rise in French exports
is seen but the percentage difference is no more than 8 per cent
17points. In absolute quantities the difference was phenomenal —
an increase of over 200 per cent points for wheat and wheat flour
over the complaint period• For wheat flour this percentage gain
was consistent, whereas not so for wheat. The Panel were unable
to hold on the basis of these historical world trade figures that 
the share was inequitable but that it did warrant further investigation
18especially for wheat flour •
19The Panel then looked at the export unit value and at the import 
20unit value raising the point of price undercutting to assist in
the determination of an "equitable share” • On the export unit value
the Panel looked at France’s and other exporting nations f.o.b. and
c.i.f. figures. The French export unit value for wheat flour barely
exceeded their one for wheat. By contrast Australia, Canada and the
United States export unit value for wheat flour exceeded their export
21unit value for wheat by 40 per cent • For import unit values the 
Panel also found that France had been undercutting exporters in
15* see Table 1 of the Panels Report supra p49*
16.. ibid.
17* ibid.
18. supra p53 paragraph 18.
19« supra paragraph 18.
20. supra paragraph 7*
21. supra paragraph 18.
Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia « - I have mentioned
earlier, the concept of price undercutting came from the Havana
Charter and the 1954/55 Review Session. The concept was initially
23proposed in the United States Suggested Charter "but was amended 
at the London Conference for non-primary goods as outlined in
O A
Article 26 of the Havana, Charter • A similar concept was proposed
at the London Conference for inclusion in the domestic stabilization 
2S
scheme exemption . This was carried into the Notes of Interpretation
26of the General Agreement at the 1954/55 Review Session » Although
the concept of price undercutting in the Notes is not as clear or
precise as Article 26 of the Havana Charter and Article XVI: 4
of the General Agreement, when considered with the understanding
that "satisfaction of world requirements of the commodity concerned
?7
^should be^ in the most effective and economic manner" , such use by 
the Panel is justifiable. It is further justifiable for the Panel 
©*v the principles»of economic liberalism which were outlined 
in the Preamble of the General Agreement. One last point about
the use of price undercutting - it was proposed by Prance at the 
Working Party for the 1954/55 Review Session for inclusion into 
Article XVT^.
The last consideration of the Panel to determine the causation
question wa,s that of "special factors". Here the Panel considered
29the effect of the International Wheat Council which was an inter­
governmental commodity agreement. What weighting would have resulted
22. supra paragraph 7*
23* see Chapter 1 Section B page 14.
24* see Chapter 1 Section c page 19.
25* see Chapter 1 Section c page T8 .
26. see GATT Article XVI Ad.
27* see Chapter 2 Section D page' 55.
28. See Chapter 2 Section D rage 52.
29. supra note 1 p53 paragraph 1b.
from France belonging to this commodity agreement? In the Havana
Charter much importance was given to commodity agreements for
achieving agricultural liberalization. Although these provisions
were not carried over into the General Agreement it still was a
satisfactory method to achieve agricultural liberalization. Article
XVI: 3 was never intended to be the only pillar •» ■ lead to
agricultural liberalization _ • r '
in the General Agreement. The Working Party of the 1954/55 Review
Session ^ ~ si^bt should not be lost of satisfying world requirements^
which impliedly must refer to commodity agreements. ' : Australia
So
belonged to the International Wheat Agreementsthe balancing
of-fK&\r y & i r .' be equal. Although the discussion of the International
Wheat Council is at a minimum the Panel did note that France*s
position as a traditional producer was not reflected in their export
31quota’s of the commodity agreement • Presumably this led the 
Panel to consider the French claim that it was entitled to increase 
its world export share reasonably but by how much? This was answered 
by the world trade figures as discussed above.
The Panel concluded that the "subsidy arrangements have contributed
32to a large extent to the increase in French exports1’^  and accordingly
found it was more than equitable. The Panel later on went to say
that "there was no inherent guarantee in the [FrenchJ system that
it would operate in such a manner as to conform to the limits
33contemplated in Article XVI:3" • Is this latter finding
30. see Chapter 2 Section D page 55*
31. supra note 1 p53 paragraph 16.
32. supra page 53 paragraph 19*
33• supra page 56 paragraph 25•
what I think it might, that is, the type of domestic stabilization 
scheme utilized by France will always be marginal in terms of 
compliance with Article XVI:3<- arid these types of schemes will 
inevitably have to be the subject of consultation by the Contracting 
Parties. If soothe Panel is in terms of the debate on agricultural 
liberalization ’ stating preference for "developing the full use of 
resources'’*^ and agreeing that the purpose should be ' stabilising 
markets rather than returns to producers. This would make more 
sense when one compares the situation of Article XVI to industrial 
goods and the initial aim of the promoters for economic liberalization 
to affect all international trade.
What is interesting about the finding of an inequitable share is
the methodology of the Panel. The Panel, takes the point which I 
35mentioned earlier and asks the crucial question of what happens 
in the absence of the subsidy. With regards to the historical world 
export shares it cannot answer the question* ' • ■
1 Those figures only record what has occurred.
Since world trade figures can be influenced by so many factors, for 
example, weather conditions, they are also unreliable. One methodology 
to answer the question is to see if price undercutting has occurred.
If so then without the subsidy those export unit values could not 
have competed with non-subsidizing Contracting Parties.
34. Preamble of GATT BISIP.
35* see Chapter 2 Section C p46 and Section D-page 34«
The Panel then moved on to illustrate its finding with reference
to individual markets. The particular market being South-east
Asia. Australia complained that the exports of Prance had displaced
its normal exports to markets in South-east Asia, especially
Ceylon, Malaya (including Singapore) and Indonesia. Fiance argued
that Australia’s deteriorating position was due to her inability
to supply wheat flour to the market due to consecutive shortage of 
36crops • The Panel agreed that Australia could not have maintained
her combined exports of wheat and wheat flour at normal levels in
1957-58 however Australia would have maintained her traditional
37supplies of wheat flour, despite those failures . French exports 
of wheat flour to the three South-east Asian countries rose 
substantially from 13 per cent in 1953-54 to 34 per cent in 
1957-58. Australia’s exports to these markets during this period 
declined substantially from 64 per cent to 50 per cent respectively. 
Further French supplies as a percentage of total imports of wheat 
flour accounted only for 0.7 per cent in 1954 and 46 percent in 
the first half of 1958. The share of Australian supplies, on the 
other hand, fell from 83 per cent in 1954 to 37 per cent in the 
first half of 1958. The Panel considered the individual market 
share movements a disequilibrium of the South-east Asia wheat flour 
market in total•
70
The French delegate later complained that too much emphasis was
placed on the regional markets to the neglect of the world market.
36. supra page 54 papa 22.
37* supra page 55 para 23(d).
38. GATT 7th Suppl• BISID p22 (1959).
The French stance here is completely at odds with its statement 
in the Review Session of 1954/55^* Panel in dealing with
individual ^regional markets showed it was prepared to deal with 
the concern voiced by primary producing countries at that 1954/55  
Review Session. Although it was not prepared to conduct its 
enquiry by equating world market with individual market it was 
prepared to substantiates its conclusion with reference to individual 
or regional markets. This reflects the negotiationsof Article XVI:3.
The final recommendation only affected the South-east Asia market 
where both parties eventually concluded a bilateral agreement on 
that market. After all>the amounts of French exports were 
insignificant so the Panel recommendation would not be perceivable 
on world export trade. The Panel did not achieve a reduction in 
France’s world export share but just a reallocation of the South-east 
Asia to preserve the status quo. Be that as it may,the Panel’s 
methodology is . v .-i the clearest o f ' q ]( . >
The Panel address the issues clearly, succinctly applies the norm of 
Article XVI:3 (which it regards as legally binding on the Contracting 
Parties) and does not fuzz the conclusion -fvo^ j+s c\rye\ luj-Suf ,
G. United States Tobacco Complaint by Malawi
The next complaint was between Malawi and the United States^. A
39 • see Chapter 2 Section B p 52 where the French delegate argues 
that the enquiry into "world trade" should be construed as 
individual markets as well.
40. GATT 15th Suppl. BISID p1l6 (19^7) United States Subsidy on 
Unmanufactures Tobacco.
Working Party was established to conduct consultations about an 
export subsidy introduced by the United States on unmanufactures 
tobacco. Since the Working Party's mandate was only consultation 
it could not make any definitive recommendations but the argument 
concerning equitable shares are worthwhile discussing.
Malawi stated that it was difficult to define the concept of 
equitability but the concept certainly did not refer to the 
maintenance by the subsidizing country of a predetermined share 
of a growing world market. Malawi noted that the Interpretative 
Note^ from the Review Session of 1954/55 allowed for entry of 
newcomers and so there were grounds for maintaining that an 
"equitable" share could vary. The United States exports ...' -
had proportionately! declined against total world trade yet its* 
volume had increased. Other Working Party members made
general comments on paragraph 3 of Article XVT without relating 
it to the complaint. It was emphasised that the pattern of supply 
to world markets could not particularly, in the spirit of GATT, 
be regarded as static and should allow for changes in relative 
competitive positions. The basis of this argument is rooted in 
economic liberalism. That meant world trade is supposed to be 
dynamic. The United States argued that it was not going to accept 
the erosion of its share. So here we have an admission that although 
the United States preaches economic liberalism (free trade and free 
enterprise) to all y . . when the chips are down with respect
to agriculture it is not going to allow such principles affect their
41. GATT Ad. Art. XVI.
f  <LC-\ 5 p a o  (o l-C
ability to have a^share in world trade c "V ■' ? ' >
. -o Such a statement is the product of the
underlying economic problem: that domestic agriculture policies 
have been given special treatment since the 1930*s depression.
Until the problem of how agricultural trade is going to occur in 
the future, i.e., the principles which should govern the meeting 
of supply and demand, governments will not respond to rules like 
Article XVI: 3. Article XVI:3 U s W s u / i S i  be. A
of binding Contracting Parties does not mean that it will
have no value at all.
' • - . / . ' - ‘ - •
■ , Article XVI: 3 value may . . , be
hortatory, S 0* it is entitled to a commitments of some form. The 
1954/55 Review Session gave commitments to Malawi as a developing 
country and a newcomer to agricultural trade that the phrase "equitable 
share" would be dynamic. The United States here refused to accept 
such a commitment. Why?
The market for unmanufactured tobacco was stagnant. The United 
States claimed it initially carried the burden for maintaining an 
equilibrium between supply and demand. ! . The United States 
claimed whilst it was doing such, other countries were expanding 
production. Although the United States did not claim that other 
countries were using export subsidies, it must be implied because 
if so, the United States would claim pursuant to the Working 
Party of the 1954/55 Review Session Point B it was able to use
the same practice to counter balance the practice used by others. 
The problem for the United States was that the complaint by 
Malawi was pursuant to Article XXXVTI:3(c) of Part IV of GATT. 
Article XXXVTI:3(c) required the United States to have due 
regard to the interests of Malawi, as a developing nation. The 
United States by using the argument that it could not determine 
the extent of its obligation therefore avoided any obligation to 
Malawi.
The Working Party Report confirmed a fear aroused at the Havana 
Charter negotiations. The fear was industrialized countries in 
a trade war situation will subsidize their exports and since 
they could afford the cost the advantage would be with them. 
Developing countries did not have the resources to compete with 
those industrialized countries.MifaoHt'the safeguards of the 
Havana Charter and the lack of an institutional , . process
li ryv £C< v \S
in the General Agreements reliance can only be placed on the 
Contracting Parties not to utilize unfair trade practices. 
Chapters 5 and 6 discusses whether this reliance was sustainable 
or a total breakdown of the General Agreement for agriculture 
haS* occurred.
D • Summary
The reason I have included the GATT Panel Report and GATT Working 
Party Report is because they reflect the international commitment 
to agricultural liberalization* The reflection is one of see-sawing 
movements* The French Assistance to Wheat and Wheat Flour Exports 
case^ was a high-tide mark for the application of the obligation 
of Article XVI:3* The complaint enquiry was extremely comprehensive 
in discussing the actual words of Article XVI:3 and all past 
negotiations on export subsidies* The Panel was also consistent in 
terms of applying the interpretation of the phrases to the actual 
events* Thus the obligation did obtain a result. The type of 
support for the norm of Article XVT: 3 by both Contracting. Parties 
indicates that the result is diplomatic compromise. The Panel 
applied the measure and found the French system not consistent with 
it. The result was not one of achieving a liberalisation of trade 
in wheat and wheat flour internationally but a carving up between 
both Contracting Parties of a particular region. A few years later 
the United States Unmanufactured Tobacco Working Party Report^ 
reflected the low-tide mark _ on the possible
application of Article XVI:3* The low-tide mark was because the 
United States was not prepared toHiOfotfthe norm of Article XVI: 3 j
.    ... v j enter into diplomatic compromises or abide the logical
consequences of arguments based on the principles of economic
42. supra note 5*
43f supra note 40.
liberalism. The low-tide mark is a serious development against
‘ liberalization of international agricultural 
trade. What the ’Working Party Report indicated was that the
pillar ... , W . . may not sustain global wealth for
primary producing nations. My discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 
assumes a greater significance, for if this trend I perceive is 
correct, then will international agricultural trade be again 
protectionist like with the government intervention in the 1930fs*
CHAPTER 4 
An Opportunity for GATT to act again
Although the discussion of the Tokyo Round is in chronological
order of the complete "law” on subsidies the reasoning for this
is different. To discuss the sugar subsidy debate a slight
problem arose in the Complaint by Brazil against the European
Economic Community on exports of sugar subsidies^• Although the
complaint to GATT was filed under Article XVI: 3 by the time the
Panel were ready to proceed the results of the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations were clear. Therefore the
Contracting Parties agreed to accept the results of the Tokyo
2
Round as it affected Article XVI:3 • The Panel Report on the
3
Brazil Complaint proceeded on the result of the Tokyo Round! 
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VT, XVI 
and XXIII (Code on Subsidies)^. Thus the reason for the 
chronological order so that "law11 on subsidies is clear for my 
discussion on the sugar subsidy debate, in Chapters 5 and 6.
A. The Reason for Movement on Article XVT: 5
As the title to the Chapter suggests GATT Contracting Parties 
were again motivated to move on Article XVI:3* GATT on many- >
1• European Economic Community - Refunds on Exports of Sugar - 
Complaint by Brazil. GATT 27th Suppl. BISED p69 (1980).
2. supra p88 paragraph 4*7
3. ibid.
4. GATT 26th Suppl. 3ISID p56 (1979).
occasions the 1954/55 Review Session^ had reconsidered the
agricultural provision but no action occurred. Mbf w f U  fl\e. 1^7° Js. 
d»cfH)e, Contracting Parties expressed a willingness to take "action" 
was at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: why?
One of the reasons for this action can be attributed to the United
States. The United States had gained an advantage in mass
produced cereals which it successfully traded internationally.
extent of the United States success in cereal production is
shown by soya beans. American exports of soya beans to the
European Economic Community from i960 to 1970 rose by 50 pei1 cent^,
7
between 1974 to 1982 those exports rose by a further 65 per cent .
In absolute quantities from i960 to 1982 soya bean imports from 
the United States to the European Economic Community rose from
q
6 million tonnes to 19 million tonnes respectively • What made
the United States join major primary producing nations and
developing countries in a call for enlarged agricultural access
was the realization that the European-Economic Community Common
Agricultural Policy would lead to self sufficiency in cereals 'fo*' T-hreJf.
The United States only had to glance over its shoulder to the
sugar subsidy dispute, as discussed later in Chapters 5 and 6, to
see the effect of such policy. The Common Agricultural Policy
would undermine the secure export market of the United States and
5* see Haberler Report: GATT. Trends in International Trade (1958/
59). GATT 7th Suppl BISID p28 (1959) 5 8th SupjU. BIS ID p121 (i960); 
9th Suppl BISID pp110, 185, 189 (1961); 10th Suppl BISID pp135,
201 (1962). GATT The Kennedy Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations L/2813 and L/2814 (1967)•
6. N. Butler "The Plough Share War Between Europe and America"
Foreign Affairs 1983 p110.
7* J* Marsh, C. Mackel and B. Revell "The Common Agricultural Policy" 
Third World Quarterly 1984 p131 at page 143*
8. ibid.
create surplus in the world markets for cereals. I think you can 
draw the opinion that the impetus from the United States was 
motivated by domestic concerns. That did not represent any change 
of position by the United States as seen in Chapter 1, but it did 
represent a significant weight to the call for trade in agriculture 
to be liberalized.
B. The Tokyo Declarations and the Proposals for Article XVI:5.
In the period between the 1954/55 Review Session and the start 
of the Tokyo Round a significant shift had occurred in the weight 
of the major economic powers. The European Economic Community Nad 
grown to be the world's largest trading entity, while Japan was 
close behind. As a result the United States no longer held a 
dominant position in international trade. These three would now 
have to agree on the direction, pace and content of trade 
liberalization in agriculture.
The United States proposed in the preparatory negotiations that 
there should be no distinction between primary commodities and 
non-primary commodities in export subsidies and these 
negotiations should lead to the liberalisation of agricultural 
trade by increased access to foreign markets for efficient 
producers • I think that the United States could not have realistic­
ally hoped that this proposal would be the basis for the
9. GATT The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Report 
by the Director General of GATT. Volume 1 p19 (1979) •
negotations at the Tokyo Round, Since it still retained the
10benefit of the waiver from GATT for agricultural commodities
the proposal lacked creditability. The extent of domestic
legislation in the United States which had the protection of
the waiver included support measures for milk, wool, wheat,
11maize, soya bean, rice, sugar, cotton and peanuts (all being
temperate products in wM:ch.major primary producers had a vital
concern with)• If the United States was interested in the
liberalisation of agricultural trade by increased access to
foreign markets for efficient producers why did it not propose to
drop the waiver? Then their proposals would have received
creditability. Undoubtedly the United States aim was to ensure its
existing agreements with the Communities on access for its products,
12especially for soya beans, was safe • As to export subsidies it 
had to bring change to the provisions to ensure the output trends 
of the Communities primary product sector did not threaten their 
export markets. No longer could the United States export markets 
be taken for granted.
The Communities position was that the "objectives of the agricultural
negotiations should be the expansion of trade in stable world
markets, in accordance with existing agricultural policies by
13means of appropriate international agreements" , With regards to 
existing "agricultural policies1’ this implied that the Communities
10, see Chapter 2 Section A pages 3 and 4*
11, European Economic Communities Commission, Memo No, 138, "EEC 
and the U.S. views of the CAP: Myth and Reality" page 1 (1982),
12. supra note 6 pages 110 - 112.
13. supra note 9 p20.
Common Agricultural Policy was not negotiable. What was implied 
by "stable world markets" in terms of international agreements 
was a "form of managed markets, which included international 
agreement on prices, stock piling procedures, phasing of exports, 
consultation and so on"^. To achieve this the Communities argued 
that agriculture should be dealt with separately by GATT. In an 
essence the Communities approach mirrored its own internal policies - 
of government intervention to ensure security of supply and price 
stability for its producers. This approach was more concerned 
with stabilizing returns to the producer than attempting to stabilize 
the market and achieve a basis on which trade in agriculture 
could lead to global prosperity. It is a continuation of the 
classic debate from the 1954/55 Review Session of how much 
government intervention should be permitted in global economic 
affairs. The Communities approach involved extensive government 
intervention, whereas the primary produce exporters( attempting 
to achieve development "of full use of resources" ) favoured no 
intervention. There was no way the Communities were going to allow 
a substantial revision of the rules on export subsidies. The 
Communities were prepared to be interested in intergovernmental 
commodity agreement only because it involved the diplomatic process 
of compromise. This time the United States had an opponent of 
comparable size in the negotiations. Given that also most of the 
world utilized export subsidies as a tool of achieving national 
policy the proposals of the United States according to the Communities 
were a non seouitur.
14. supra note 9 p20.
15. GATT Preamble.
The Tokyo Declaration of 1973 represented a trade off for
agriculture. To get the trade off the United States had to agree
to restructure the scope of its unilateral action under its
17countervailing duty law • The Communities compromised to have
18negotiations on the review of export subsidies • The Declaration
also made provision for negotiations in agriculture to take account
19of the special characteristics and problems of the sector •
The substantive negotiations on Article XVI:3 did not begin until
1978 because the United States and the European Communities could
not agree’ over the extent of the review for export subsidies.
Further compromise resulted, particularly from the United States.
The concession which concerns us is that the United States eventually
agreed the review 1 of export subsidies limited to building
upon the existing rules. The impetus was again lost to achieve
liberalisation of agricultural trade uer se, ' ;  the rhetorical
20calls 'uvc • The negotiating balance had’ swung entirely
against the United States. Intervention was already accommodated 
in Article XVI: 3 and it was there to stay.
16. supra note 9 p185 Annex B.
17. R.R. Rivers and J.D. Greenwald "The Negotiation of a code on 
subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental 
Policy Differences" Law and Policy in International Business 
P1453 (1979).
18. supra note 9 at p186.
19* supra p186.
20. GATT did act on two primary commodities: Dairy Products and 
Bovine Meats in which international agreements were concluded.
The juxtaposition between liberalisation and stabilization 
continued and they only provided a basis for continual consultation 
between exporters and importers: see supra note 9 page 143-146. 
Negotiations did start on an agreement on grain but with the 
work by UNCTAD in the International Wheat Council, the 
negotiations came to a conclusion: supra p25-26.
The United States negotiators considered that their task was
now to make Article XVI:3 more effective and applicable. ; d .0
The approach decided upon was to bring further clarification
and precision to phrases in Article XVI:3* This approach was
at odds with what I concluded as a hope to achieve liberalization.
21I concluded that it must have oeen the intention of the drafters
of Article XVT: 3 at the 1954/55 Review to leave the phrases
imprecise and subjective. Since Article XVT: 3 did not require
political backing, it gave opportunity for consultation and
dispute settlement procedures to advance the cause. The French
22
Assistance to .vheat and Wheat Flour Exports case justified this 
Q j ? O P ' y e t  it could not be sustained^. It did not 
mean that the phrases were incapable of bttin Cyy* just that
unless they received support from the Contracting Parties they
f o r t only broad statements. I . . consider the^United States
the. o pp 1 J i'Kj o-nw
t ; \ could not progress'* ? any
further. ~"7h£4/approach to make Article XVI: 3 more effective was
a concentration on the phrases "more than an equitable share of
world export trade" and " a previous representative period"• Such
changes would not ensure that Communities exports would threaten
United States exports.
The United States initially suggested that an inequitable share of
21. see Chapter 2 Section F .pages 64-67*
22. see my discussion in Chapter 3 Section B pages 69 to 76.
23* see my discussion on the United States Unmanufactured Tobacco 
case in Chapter 3 Section C page 80 and my latter discussion 
on the Australia Complaint against the European Economic 
Communities Chapter 6.
the world market for primary commodity would "exist whenever a
country increased its share of any natural market for such a
2 A
commodity" . In other words it is saying that any increase in
a country's share would he unfair. This is a prohibition on
export subsidies and of course was totally rejected by the
Contracting Parties not only because intervention was now already
acceptable but also since it froze the world market share and did
not allow it to be dynamic. It has also been suggested that this
proposal would be impossible to regulate because of the difficulty
25
in obtaining precision in world figures of sales .
The United States proposals on price cutting and displacement
followed '• the French Assistance ’//heat and Wheat Flour Export 
26Case • Naively the United States thought both concepts were 
demonstratable because their own producers had utili ed the 
concepts in the drafting of complaints to GATT on wheat exports. 
These proposals were of course negotiableto
tco ( jp r r t r * .  v  j-'l'-C £ \cA (/ I ^  <2-
u/'the,✓ cA \q«v\ a c V
24* supra note 17 p1477*
25* supra p1478.
26. GATT 7th Suppl ‘BISID (1958) p46.
27
C. The Code on Subsidies
28The Code on Subsidies is only binding on signatories • Article 10:1 
of the Code on Subsidies reproduces Article XVI:3 in a condensed 
form retaining the "more than equitable share of world export 
trade". Article 10:2 is an attempt to give more precision to some 
of the terms of Article XVI:3 by stating that:
2. For the purposes of Article XVI:3 of the General Agreement ...
(a) "more than equitable share of world export trade" shall 
include any case in which the effect of an export subsidy 
granted by a signatory is to displace the exports of another 
signatory bearing in mind the developments on the world markets.
(b) With regard to new markets traditional patterns of supply 
of the product concerned to the world market, region or 
country, in which the new market situated shall be taken 
into account in determining "equitable share of world export 
trade".
(c) A "previous representative period" shall normally be 
the three most recent calendar years below those of other 
suppliers to the same market.
In addition Article 10:3 atates that:
3* Signatories further agree not to grant export subsidies on
27* supra note 4»
28. As at the 31st December 1982 out of 51 Contracting Parties to
GATT only 15 have accepted unconditionally the Code on Subsidies, 
a further 2 have accepted it conditionally.
exports of certain primary products to a particular market in 
a manner which results in prices materially below those to 
other suppliers on the same market.
The first thing about Article 10, as already mentioned in this
chapter, is that it merely adopts the concepts of "market displacement"
and "price undercutting" from the French Assistance to Wheat and
29
Wheat Flour Exports case • Although the concept of "displacement"
is adopted, the Code on Subsidies has changed the methodology of its
enquiry. The French Assistance case^ used individual markets to
illustrate its finding that an inequitable share had risen, ^his
approach was taken by the Panel to reflect the negotiations of
the 1954/55 Review Session^, So - the methodology
prior to Article 10 was that the determination had occurred before
individual markets were discussed. Article 10:2 changes this
methodology* ; J he concept of individual markets is
promoted into the determination ; nauiry. No longer can individual
markets illustrate a finding, it is now a factor for inclusion
in the decision making process. This was the position of the
major primary producers in the 1954/55 Review Session^ which the
33United States successfully opposed . Otherwise no changes 
occurred to the phrase from Article XVI:3•
*
If I am correct, and this is the only substantial change from 
Article XVI: 3 how could it be justified to primary product nations
29* supra note 26,
30. see my earlier discussion in Chapter 3 Section B p 76,
31. ibid
32. see Chapter 2 Section I) p 53 Chapter 3 Section B p 76
33. ibid ' '
in order to secure their ratification of the Code on Subsidies.
The change for Article XVI:3 must have been more subtle. 
only subtlety which secured their ratification is that the purpose 
of Article 10 was adveftaced towards one of stabilizing world markets 
rather than stabilizing the returns to national producers. As 
discussed earlier, Article XVI:3 was not clear about its purpose.
The concepts of displacement and price undercutting progress the 
aim of ”developing the full use of resources” to stabilize world 
markets rather than return to producers. If I am correct then 
the aim of Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies should be apparent 
in the discussion on the sugar subsidy debate.
The other change to Article XVI:3, to make it more effective,
resulted in provisions on consultation, conciliation and dispute
34settlement being detailed in the Code on Subsidies . These Articles 
in the Code on Subsidies are supposed to result in the timely 
resolution of a dispute and to bring to a halt the prejudice or 
impairment to the economies of Contracting Parties.
D. The summary
Not surprisingly the Tokyo Round neither assisted the call for 
liberalization of trade in primary products nor made the provisions 
dealing with export subsidies on primary products any more effective*
34* supra note 4 Articles 12, 13» 17 and 18.
Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies only hints, very subtlety, 
that the aim for trade in agriculture should be upon the basis 
of stabilizing world markets rather than to maintain incomes for 
farmers. The change of direction for the aim of Article 10 was 
not expressly stated. Thus the provisions of Article 10 still 
contains "grey” areas. Only the methodology of the dispute 
settlement and the apparatus for consultation and dispute settlement 
received any support at the negotiations, probably because it involved 
no political backing and preserved the status quo - as in the 1954/55 
Review Session. Article XVI:3 relies heavily on the manner in which 
Contracting Parties perceive their obligation. I now move to the 
discussion of the two panel cases which is of greater significance 
for the aspiration of primary producer nations.
CHAPTER 5
The Sugar Subsidy Rebate - Round One
A. Initial Comments
In this discussion I consider the question of GATT’s effectiveness 
in liberalizing trade in the primary commodity of sugar. Sugar 
is of interest because it easily shows the conflict between 
government intervention and economic liberalism. That conflict 
results in restrictions on trade and I hope to show that there 
exists a direct link between such restrictions, export subsidies 
and commodity surpluses. The link between export subsidies and 
commodity surpluses is made in this chapter. Chapter 6 will make 
the link between the commodity surplus and restrictions on trade. 
Before discussing the sugar subsidy dispute I shall outline briefly 
the features of the world market in sugar which put into perspective 
the discussion. These features shall be discussed in more depth 
during this chapter.
One feature is the manner in which sugar is traded internationally.
One method includes preferential arrangements. In the 1960*s these
preferential arrangements included more than 50 per cent of the
1
total world exports in sugar • The prominent arrangements in the
1. GATT Committee II Report on the Programme for Expansion of 
International Trade and Agricultural Protection - Sugar. 10th 
Suppl. 3ISID pages 162 - 163 para. 1 (L/1461).
1960fs included the United States Sugar Act, the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement and the bilateral arrangements between Cuba and the Soviet 
Union and the Comecon Countries. By the late 1970s and €^^1980*s 
those sales in the preferential market (tied sales) had reduced as 
a proportion to 20-30 per cent of total world exports. The sales of 
sugar not under preferential arrangements occurred in CV residual 
market (called the "world free market"). These two markets
. account for all sugar traded internationally. The remaining 
prominent tied sales Si*c <l the late 1970's are between Cuba and the 
Soviet Union and the Comecon countries, and between the Communities 
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the 
Lome convention. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement expired around 
1974 with the entry of the United Kingdom into the Communities.
The ACP countries under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement retained 
their preferential sales- with the exception of Australia, thus 
making the impact of the Lome convention minimal. V/ith the advent 
of the International Sugar Agreement the United States allowed its 
quota system under their Sugar Act to lapse de facto. The other 
arrangement which affects international trade in sugar is the 
intergovernmental commodity agreement called the International 
Sugar Agreement. The International Sugar Agreement attempts to 
regulate returns to producers and security of supply. The International 
Sugar Agreement tries to regulate trade in the world free market 
but not all major exporters belong to this commodity arrangement.
The major exporter not belonging is the Communities. In 1973
the 57 per cent of total world sugar traded on the world free market
2
15 per cent was accounted for by the Communities . By 1981/82 it
was estimated that the Communities would account for around J O  per
3
cent of all sales on the world free market •
Another feature is the nature in which sugar is sold. Sugar is
produced in three forms - cane, sugar beet and hi^i fructose maize
syrup. High fructose maize syrup is the produce of developed
countries and although is restricted by production quotas in such
countries to protect domestic cane sugar and sugar beet producers
it does affect exporters^. High rf/uctose maize syrup is an alternative
sweetener and does not affect my discussion of cane sugar and sugar
beet. The production of cane sugar is mainly in developing countries,
particularly the Batin America, Caribbean, Indian and the South
Pacific. However it is also the product of two developed countries -
Australia and the United States. The production of sugar beet is
the crop of the developed countries of Continental Europe.
sugar (s a product consumed *0 developed countries an
inevitable clash has occurred between these two types of producers.
The clash c.otite./i'vs the degree of intervention by governments to
protect the producers. This has occurred continuously since the
1930fs. As I mentioned earlier the clash is about economic
5liberalism versus protectionism . Sugar beet is considered a high
2. J.E. Nagle. Agricultural Trade Policies (1976) P*I03«
3. GATT. European Communities - Refunds on Sugar Exports - 
Communication by Australia, 12 September 1981 (L/5185).
4. I* Smith "Prospects for a New International Sugar Agreement" 
Journal World Trade Law, 1983 P308 at p310.
5. see my discussion particularly in Chapter 1 Section A pages 
11-12, Chapter 2 Section E and Chapter 4 Section A which address 
this point»
cost crop and required subsidies for production and export unlike
cane sugar • The problem is that cane sugar is not an annual
crop and . cannot meet immediately shortfalls in
7
production .
My last feature of world trade in sugar is the production and
consumption patterns* Historically consumption has kept pace
8with increases in production • Consumption rapidly increased in 
developing countries around the early 1970’s such that by 1973/74
9
there was a shortfall in production . As a result of this shortfall 
developed countries increased their production, as they were able 
to meet this shortfall immediately by increased sugar beet production. 
By 1975 consumption had lewilecf.oj^  or declined but production was s h M  
increasing. This very brief description of production and 
consumption figures leads me into the Panel cases, as a result of 
surpluses generated by the agricultural policies of the Communities 
a clash occurred about these policies within the context of GATT 
which was supposed to accommodate trade in agriculture on the 
principles of economic liberalism.
6. see the discussion on the United Kingdoms policy of importing 
sugar by S. Harris and I. Smith ’’World Sugar Markets in a State 
of Flux1’ Trade Policy Research Centre (1973) p80.
7* ibid.
8. From 1950 to 1970 only 19&3 w&s the exception to the rule when 
a shortage of sugar occurred: supra note 1 page 164 para. 5*
9* supra note 2 page 99•
10 11B. The Complaint by Australia and Brazil
Australia1s main complaint about the European Economic Communities
(Communities) export subsidies fdr sugar was that the system
resulted in the Communities having more than an equitable share of
12world export trade, which was based on Article XVI:3 •
Brazil’s complaint against the Communities was similar to Australia,
13that is, under Article XV1:3 • However Brazil also complained
in detailed terms that the effect of the subsidy measure had
resulted in serious prejudice: reduced sales opportunities and
diminished export earnings. 3razil as a developing country claimed
generally that the Communities had not carried out their obligations
under Fart IV of GATT. As I mentioned earlier, Brazil in the Panel
hearing altered the basis of its complaint to be pursuant to Article
1014 of the Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII (Code on Subsidies)^. This does not
make a difference to my discussion because as I have noted earlier
there was very little change in the substance of Ajjticle XVI:3 of
16the General Agreement and Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies
10. European Communities - Refund on Sugar - Complaint by Australia. 
GATT"26th Suppl. BISIB page 290 (1979)-
11. European Communities - Refund on Sugar - Complaint by Brazil. 
GATT*27th Suppl. BISIB page 69 (1980).
12. Supra note 10 p291 para. 2.1
13. supra note 11 p70 para. 2.2
14. supra p88 para. 4*7
15. GATT 26th Suppl. 3ISIB P56 (1979)
16. see my earlier discussion in Chapter 4 Section C p90-92.
C• The Domestic Stabilization Scheme
The Communities in accordance with the Common Agricultural Policy
17
ran a system of support for susgar. The objectives of this support
system were to guarantee employment, a reasonable standard of living
for the Communities growers and security of supplies for the entire 
18Community • The objectives of this policy do not represent any
departure from national, policies of countries in respect of
agriculture „ the 1930* s as I . mentioned
19earlier • To achieve these objectives the Communities reserves 
the domestic market for its producers by imposing a levy on sugar 
which crosses the external frontiers and set a relatively high 
internal price for sugar^.
In order to regulate production the Communities operates^a quota 
system for each member country. The. quotas are supposed to 
operate as Inhibitors of production to ensure a burdensome surplus 
did,; not accumulate. As will be shown the system does not provide 
a quota on production but rather operates a sliding scale of price 
inhibitors on production over and above domestic requirements. This 
means that surpluses readily accumulate. The Communities to ensure
17* The System was established by Regulation (EEC) No. 1009/67 
which came into force on the 1st July 1968. The Regulation 
has been amended on various occasions but it has not altered 
the structure of the system.
18. supra note 10 page 301 para. 3*3 a^d supra note 11 page 81
para. 3.3
19* To confirm this point of view see my discussion in Chapter 1
Section A pages 1 - 1 2  where these policies were outlined.
20. supra note 18 ibid
domestic self sufficiency is met a basic quota (Quota A) which 
guarantee® a price and market for that production. Quota A is 
100 per cent of the Communities estimated total consumption. 
Production in excess of Quota A is also guaranteed up to a certain 
point (originally 135 per cent of Quota A), and this is known as 
Quota B. Quota B is guaranteed a market and price - although a 
lower price than Quota A. Production in excess of these two quotas 
is known as Quota C sugar and . hcv.£. to be sold outside the 
Communities at the growers'own risk (unless the Communities suffer 
a shortage).^
The second part of the system which supposedly regulates over-
burdensome surpluses is one of prices. The price system is made
of three components: (i) a target price for white sugar, (ii) an
intervention price, and (iii) a threshold price which sets the
minimum import levies for imported sugar. The target price is
determined by the Community region having the lowest price. From
the target price the intervention price is set to guarantee a
market for Quota A and Quota 3 production (_th t.5 is lower than the
target pric^. The threshold price is also derived from the target
price but includes the domestic transport charges for the area of
the greatest surplus (Northers France) to the most distant deficit
22area (Southern Italy) • An example of the pricing mechanism is 
in 1972/73 Communities target price was 245*5 "units of account'
21. This system is described more fully in the Panel Reports: supra 
note 10 pages 302-302 para. 3*7 to 3*10, and supra note 11 page 
82 para. 3*7 to 3*10.
22. ibid
23. A unit of account was equal to the United States dollar at a 
fixed price.
the intervention price was 233*4 units of account and the threshold
. 24
price was 276 units of account - all per ton of white sugar •
The world market price for that period was estimated around 69 units
25
of account per ton of white sugar . This is what I mean, when I
say the system is not one of production controls but is a scale
of price inhibitors on production over and above Quota A and Quota B.-
Production & f  . Quota A and Quota B can be subject to a production
levy to meet the cost of disposing of the excess domestic sugar
requirements onto the world market. It is this sugar which was the
basis of the complaint by Australia and Brazil. If the production
levy does not cover the difference between the intervention price
and the price prevailing on the world market, to dispose of it would
require an export subsidy* The question is where does this export
subsidy come from? It terms of the General Agreement provisions
26it can not come from central government funds •
Australia argued in 1978 s the London Daily price for white sugar
was United States $206 per tonne, the intervention price in
the Communities was above US$612 per tonne. If the production
27
levy in 1978 was 30 per cent of the intervention price then a
28subsidy equivalent to US$403-428 per tonne occurred • The
29
Communities exported with refunds in 1978 2,708,000 tonnes , so
24* S. Harris and I. Smith supra note 6 pages 61 and 62.
25. I* Smith "The European Community and the World Sugar Crisis"
Trade Policy Research Centre Staff Paper No. 7 p5 (1974)
26. see GATT Ad. Article XVI: 3 BISID volume IV p68,
27. It is reasonable to use this figure as it was mentioned in the 
complaint without a date of application: supra note 10 page 302 
para. 3*8
28. supra page 293 para. 2.7
29. supra page 3^7 Table 6.
the total subsidy involved was US$ 1,126 million. Australia argued 
that this total export subsidy was met by government funds.
The Panel considered the refunds in the system could not be the
30subject of budgetary limits , if the appropriations originally 
allocated to the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund proved 
insufficient, the Communities had recourse to a supplementary 
budget. Therefore the budget had no legal limits for refunds on
31
the export of sugar • Accordingly the system involved government
32
funds and^was within the obligation of Article XVI:3 . Australia 
and the Communities were in agreement with this finding^.
Brazil did not have to argue this point as the Communities were in
agreement that the system was subject to the obligation in Article 
34
XVI: 3 • The effects of the subsidy scheme are discussed later 
on.in this Chapter.
30. supra page 929 paragraph 2.7
31. supra page 3^9 paragraph 4*34
32. supra page 305 paragraph 4«3
33• supra page 306 paragraph 4*4
34* supra note 11 pages 86-87 paragraph 4»2 and 4«3
D. World Sx-port Trade - Is it the same as World Free Market?
The Panel were presented with an argument by Australia, that when
looking at the disposal of the surplus sugar generated by the
Communities support system, it should only consider the trade
35' in which that surplus was sold • ±n other words Australia
requested that "world export trade" should be read as "world free 
36market" • Australia based its argument upon the basis that whereas
it traded in both markets (the world free market and the tied sales
market) the Communities only traded in the world free market. Since
the world free market was accessible to both on the basis of
competition then it was appropriate to use that market. Another
general argument is that since this was the market that felt the
effects of the Communities system it was important that the measure
37of the obligation be against that market . I understand this 
argument did present a problem to the Panel although this is not
■ZO
reflected in their discussion or findings • There is merit in the 
argument and so I shall discuss it as some depth because it also 
goes to the general question of whether GATT can liberalise 
agricultural trade.
The Communities quite rightly argued that the words "world export 
trade" referred to world trade in a commodity and that meant the
39entire market not just a portion of it, even if it was a large part . 
35* supra note 10 page 297 paragraph 2.20
36. ibid
37. ibid
38. supra page 307 paragraph 4*9 
39* supra page 297 paragraph 2.21
I shall come back later to the balance of the Communities argument 
for this, I consider G* AiO-Lf j9eh'i)v
As I have mentioned before trade in sugar occurs in two markets. So 
what is the nature and extent of the "tied sales market"? The trade 
figures available to the Panel show the breakdown for both
bejwc*.vN. 4q
markets ' 4  the years 1969 and 1977 • 19&9 ^ ^Sthe first year
of operation of the Communities Common Sugar Policy. 1977 Ici*^ of  ^
O p ) t \ i b ^ \ represents a normal year of trade in sugar. In 1?69 °T
the 18.5 million tonnes of sugar traded internationally, 16.35
million tonnes entered the world free market. In 1977 of 28 million
tonnes of sugar traded,21.7 million tonnes entered the world free 
zL1
market • The tied sales market for 1969 and 1977 is 2.15 million
tonnes and 6.3 million tonnes respectively. Thus we see 75 ~ 88
per cent of sugar traded occurs on the world free market. This
does represent a change from 1950-60 where 50 per cent or over of
42
sugar traded occurred on the tied markets • This change accords
with reality \ in terms of tied sales tothe only remaining major
p r e f e r e n t i a l  s a l e  a g r e e m e n t  is b e t w e e n  C u b a  a n d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n
43and Comecon countries . In terms of the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement it ceased to have effect and Australia was excluded from 
the Dome Convention between the Communities and African, Caribbean 
and Pacific States. The United States around this period lifted 
its quota policy and bought directly from the world free market.
40. supra page 304 paragraph 3*18
41• ibid
42. Committee II 3rU Report on Programme for Expansion of International
Trade and Agricultural Protection. GATT 10 th Suppl. SIS ID pl63
paragraph 1•
43* !• Smith "Prospects for a New International Sugar Agreement". 
Journal of World Trade Law 1983 page 308 at p313*
Further the International Sugar Agreement still ceased to have 
effect "because of the rise in prices and the inability to balance 
supply and demand on the world free market.
Moving . it £  tied sales only occur: significantly
between Cuba and the Soviet Union and Comecon countries^
, _ . , , Trade figures from 1965-70 ^or markets
sales Gif' an average of 2,0 million tonnes per annum and for 1981-82
44- an average of 3*8 million tonnes per annum . If I assume for
1969 those sales amounted to 2.0 million tonnes and 1977 somewhere
around 3*0 million tonnes then that is the major share of world
tied sales, especially for 19&9v -'-n ^977 that markets tied sales
would represent around 50 per cent of all world tied sales. Being
conservative, if I presume that all of Australia’s sales to Group
AS
III in Table 4 of the Panel's Report were tied in 1969 it would 
amount to 0 ,96 million tonnes and in 1977 2,2 million tonnes of 
world tied sales. No account of the special arrangements under Lome 
Convention has been taken. I conclude that the tied sales market 
was dominated by the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union 
and Comecon countries, Australia's tied sales represented as a 
proportion of traded world sugar in 19&9 0*05 per cent and in 1977 
0.07 per cent.
The first point to be said about Australia's argument that world 
export trade statistics should be those of the world free market
44« ibid.
45* supra note 10 p3"11*
46, ibid.
concerns the Communites export subsidy programme. Since that 
support policy only occurs in the world free market then it is 
reasonable that it should be the basis for the statistics.
Australia's tied sales are a special factor, which is part of 
the weighing of the obligation, and are not relevant to the
statistics on world export market. The second point to be said
of the world export trade argument is that the enquiry is within 
the context of GATT. The Soviet Union and some Comecon countries 
are not Contracting Parties to the General Agreement. The 
Havana Charter had a provision which dealt with competition agains t 
non member using export subsidies - the General Agreement did
A *7 ~~
not carry over that provision * ' I he General Agreement
Preamble does state that the objectives in the field of trade are
to be entered into on a "reciprocal and mutually adventageous 
arrangement". Accordingly if the Soviet Union and Comecon countries 
are not prepared to enter into GATT upon that basis why should their 
tied sales, which represents the large percentage of that market, 
be allowed to diminish the share of Contracting Parties to GATT 
to the detriment of the complainant.
The Communities also argued that in reiferring to "world export trade"
it meant the entire market for sugar and not an individual market.
The Communities said support for this was found in the French
A8
Assistance to Wheat and Wheat Flour Exports case and the negotiations
47# see my discussion in Chapter 2 Section I) page 59-61 on Point B 
of the "Understanding" of the ’Working Party in regards to 
Article 26:4 of the Havana.Charter.
48. GATT BISID 7th Suppl. (1958) p46.
in the Havana Charter and the 1954/55 Review Session. With regards
to the Havana Charter there is no support for the Communities
49 / 50argument . The 1954/55 Review Session did discuss individual
markets hut that was in relation to displacement not world export
trade. Th:£ argument of displacement in individual countries and
the world export markets was carried over into the French Assistance
51to Wheat and Wheat Flour Exports case «
52The Panel rejected Australia’s argument and accepted the Communities 
argument; that world export trade meant the free market and the 
tied sales markets. The Panel referred to the 1954/55 Review 
Session and the French Assistance to Wheat and Wheat Flour Exports 
Case as supporting this finding. As I mentioned in the above 
paragraph there is no support for such a point. It was not foreseen 
that two markets could deal with the trade in a commodity and so 
no negotiations took place on the point. Since the definition of 
trade means the exchange of a commodity the Panel should have
examined the question of the extent and nature of both markets to
see the result. I consider a case was made out for the analysis of 
the world free market and do not think the Panel’s conclusion is
justified. In the rejection of this argument the possibility of
Australia showing of the Communities sugar
subsidies diminished..
53In the Brazilian complaint the question of what was to be the
49* see my earlier discussion Chapter 1 Section B page 13-18 and 
Section E pages 24-35*
50. see my discussion Chapter 2 Section D pages 52-54*
51* see my discussion Chapter 3 Section B pages 69—77•
52. supra note 10 page 307 para. 4*9
53* supra note 11 page 89•
" w o r l d  e x p o r t  t r a d e "  w a s  n o t  r a i s e d  C * » i t  h a d  b e e n  s e t t l e d
54-
i n  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  c o m p l a i n t  . T h e r e f o r e  w o r l d  e x p o r t  t r a d e  
i n c l u d e d  t h e  m a r k e t  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  f r e e  m a r k e t  a n d  t i e d  s a l e s ,  
B r a z i l ,  u n l i k e  A u s t r a l i a ,  o n l y  t r a d e d  o n  t h e  w o r l d  f r e e  m a r k e t  
f o r  t h e  c . m p l a i n t  p e r i o d ,  t h e r e f o r e  it c o m p e t e d  e v e n l y  w i t h  t h e  
C o m m u n i t i e s  in t h e  s a m e  m a r k e t .  B y  t h e  P a n e l  a d o p t i n g  i t s  p r i o r  
c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  d i d  n o t  s h o w  t h e  
r e a l  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  e x p o r t  s u b s i d y  p r o g r a m .  T h e  
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s h a r e  a s  a  r e s u l t  of  t h e i r  s y s t e m  
d i m i n i s h e d  a g a i n .
T h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h i s  l u m p i n g  t o g e t h e r  t w o  s e p a r a t e  m a r k e t s  ,* 
y i n  ray o p i n i o n ^ g o e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  a i m s  ftf t h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t .  T h e  
w o r l d  f r e e  m a r k e t  is v e r y  s u s c e p t a b l e  t o  e n o r m o u s  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
a n d  t h e r e f o r e  w a s  o f  l i t t l e  u s e  t o  e x p o r t e r s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s t a b l e  
r e n u m e r a t i v e  p r i c e s  o r  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  o r  to i m p o r t e r s  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  s e c u r i t y  of  s u p p l y ( t h i s  r e a d s  l i k e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  
C o m m u n i t i e s  C o m m o n  S u g a r  P o l i c y ) .  P o s s i b l y  t h e  w o r l d  f r e e  m a r k e t  
p r i c e s  h a d  n o  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  c o s t s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  
o n l y  r e g a r d e d  b y  e n t i t i e s  l i k e  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  a s  a  d u m p i n g  g r o u n d s  
f o r  -the. s u r p l u s < g e n e r a t e d  b y  i ts s y s t e m .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  r e s i d u a l
fa
n a t u r e  o f  it, t o  s o m e  e x p o r t e r s ,  m e a n t  ^ d i d  n o t  h a v e  a  l o t  g o i n g  
f o r  it. S o  t h i s  m a r k e t  is a t  o d d s  w i t h  t h e  a i m s  o f  e c o n o m i c  
l i b e r a l i s m .  B y  t h e  P a n e l  l u m p i n g  t o g e t h e r  b o t h  m a r k e t s  it c a n  b e  
s a i d  t h a t  i t  s u p p o r t s  t h e  t y p e  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n  a n d  i n s t a b i l i t y  w h i c h
5-4* s u p r a  n o t e  10.
t h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  is s u p p o s e d  t o  r u l e  a g a i n s t .  I f  t h e  P a n e l  h a d  
u s e d  t h e  w o r l d  f r e e  m a r k e t  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n ,  
it  w o u l d  h a v e  g i v e n  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  t o  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c e r  n a t i o n ,  l i k e  
A u s t r a l i a  a n d  B r a z i l ,  t h a t  i t  w a s  p r e p a r e d  t o  t a k e  o n  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  a  s y s t e m  g e n e r a t i n g  s u r p l u s e s  u p o n  a u t a r k i c  g r o u n d s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  " f u l l  u s e  o f  r e s o u r c e s " .  T h u s  it w o u l d  h a v e  e n c o u r a g e d  a  
m o v e m e n t  t o  a  s t a b l e  m a r k e t  s y s t e m .  T h i s  m a y  n o t  b e  t h e  t i e d  m a r k e t  
b u t  a  r e f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  f r e e  m a r k e t .
E .  T h e  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  P e r i o d
A u s t r a l i a  c o m p l a i n e d  a b o u t  t h e  e x p o r t s  of  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  b e t w e e n
1975 t o  1 9 7 8 ^  ( p r e l i m i n a r y  d a t a  o n l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  1 9 7 8 )  a n d
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  e n t i r e  p e r i o d  of 19&9 t o  1975 s h o u l d  b e  t h e
56
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d  • T h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s u g g e s t e d  c o m p a r i n g  t h e
a v e r a g e s  o f  1972-74 w i t h  t h a t  o f  1975-77 a n d  a r g u e d  a g a i n s t
" e s t i m a t e s  f o r  r e c e n t  p e r i o d s ,  f o r e c a s t s  o r  p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  f u t u r e
57
p e r i o d s  o f  w h a t e v e r  d u r a t i o n  m u s t  n o t  b e  u s e d "  • T h e  y e a r s  1 9 7 4 /  
1975 9 b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  v a g a r i e s  o f  s u g a r  t r a d i n g ,  w e r e  r e g a r d e d  w i t h
£T Q
s u s p i c i o n  b y  t h e  Panel. £0 \a j U z ,  d i s c o u n t e d  . T h e  P a n e l  t h e n  
t o o k  t h e  y e a r s  1971 t o  1 9 7 5  a n d  1972 t o  1 9 7 4  a s  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
p e r i o d .  T h e  P a n e l  d i d  n o t  u s e  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 & 9  1 °  197*1 a n d  n o
5 5* s u p r a  n o t e  1 0  p a g e  292 p a r a .  2 . 7
5 6 .  s u p r a  p a g e  2 9 8  p a r a s .  2 . 2 2  a n d  2.23
57• s u p r a  p a g e  2 9 8  p a r a s .  2.24 a n d  2.25
5 8 .  s u p r a  p a g e  307 -  3 8 p a r a .  4 * 1 0
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  w a s  o f f e r e d  f o r  t h e i r  e x c l u s i o n *  D i d  t h i s  m a k e  a  
d i f f e r e n c e ?
A u s t r a l i a  h a d  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  1 9 6 9  "1975
w a s  f i r s t l y  t h a t  1969 w a s  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e
C o m m o n  S u g a r  P o l i c y  a n d  1968 w a s  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n
o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S u g a r  A g r e e m e n t .  S e c o n d l y ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e
v o l i t i l e  n a t u r e  o f  s u g a r  i t  w a s  d e s i r a b l e  t o  a c h i e v e  a  t r u e
59
h i s t o r i c a l  p i c t u r e  b y  a  l o n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d  . I n  g e n e r a l  
t e r m s  t h e s e  a r g u e m e n t  s e e m  t o  b e  r e a s o n a b l e .  A  f u r t h e r  a r g u m e n t  
f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  1 9 6 9  is t h a t  it  w o u l d  s h o w  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  e x p o r t s  
w i t h o u t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  C o m m o n  S u g a r  P o l i c y .  1 9 7 0  s h o u l d  b e  
t h e  f i r s t  c r o p p i n g  y e a r  u n d e r  t h a t  p r o g r a m .  U n l e s s  1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 1  w e r e  
a b n o r m a l 0 ^  y e a r s  t h e r e  s e e m s  t o  b e  n o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  
e x c l u s i o n .  N o  s p e c i f i c  c a s e  w a s  m a d e  o u t  b y  A u s t r a l i a  f o r  t h i s  
p e r i o d .  I a m  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n i u  t h e  P a n e l  s t a r t i n g  ft»c, r e  p r e  s e n t a t  i v e  
p e r i o d  in  1971 itifcl £V\ ’ c o m p a r i s o n  o f  e x p o r t s  *
I f  t h e  t a s k  o f  t h e  P a n e l  is t o  m e a s u r e  t h e  e x p o r t s  s u b s i d y  a g a i n s t  
t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t h e n  1969 t o  1971 s h o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  u s e d  t o  g i v e  a  
b e t t e r  c o m p a r i s o n .
. , UAL!/\Ae4
B r a z i l s ' c o m p l a i n o  A  . t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  b e t w e e n
61
1 9 7 6  t o  1979 ( p r e l i m i n a r y  d a t a  o n l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  1979) a n d  s u g g e s t e d
5 9• s u p r a  p 2 9 8  p a r a .  2 . 2 2  T h e  l a t t e r  p o i n t  is s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  
F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  t o  W h e a t  a n d  W h e a t  F l o u r  I x p o r t s  c a s e  s u p r a  
n o t e  4 8  w h i c h  u s e d  t h e  p e r i o d s  1 9 3 4 - 3 8  a n d  1 9 4 8 - 5 8 .
60. w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  n o t .  S e e  S. H a r r i s  a n d  I. S m i t h .  S u p r a  n o t e  6 
P 5 4 - 5 5 *
61. s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  7 4  p a r a s .  2 . 1 2  a n d  2.13
t h a t  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d  h e  t h e  c o m p a r i s o n  b e t w e e n  1973-75 
82
a n d  1 9 7 6 - 7 8  • T h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  t w o  r e f e r e n c e
65
p e r i o d s  b e  1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 4  a n d  1 9 7 5 - 7 7  • T h e  P a n e l  d i d  n o t  a p p l y  A r t i c l e
1 0 : 2 ( c )  o f  t h e  C o d e  o n  S u b s i d i e s  l i t e r a l l y  a n d  t o o k  t h e  p e r i o d s
1971-73 a n <i 1972-74 a s  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d  t o  c o m p a r e  
w i t h  t h e  s h a r e s  o f  1 9 7 6  t o  1 9 7 9 ^ *  T h e  P a n e l  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e s e  
p e r i o d s  t o  s h o w  t h e  n o r m a l  m a r k e t  y e a r s .  If t h e  P a n e l  w a s  p r e p a r e d  
t o  g o  t h i s  f a r  w h y  d i d  i t  n o t  go  b a c k  t o  1969 w h i c h  w a s  t h e  s t a r t  
o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  C o m m o n  S u g a r  P o l i c y ?
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  w h i c h  I h a v e  c o m p i l e d  s h o w s  t h e  m a r k e t  s h a r e s  
f r o m  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  C o m m o n  S u g a r  P o l i c y  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  
w i t h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d  a n d  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  c o m p l a i n t *
TABLE 1/over
6 2* s u p r a  p 7 4  p a r a *  2 . 8
63. s u p r a  p 7 4  p a r a ,  2 . 1 0
64. s u p r a  p 8 9  p a r a .  4 * 9
TABLE 1
T r a d e  i n  S u g a r ( t h o u s a n d  t o n s ,  r a w v a l u e )
P e r i o d A u s t r a l i a B r a z i l
E u r o p e a n
C o m m u n i t i e s
A v e r a g e
e x p o r t
t o t a l
P e r c e n t a g e  
o f  w o r l d  
e x p o r t
A v e r a g e
e x p o r t
t o t a l
P e r c e n t a g e  
o f  w o r l d  
e x p o r t
A v e r a g e
e x p o r t
t o t a l
P e r c e n t a g e  
o f  w o r l d  
e x p o r t
1 9 6 9 -
1971
1661 8 . 9 5 a p n r o x
2 0 0 0
1 0 . 7 8 1091 5 . 9 5
1 9 7 ? -
1 9 7 3
2072 9 . 3 a p o r o x
2 3 3 6
1 0 . 4 1 7 0 8 7 . 8
1 9 7 7 2 9 6 5 1 0 . 5 a p p r o x
1 8 8 8
8 . 8 2 6 9 9 9 . 6
1 9 7 3 2 0 0 2 8.1 1 9 6 0 7 . 8 3 5 6 6 1 4 . 4
1 9 7 9 2 1 6 4 8 . 2 2 1 1 2 8 . 0 3 7 2 2 14.1
S o u r c e s :  s u p r a  n o t e  10 p a g e  3 0 8  T a b l e  2 a n d  p a g e  311 T a b l e  4> 
s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  73 'Table 1 a n d  p a g e  8 9  T a b l e  4 5 
I. S m i t h  a n d  S. H a r r i s  s u p r a  n o t e  6 p 5 o  T a b l e  1 
a n d  I. S m i t h  P r o s p e c t s  f o r  a  ^ e w  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S u g a r  
A g r e e m e n t ,  J o u r n a l  J o r l d  T r a d e  L a w  1 9 8 3  p 3 0 8  T a b l e  1.
T a b l e  1 s h o w s  h o w  t h e  s e l e c t i v e  u s e  of  p r e v i o u s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d s  
m a y  d i s t o r t  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  p i c t u r e .  A  c o n c l u s i o n  I c a n  d r a w  f r o m  
T a b l e  1 is t h a t  1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 1  w o r k e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  C o m m u n i t y .  S i n c e  t h e  
P a n e l  c o u l d  n o t  p r o v i d e  a  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 1  it is o p e n  t o  
s p e c u l a t i o n .  O n e  c o u l d  s p e c u l a t e  t h a t  t h e  P a n e l  w a s  p r e j u d i c e d  i n  
f a v o u r  o f  a  m a j o r  t r a d i n g  e n t i t y .  A f t e r  a l l  t h e  C-eneral A g r e e m e n t  
w a s  d r a w n  u p  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h o s e  m a j o r  t r a d i n g  n a t i o n s  s t a t u s  q u o .
F. The Measure of the Obligation
-  e q u i t a b l e  s h a r e
6 5  6 6
T h e  P a n e l  in  b o t h  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  a n d  B r a z i l i a n  c o m p l a i n t s  n o t e d
t h a t  t h e  c o n c e p t  h a d  n o  c o m p l e t e  d e f i n i t i o n  n o r  h a d  it  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d
a b s o l u t e l y  n e c e s s a r y  t o  h a v e  a  c o m p l e t e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f
. G o o  L &  ( 7  f v  . T h i s  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o f  A r t i c l e
67
X V I : 3  a n d  A r t i c l e  1 0  • A s  I m e n t i o n e d  e a r l i e r ,  a l l  it  m e a n s  is
t h a t  t h e  c o n c e p t  is f l u i d  a n d  r e f l e c t s  t h e  d y n a m i c  n a t u r e  w h i c h  
s h o u l d  f l o w  f r o m  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  l i b e r a l i s m  i n  t h e  
p r e a m b l e  t o  t h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t .
A u s t r a l i a  t o  p r o v e  i t s  c o m p l a i n t ,  b a s e d  i t s  c a s e  a l o n g  s i m i l a r  l i n e s
6 9
t o  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  t o  W h e a t  a n d  W h e a t  E x p o r t  C a s e  , a n d
a r g u e d  t h a t  a n y  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s h a r e  W o u l d  b e  a t t r i b u t a b l e
t o  t h e  e x p o r t  s u b s i d y  f o r  w i t h o u t  it t h e y  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  a b l e  t o  
7 0
e x p o r t  • T o  p r o v e  t h e  s h a r e  w a s  i n e q u i t a b l e  A u s t r a l i a  a r g u e d  m a r k e t
17 -4 1-7 -* 7  a
s h a r e  , d i s p l a c e m e n t  , p r i c e  u n d e r c u t t i n g  a n d  s p e c i a l  fa.ctors '.
63* s u p r a  n o t e  10 p a g e  3 0 8  p a r a .  4«11
6 6 .  s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  8 8  p a r a .  4 * 6
67. s e e  m y  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  C h a p t e r  2 S e c t i o n  F  p a g e s  65- 68.
08. s e e  m y  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  A r t i c l e  10 o f  t h e  C o d e  o n  S u b s i d i e s
i n  C h a p t e r  3 B e e t i o n  B  a n d  E.
69* s u p r a  n o t e  43*
70. s e e  m y  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  o f  t h i s  c a s e  i n 
C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  3.
71. s u p r a  n o t e  10  p a g e  2 9 5 - 2 9 8  p a r a .  2.15
72. s u p r a  ;a g e  299 p a r a .  2 . 2 6
73• s u p r a  p a g e  296 p a r a .  2 . 1 6
7 4 -  s u p r a  p a g e  292-294 p a r a s .  2 . 7  t o  2 . 9
B r a z i l ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o n  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  c o m p l a i n t ,  a n d  t h e
C o d e  o f  S u b s i d i e s ,  w a s  l e f t  t o  a r g u e  m a r k e t  s h a r e  , d i s p l a c e m e n t  ,
7 7  7 8
p r i c e  u n d e r c u t t i n g  a n d  s p e c i a l  f a c t o r s  • B r a z i l ' s  m e t h o d o l o g y
t o  t h e  e q u i t a b l e  s h a r e  o b l i b a t i o n  c h a n g e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  A r t i c l e  1 0
o f  t h e  C o d e  on  S u b s i d i e s  a s  I m e n t i o n e d  e a r l i e r  in  C h a p t e r  4*
A l t h o u g h  it  a f f e c t s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t s
a r e  t h e  s a m e .
-  w o r l d  m a r k e t  s h a r e
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s h a r e s  o f  w o r l d  e x p o r t  
t r a d e  t o  a s s i s t  m y  e n q u i r y  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  s h a r e .
T A B L E  2
S h a r e s  o f  V/orld E x p o r t  T r a d e  in  S u g a r  ( i n  p e r c e n t a g e
p o i n t s  o f  w o r l d  t o t a l )
E u r o p e a n
C o m m u n i t i e s A u s t r a l i a B r a z i l O t h e r s
1 9 9 1 - 7 3
( a v e r a g e ) 7 . 3 9 . 5 1 0 . 4 7 2 . 3
1 9 7 2 - 7 4
( a v e r a g e ^ 7 . 5 9 . 5 1 2 . 0 71
1 9 7 6 8 . 3 1 1 . 6 5 . 5 7 4 . 6
1 9 7 7 9 . 6 1 0 . 5 8 . 8 71
1 9 7 8 1 4 . 4 8.1 7 . 8 6 9 . 7
1 9 7 9 14.1 8 . 2 8 . 0 6 9 . 7
S o u r c e :  T a b l e  4  s u p r a  n o t e 11 p a g e  8 9  a n d  m y  T a b l e  1 C h a p t e r  5
S e c t i o n E  p a g e  1 1 3.
7 5 *  s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  72-74 p a r a s .  2 . 6  t o  2 . 9
7 6. s u p r a  p a g e  7 4 - 7 6  p a r a s  2 . 1 2  t o  2.15
7 7. s u p r a  p a g e  78  p a r a .  2 . 2 2
7 8. s u p r a  p a g e  7 7 - 7 9  p a r a s  2 . 1 8  t o  2.19 a n d  p a r a .  2 . 2 2
T h e  c l a i m  b y  A u s t r a l i a  t h a t  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  h a d  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r
m a r k e t  s h a r e  b y  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s  w a s  w e a k e n e d  b y  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f
1 9 6 9 - 7 1  f r o m  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d  a n d  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e
7 9  8 0
w o r l d  f r e e  m a r k e t  a n d  t i e d  s a l e s  m a r k e t  • T a b l e  1 a n d  T a b l e  2
d o  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  s h a r e  d u r i n g 1 t h e
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .  T h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  f o r  1 9 7 7  c o m p a r e d
81
t o  1972-74 w a s  a t  2.1 p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  a n d  i n  1 9 7 8  c o m p a r e d  t o
32
1 9 7 2 - 7 4  w a s  6 . 9  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  . T h e  r e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e  w a s  n o t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  t o  ./heat a n d
07
V/heat F l o u r  E x p o r t s  c a s e  w h e r e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  w a s  8 p e r c e n t a g e
a  a
p o i n t s  . Y e t  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  t h e  B r a z i l  m a r k e t  s h a r e , a t  l e a s t  .
A u s t r a l i a  -./as a b l e  t o  p o i n t  t o  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  \Y)C/tCiS
35
t h e i r  s h a r e  of e x p o r t s  • I n  a b s o l u t e  t e r m s  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h i s  
c o m p l a i n t  m e t  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  t o  '/heat a n d  V/heat F l o u r  E x p o r t  
c a s e ^  a t  a r o u n d  a  2 0 0  u e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e .
T h e  P a n e l  i n  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  c o m p l a i n t  w e r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  u s e  t h e  1978
87
f i g u r e s  w i t h  s o m e  r e s e r v a t i o n  t o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  b y  t h e
88
C o m m u n i t y  j u s t i f i e d  m o r e  t h o r o u g h  e x a m i m i n a t i o n  • T h e  P a n e l  w a s  n o t
79* C h a p t e r  5 S e c t i o n  I) a n d  S e c t i o n  B.
8 0 .  C h a p t e r  5 S e c t i o n  B  p a g e  112.
8 1 .  s u p r a  n o t e  10  p a g e  309 p a r a .  4 * 1 2
8 2 .  s u p r a  p 310 p a r a .  4«14 
83* s u p r a  n o t e  48
84. s e e  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  B  p a g e s  71 a n d  7 6 .
.85* I r e f e r  t o  m y  f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  B r a z i l ’s m a r k e t  s h a r e  w h e r e  
i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s h a r e  p e a k e d  i n  1 9 7 8  a n d  t h e n  
d e c l i n e d  i n  1979•
8 6 .  s u p r a  n o t e  48
8 7 •  s u p r a  p a g e  3 0 9 - 3 1 0  p a r a s .  4 * 1 3> 4»15 a n d  4 * 1 6  
8 8 .  s u p r a  p a g e  310 p a r a .  4 * 1 6
p r e p a r e d  t o  g o  a s  f a r  a s  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  t o  V/heat a n d  W h e a t
QQ
F l o u r  E x p o r t  c a s e  ( F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  c a s e )  a n d  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  
e n t i r e  i n c r e a s e  w a s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  s u b s i d y  s y s t e m .  I q u e s t i o n  
w h e t h e r  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  t o  t h e  f i n d i n g  is c o r r e c t .  I s h a l l  c o m e  b a c k  
t o  t h i s  p o i n t  a f t e r  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  s a m e  a r g u m e n t  i n  t h e  B r a z i l i a n  
c o m p l a i n t .
B r a z i l ,  a l s o  s u f f e r i n g  w i t h  t h e  f i n d i n g s  i n  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  c o m p l a i n t
o n  t h e  w o r l d  f r e e  m a r k e t  a n d  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  1 9 6 9 - 7 1  f r o m  t h e
p r e v i o u s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d ,  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  a  s t r o n g
c a s e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s h a r e  h a d  i n c r e a s e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e
s y s t e m .  B r a z i l  h a d  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c o m p l a i n t  p e r i o d  
9 0
w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t  b u t  f r o m  T a b l e  2 w e  s e e  t h a t  t h i s  m a x i m u m  r e l a t i v e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  1977 a m o u n t e d  t o  1 . 3  p e r  c e n t ,  1 9 7 8  i t  a m o u n t e d  t o  6 . 6  
p e r  c e n t  a n d  b y  1 9 7 9  i t  w a s  6.1 p e r  c e n t .  T h e  r e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e  is
n e i t h e r  a s  s t r o n g  a s  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  c o m p l a i n t  n o r  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e
91 9 2
c a s e  • T h e  P a n e l  d i s c o u n t e d  1 9 7 6  i n  f a v o u r  o f  B r a z i l  • T h e
r e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e s  f o r  1977-79 c a n n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t
g a i n  i f  w e  u s e  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  c a s e  f i g u r e  o f  8 p e r c e n t a g e
p o i n t s  a s  a  b e n c h  m a r k .  W i t h  1 9 7 9  p r e l i m i n a r y  f i g u r e s  s h o w i n g  a
d e c l i n e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s h a r e  i t  a l s o  d o e s  n o t  i n d i c a t e  a  p a t t e r n
o f  v /  m a i n t a i n i n g  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r t s .  I n  t e r m s  o f  a b s o l u t e
s h a r e ,  f r o m  T a b l e  l ^ t h e  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  e x p o r t s  w e r e  o n l y
i n  e x c e s s  o f  1 p e r  c e n t  o f  B r a z i l ' s  a b s o l u t e  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  w o r l d
e x p o r t s .  O n l y  t h e  t r a d e  f i g u r e s  f o r  1 9 7 8 ' s a b s o l u t e  s h a r e  justified
8 9 *  I  r e f e r  t o  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  t h i s  c a s e  in C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  B  p a g e  72.
90. s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  72 p a r a .  7 * 2
9 1 .  s e e  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  B  p a g e s  71 a n d  7 6 .
92. s u p r a  n o t e  1 p a g e  90 p a r a .  4 . 1 0
t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n *  T h e  P a n e l  i n  t h e  B r a z i l i a n  c o m p l a i n t  s a i d  1 9 7 7
c o u l d  n o t  j u s t i f y  f u r t h e r  e x a m i n a t i o n  b u t  t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  1978 a-ncL
9 3  9 4
1 9 7 9  c o u l d  • T h i s  is  s i m i l a r  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  C o m p l a i n t  •
T h e  P a n e l  t h e n  w e n t  o n  t o  s t a t e  t h a t  11 [it] w a s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s u g a r  e x p o r t s  h a d  b e e n  a f f e c t e d  t h r o u g h
9 5
t h e  u s e  o f  s u b s i d i e s ” • T h i s  a d m i s s i o n  w a s  t h e  s a m e  c o n c l u s i o n  a s  
i n  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  c a s e  b u t  i t  c a n n o t  b e  j u s t i f i e d  i n  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  P a n e l s  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  m a r k e t  s h a r e *  U s i n g  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  
c a s e  a s  a  b e n c h  m a r k ,  t h e n  t h e  l o g i c a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h a t  f i n d i n g  is 
t h a t  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  i n c r e a s e  i n  s u g a r  e x p o r t s  is i n e q u i t a b l e .  I f  
t h i s  is a  c o r r e c t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e n  s u r e l y  A u s t r a l i a  s h o u l d  h a v e  
h a d  a  s i m i l a r  f i n d i n g  b e c a u s e  i t s  c a s e  o n  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  s t r o n g e r  
t h a n  B r a z i l fs*
T h e  q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  t h e n  p o s e d  is, w h e t h e r  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n
f i n d i n g s  o n  m a r k e t  s h a r e  is - .correct f r o m  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e
c a s e  m e t h o d o l o g y ^  i ^ Ai.V" ‘V
B r a z i l  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  i t s  c a s e  o n  m a r k e t  s h a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o
t w o  m o r e  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o i n t s  *  f  i r s t l y ,  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  b y
u n r e s t r a i n e d  s u b s i d i e s  h a d  d i s p l a c e d  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c e r s  a t
a  t i m e  o f  o v e r p r o d u c t i o n c u o ^ X a s t l y ,  a l t h o u g h  . other c o u n t r i e s  ( C u b a
a n d  T h a i l a n d )  h a d  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  i t  w a s  n o t  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  
9 7
o f  B r a z i l  • T h e s e  p o i n t s  w e r e  n e i t h e r  a d d r e s s e d  e x p l i c i t l y
93* s u p r a  p a g e  90 p a r a s .  4*10- 4.11 
94* s e e  t h e  a b o v e  d i s c u s s i o n  
95* s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  90 p a r a .  4*11 
96. s u p r a  n o t e  48*
97* s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  72 p a r a s .  2.6 a n d  2.7
9 8  99
b y  t h e  P a n e l  n o r  r e p l i e d  t o  b y  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  . T h e s e  f u r t h e r
a r g u m e n t s  w e r e  n o t  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e " ^ ^  c a s e  b y
101
A u s t r a l i a  b u t  w e r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  b y  t h e  P a n e l  e x p r e s s l y  •
B r a z i l ’s a r g u m e n t  a b o u t  t h e  u n r e s t r a i n e d  C o m m u n i t i e s  s u b s i d i e s
w h i c h  h a d  d i s p l a c e d  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c e r s  a t  a  t i m e  o f  o v e r -
102
p r o d u c t i o n  m u s t  b e  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  P a n e l ' s  f i n d i n g  •
T h i s  a r g u m e n t  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  p o i n t  o f  a c c o m m o d a t i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  e c o n o m i c  l i b e r a l i s m  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  B r a z i l  d o e s  n o t  
a r g u e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  b u t  r a t h e r  i n  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  p r e a m b l e  " f u l l  u s e  o f  r e s o u r c e s ” b y  
e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c e r s .  T h e  a r g u m e n t  is o f t e n  m a d e  o u t  t h a t  t r a d e  i n  
a g r i c u l t u r e  s h o u l d  b e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  b u t  y o u  
w i l l  n o t e  i n  m y  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  I h a v e  m a d e  n o  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  
p r i n c i p l e ^  T h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  d o e s  n o t  m a k e  o u t  C\*\ a r g u m e n t  
t h a t  t r a d e  s h o u l d  b e  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  b u t  r a t h e r  
m a k e s  a n  a r g u m e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
w o r l d  r e s o u r c e s  t o  a c h i e v e  g l o b a l  w e a l t h ^ ^ .  T h e  e x p o r t  s u b s i d y  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  a n d  t h e  C o d e  o n  S u b s i d i e s  d o  
n o t  c o n t r a d i c t  t h i s v ' ^ r t ^ , . . a c k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
t r a d e  t o o l s  o f  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  1 . w / t I j  ' ■ a c c o m m o d a t e *  f o r
n a t i o n a l  a u t a r k y  . : T h e  p r o b l e m  i n  the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  o f
a g r i c u l t u r e  is t h a t  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  a c h i e v e  a  " f u l l  u s e  o f  r e s o u r c e s "
9 8 .  s u p r a  p a g e  8 9 0 9 0  p a r a s .  4 » 8  t o  4*11
9 9 *  s u p r a  p a g e  7 4  p a r a s .  2 . 9  t o  2 . 1 1
1 0 0 .  s u p r a  n o t e  4 8
1 0 1 .  I r e f e r  t o  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  B  p a g e s  71 a n d  7 2
1 0 2 .  s u p r a  n o t e  11 p a g e  90 p a r a .  4«11
1 0 3 .  s e e  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  C h a p t e r  2 S e c t i o n  E  a n d  C h a p t e r  4  S e c t i o n  
B  a n d  D.
104. s e e  i b i d .
i t  h a s  t o  h e  d o n e  b y  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of f r e e  t r a d e  a n d  f r e e  e n t e r p r i s e .  
T h i s  is w h e r e  t h e  c o n f l i c t  h a s  p e r s i s t e n t l y  o c c u r r e d  a n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
s t i l l  r e m a i n s  o p e n  a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  S o  B r a z i l ' s  a r g u m e n t  h a d  t o  b e  
t a k e n  c o g n i z a n c e  o f  b e c a u s e  i t  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  i n  a  n u t s h e l l  
o f  w h a t  A r t i c l e  X V I : 3 a n d  A r t i c l e  1 0  h a v e  t o  s o l v e .  It  is a n  u n d e r ­
l y i n g  t h e m e  t h a t  p r o d u c e r s  u t i l i s i n g  f u l l  u s e  o f  r e s o u r c e s  i n  a  
p e r i o d  o f  o v e r p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  e n t i t l e d  n o t  t o  h a v e  t h e i r  e x p o r t s
d i s p l a c e d  b y  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s .  T h i s  t h e m e  r u n s  t h r o u g h
1or 1
t h e  H a v a n a  C h a r t e r  , t h e  1 9 5 4 / 5 5  R e v i e w  S e s s i o n  , t h e  F r e n c h
107
A s s i s t a n c e  t o  v/heat a n d  v/heat F l o u r  E x p o r t s  , t h e  U n m a n u f a c t u r e d
T o b a c c o  c a s e t h e  t h e  C o d e  o f  S u b s i d i e s ^ ^ .  T h e r e f o r e  I c o n s i d e r
110
t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  f i n d i n g  o n  m a r k e t  s h a r e  a n  a b b e r a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  
m e t h o d o l o g y  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  c a s e .
1 0 5 .  I r e f e r  t o  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  in C h a p t e r  1 S e c t i o n  E  p a g e s  2 9 - 5 0  w h e r e  
o n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  p r o h i b i t  e x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s  i t  a l l o w s  3 p e r m i t t e d  
e x c e p t i o n s  u p o n  t h i s  b a s i s .
10 6 .  I r e f e r  t o  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  C h a p t e r  2 S e c t i o n  I) o n  " e q u i t a b l e  
s h a r e " ,  " w o r l d  e x p o r t  t r a d e ” , " p r e v i o u s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p e r i o d "  
a n d  t h e  " s p e c i a l  f a c t o r s " .
1 0 7 .  s e e  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  in  C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  B  p a g e s  7 4  a n d  7 5  •
.108. I r e f e r  t o  m y  d i s c u s s i o n  in C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  C. A n  a r g u m e n t
h a s  b e e n  m a d e  a b o u t  t h i s  c a s e  t h a t  it s u p p o r t s  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  A r t i c l e  X V I : 3 a  s u b s i d i z i n g  c o u n t r y  s h a r e  d o e s  n o t  
h a v e  t o  b e  a  p r e d e t e r m i n e d  p o r t i o n  b u t  t h a t  it s h o u l d  b e  d y n a m i c .  
T h i s  d o e s  n o t  h o w e v e r  f a i r l y  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  W o r k i n g  P a r t y  R e p o r t .  
M a l a w i  a g r e e d  t h a t  i n  a  g r o w i n g  m a r k e t  a  s u b s i d i z i n g  C o n t r a c t i n g  
P a r t y  s h a r e  n e e d  n o t  b e  s t a t i c  a n d  c o u l d  v a r y .  T h e  v/orking 
P a r t y  a g r e e d  w i t h  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  n o t  o ne a p p l i e d  t o  a  s t a t i c  
m a r k e t .  S u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  is f o u n d  i n  t h e  1 9 5 4 / 5 5  
W o r k i n g  P a r t y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a b o u t  s p e c i a l  f a c t o r s  i n  C h a p t e r  2 
S e c t i o n  D .
109. I r e f e r  t o  m y  p o i n t  a b o u t  t h e  s u b t l e t y  r e q u i r e d  t o  a c h i e v e  
r a t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  C o d e  on  S u b s i d i e s  b y  m a j o r  p r i m a r y  p r o d u c i n g  
n a t i o n s  w h i c h  h i n t s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  /one 
o f  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  a n d  s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t  a n d  r a i s i n g  t h e  i n c o m e  
o f  f a r m e r s :  C h a p t e r  4 S e c t i o n  C.
11 0 .  s u p r a  n o t e  10  p a g e  310 p a r a .  4 * 1 6
T h e  f i n d i n g  s h o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  t h a t  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s  s y s t e m  o f  s u b s i d i e s  
h a d  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t s  b u t  w h e t h e r  i t  
c o u l d  b e  e x t e n d e d  t o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  a n  u n f a i r  s h a r e  h a d  a r i s e n  w a s  
u n c e r t a i n .  A l t h o u g h  t h i s  m i g h t  a p p e a r  a  t a u t o l o g y  o n  t h e  P a n e l  
a c t u a l  f i n d i n g  I c o n s i d e r  i t  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  G A T T  p a n e l s  b e  s e e n  t o  
b e  a d o p t i n g ^ A i ‘^ ' > W m e t h o d o l o g y  t o  t h e  c o m p l a i n t s  f o r  t h e  d i s p u t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e s s .  T h e  A u s t r a l i a n  f i n d i n g  is i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  c a s e  a n d  t h e  B r a z i l i a n  c o m p l a i n t .
-  d i s p l a c e m e n t
111
I t  w i l l  b e  r e c a l l e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  c a s e  t h e  P a n e l ,
i l l u s t r a t e ^  i t s  f i n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  F r e n c h  s h a r e  w a s  i n e q u i t a b l e
discussi'Vj t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  s u b s i d y  in  r e g i o n a l  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  
112
m a r k e t s  • T h i s  is  w h a t  is m e a n t  b y  d i s p l a c e m e n t ,  a s  ± m e n t i o n e d
e a r l i e r ,  t h e  C o d e  o n  S u b s i d i e s  a l t e r e d  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y  o f  t h e
e n q u i r y  i n t o  t h e  m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  b y  i n c l u d i n g  d i s p l a c e m e n t
113
a s  o n e  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  . T h e  A u s t r a l i a n
c o m p l a i n t  w a s  n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d  u n d e r  t h e  C o d e  o n  S u b s i d i e s  r a t h e r
114.
A r t i c l e  X V I : 3 o f  t h e  G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  . B y  p r e c e d e n c e  t h i s  P a n e l
s h o u l d  h a v e  f o l l o w e d  t h e  s a m e  m e t h o d o l o g y  in t h e  F r e n c h  A s s i s t a n c e  
115
c a s e  . T h e  p r o b l e m  w a s  t h a t  t h e  P a n e l  d i d  n o t  . ; . .
T h e  P a n e l  u t i l i z e d  d i s p l a c e m e n t  i n  r e g i o n a l  : a n d
1 1 1 .  s u p r a  n o t e  48.
112. s e e  C h a p t e r  3 S e c t i o n  3  p a g e  76.
1 1 3 *  s e e  C h a p t e r  4  S e c t i o n  C p a g e  90*
1 1 4 *  s e e  m y  e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  C h a p t e r  S e c t i o n  3  p a g e  98.
1 1 5 *  In a l l  p r e v i o u s  d i s c u s s i o n  on  A r t i c l e  XVI:3 P a n e l s  h a v e  m a d e
r e f e r e n c e  t o  p r e v i o u s  P a n e l  R e p o r t s ,  t h e  1 9 5 4 / 5 5  W o r k i n g  P a r t y  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  H a v a n a  C h a r t e r  n e g o t i a t i o n .  S o  i t  i s  
r e a s o n a b l e  t o  a s s u m e  t h i s .
individual markets to assist in the determination of the measure of
116the obligation rather than illustrate the finding • The Panel had
no legal basis to do this* The 1954/55 Review Session negotiations
made it clear that the primary question was world export trade and 60
individual markets could not enter into the weighing of that 
117determination • The Panel in the French Assistance case reflected 
those negotiations, but not so in this Australian complaint* I do 
not think you can take this point any further and I propose to 
discuss displacement in the terms outlined by the Panel*
The Panel in the Australia complaint examined in detail the displace­
ment of Australian exports by dividing fi|1l markets up into groupings:
markets in which the Communities and Australia directly competed,
118traditional markets and new markets • A further market was 
Australia’s exports to the Communities but this had declined with 
the termination of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement*
With respect to the traditional markets both Australia and the 
Communities had tended to maintain those markets without any 
l/f\ o n  ^  „ . S o  that left Australia to show
displacement in the remaining ■ markets.
116. see supra note 10 pages 310-515 paras. 4*17 and 4«28
117. see my discussion in Chapter 2 Section D pages 52-55*
118* supra note 10 page 310-312 para. 4*20 and see Table 4 at
page 311.
119# supra pages 312 to 313 paras* 4*23 and 4*25
The market in which Australia and the Communities directly competed
120
showed growth 1976 and 1977 but declined in 1978 • The
individual market which showed a discrepancy in this proportional
movement was China, Communities exports to China were apparently
121
negligible until 1978 • The Panel thought 'By’if partial displacement
122of Australian sales C  a t  from other sources • The Panel
concluded there was not sufficient evidence of displacement in this
grouping to constitute clear evidence even though the Communities
123
could have replaced some of China imports . The Panel noted that~fh
rv| o ^ \c. c- SQs
proportional decline in 1978 for Australian A . China and United
States 1 Yet Australia in 1978 also showed a decline in
124exports to the United States whereas the Communities increased .
The drop in Australia’s exports to China amounted 6 per cent of
absolute market share, one can conclude that the Communities
increased its exports by somewhere around 3 to 5 per cent of absolute
market share. The Panel did not present any figures on the
Communities increase of exports to the United States for 1978, I
have calculated that total imports of sugar to the United States
in 1978 was 4>000,000 tonnes. If Australia maintained its share
from 1968 at 5 per cent of the absolute market that in 1978 would
125
amount to 210,000 tonnes • This would mean the Communities exports 
increased by about 20,000 tonnes. J.Otal exports to this
group in 1978<\the Communities increased by 10 per cent
120. supra page 312 para. 4*21
121. ibid.
122. ibid.
123. supra page 313 para. 4*26 
124* supra page 312 para. 4*21
123. This calculation is from figures in the Brazilian complaint
supra note 11 page 91 para. 4*14 and P.O. Lichts International 
Sugar Report. Problems and Prospects of a new International 
Sugar Agreement. Special Edition 1977 p41•
in absolute terms against Australia. In terns of the French Assistance
case in the Indonesia market alone French export rose from nothing
to 49*2 per cent and Australian shares dropped from 89 per cent to 
126
47 per cent. The displacement of Australian sugar exports in
comparison with the Communities is insignificant. The Panel
127.
regarded it as . f a  sufficient
The remaining argument for direct displacement concerned new markets.
These were opportunities in the Mediterranean, Middle East and 
128Africa - the group which had shown a dramatic increase in
consumption in the 1970's* According to th£. statistics ;
C 129
° r  the Panel this market was dominated by the Communities . The
increase of exports to those countries in 1976 to 1978 by the
Communities was not a result of theirSMk$icf ref but rather a lack of
marketing by Australia* /Australia’s exports in 1972 were to Algeria,
130Tunisia and Morocco, and none thereafter . I understand from some 
quarters that this was not a fair presentation of the statistics 
and Australia did have exports to these markets <31.
w:... •; /"/ , 1 . ' . g _ . No
statistics were presented by those quarters. Again there is no 
. evidence presented by Australia of displacement in terms of
the French Assistance case "Hn (■* t v \ o s
126. supra note 48 page 59 Table 3. The Indonesian displacement
was the minimum drop suffered by Australia.
127. supra note 10 page 313 para. 4*26
128. supra page 313 para. 4*24
129. supra page 311 ‘Table 4 and page 313 para. 4*24
130. ibid.
The Panel then considered the possibility of indirect displacement
against Australia as a result of the Communities only exporting 
131white sugar . M y  discussion on indirect displacement overlaps
with price undercutting so I will move beyond a discussion on the 
132statistics . Suffice to say although indirect displacement had 
occurred the Panel found that with the ’’re-export of raw sugar 
imported by the 3uropean Communities under special arrangements” it 
meant that g ; could not constitute clear evidence
As I have already mentioned, this special arrangement was one of
i* 134
the remainingAsignificant tied sales . The Communities under the
Protocol to the Lome Convention had provided preference for 1.4
million tonnes of raw sugar to cross its frontiers without paying
the same levy as other third country exporters. The Communities had
argued that they were entitled to re-export an equivalent amount 
135of sugar and it seems that the Panel agreed with them. I
cannot understand what the Panel means by referring to the re-export
of ACP sugar. The only way the Panel could consider such an
argument was if this re-export occurred with an export refund
after refining from raw sugar into white sugar. Australia’s
argument , was concise - it was of no concern to them
how exports from the Communities were generated but rather what
13 6support such exports received • Australia is inconsistent on 
this point, it is concerned about the generation of the surplus
131. supra page 313 b° 315 paras. 4«27 to 4«28
132. supra page 314 para. 4*28 and Table 5«
133. ibid.
134* see my discussion in this Chapter Section L page 104*
133* supra note 10 page 296 para. 2.18
136. supra page 296 to 297 paras. 2.18 and 2.19
otherwise it would not have, complained under the general
J?,greement. £^4 4-o fUe, i«>\ iihe possibility ACP sugar
was re-exported is irrelevant. Further I understand that in "practice
ACP sugar has never been intervened and has never been re-exported.
157U i E E C  Regulations ACP sugar is not entitled to export refunds" •
1 ^58This was not appreciated by the Panel • The Panel conclusion on 
indirect displacement I consider cannot be justified. Indirect 
displacement had occurred.
Brazil was very confident that it could produce clear evidence of
displacement, in accordance with the Code on Subsidies. The Panel
undertook a similar type of analysis as with the Australian complaint
by looking at regional markets grouped e \ S traditional or new 
139
opportunities • Unfortunately the Panel was not prepared to name 
all the countries which consisted the regional markets in the 
presentation of its conclusion. So I can only address those 
individual markets mentioned by the Panel io Me4c* \ ' s S C o  .
The Panel found for a number of regional groupings a reversal of 
position had occurred between the Communities and Brazil"*^. In 
terms of the French Assistance case this would have been the
137. I. Smith "GATT: EEC Sugar Export Refunds Dispute" J.W.T.L. 1981 
page 532 at pp542.
138. In the 1982 Working Party Report on Sugar the Chairman stated 
ACP sugar was not re-exported and the Communities agreed with 
this: GATT 29 th Suppl. BIS ID page 87.
139* supra note 11 page 90 para. 4*12
140. supra page 91 para. 4*13
141equivalent to the finding on the Southeast Asia market . The Panel
then moved onto consider individual market to see if this displacement
142
was systematic and produced the same conclusion •
143The Panel considered the United States market as an illustration •
Brazil exports to the United States^ in absolute terms} were in 1968
615,200 ' tonnes; 1973 445*584 tonnes"*^; 1978 approximately 50°>000
145
tonnes and 1979 1,000,000 tonnes . The Panel obviously thought 
that this rise in exports to the United States was the basis for the 
Communities1 exports rising to other markets* Brazil took the 
opportunity to increase its sales in the United States for sound' 
commercial reasons - the payment was quicker than would have been 
the case in the Middle East/Africa and it resulted in better prices 
because of less transport charges* The Panel merely took this 
statistic as basis for its conclusion on displacement. /ithout the I ' m  
United States market statistics it is impossible to draw /> conclusion,
/ ' '' ■ I know from the Australian complaint that the 
Communities had increased their exports by 20,000 tonnes from 1972
141. The Erench had increased its exports from 0*7 per cent in 1954 
to 46 per cent in 1958 with the Australian percentage of exports 
decreasing by exacting the same proportion, supra note 
page 54 and-55* paragraph 23(a) and (b). The Communities share 
in the regional markets had increased from 6*5 per cent in 
1971-73 to 13*9 per cent in 1979* Brazil suffered a decrease of 
similar percentage points: supra page 91 Table 5- Australia did 
not suffer a reversal of position with the Communities: supra 
note 10 page Table 4«
142* page 9*1 para* 4«14 
143• ibid•
144* supra note 123 page 41«
145. supra note 11 page 91 para. 4*14
1A6
to 1977 • Yet in 1978 the Communities increased their exports to
147
t h a t  m a r k e t  b y  1 5 7  p e r  c e n t  o n  1 9 7 7  • S o m e  c o n c l u s i o n s  I c a n
d r a w  a r e  t h a t  1 9 7 7  t o  1 9 7 9  s a w  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n c r e a s e ^ i t s  
i m p o r t s  o f  s u g a r ,  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  w a s  s p r e a d  b e y o n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
S u g a r  A g r e e m e n t  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  t h e  C o m m u n i t i e s * .  - . —
I consider the Panel1s discussion on this market lacks depth, I
consider it also impossible to conclude that if Brazil had not 
persisted with the 1979 trade figures in that market the Panel 
would have found displacement.
Brazil in the presentation of its argument on displacement ^
(tjc/k©!: c>| i v t4 e ^  # O n e  w a s  C h i l e ,  C h i n a ,  E g y p t , I r a n
a n d  t h e  U . S . S . R .  E x p o r t  t o  t h i s  g r o u p  f r o m  1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 5  t o t a l l e d  f r o m
an annual average 729>400 tonnes yet in 1976-1978 fCll
148
to an annual average 549*000 tonnes • The relative market share 
decrease was from 16.7 per cent to 7 pe*‘ cent for the respective
149
period • The Communities had increased their absolute share from 
an annual average 270,400 tonnes to an annual average of 798,000 
tonnes and their relative share from 0.8 per cent to 9*4 per cent 
for the respective period. Although^not the representative period, 
the reversal of trade statistics .
150of the same magnitude as the French Assistance case . The Communities
146. s u p r a  n o t e  10 p a g e  5 1 4  T a b l e  5*
147* ibid.
148. supra note 11 page 75-76 para. 2.13  
149* ibid.
150. see my discussion on this point in this 3ection page 122 and 123.
justified this increase in exports on the very weak grounds that
151there was no connection • They did not refer to the United 
States market.
The other group of markets which Brazil presented statistics on
were Algeria, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Spain, Sudan, Syria
and T-unisia^^. Brazil exports in 1972-1975 totalled
an annual average of 193*900 tonnes yet 1976-1978 it had fallen to
153an annual average of 78,800 tonnes . The relative market share
154drop was from 17*2 per cent to 5*7 per cent • The Communities
increased their absolute share from an annual average of 270,400
tonnes to one of 798*900 tonnes; and relative market share from
15524.8 per cent to 56.4 per cent for the respective period . The
Communities stated that the Brazilian decrease was accounted for
by 2 countries - Algeria and iraq ' further their share in those
156markets also decreased developments in Sudan and Syria was
157 - — ■the result of other competition > I,he Communities justified
their increase in Tunisia and the other markets because of their 
special commercial relationships•
We see unlike the Prench Assistance case where the Panel addressed 
the markets of Southeast Asia and its individual countries the net 
for regional and market displacement is cast wider. The net is
151* supra note 11 page 7°-79 para. 2.17 and 2.19
152. supra p75 para. 2.13
153. ibid.
154* ibid.
155. ibid.
156. supra p70 para. 2.15  
157• supra p77 para. 2.16
cast so wide that it accounts for 44 per cent of Brazil markets in
1977-1978^ ^ # This amounts to a yO^ytSibo . of the market share
witji an emphasis o  *-v significant displacement in every type of
market d .. The French Assistance case just referred to one
region for illustration, ‘The Panel said in other words, that
displacement had occurred in the Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan and
Tunisia but it was not attributable to the Communities^*^. S o  .-;
f t \ e  'hi-szs Sc0jfe.^v- did not show clear and general
160
evidence of displacement • The entire Panel's discussion on
displacement in the Brazil complaint is cursory. This is unlike
the discussion in the Australian complaint where the Panel's findings 
161
were justified • In terms of the French Assistance case the
Indonesian absolute market figures O v v ^ e ^ v l ~
from 0 tonnes to 65,000 tonnes whereas Australia's fell from 98,000 
162to 62,000 tonnes . In Lebanon the absolute market figures in
197-2 were 11,000 tonnes and 197  ^5^,000 tonnes, 1977 150,000 tonnes
165and 1978 72,000 tonnes. Similar increases occurred for Communities
16A
exports to Morocco and Tunisia * # Thus we see thatio«v\absolute 
market share comparison Brazil decline of similar proportions.
If it was significant to constitute clear evidence in the French 
Assistance case it should be.sufficient for this complaint. I 
consider that the Panel was too heavily influenced by the 1979 figures 
of trade between the United States and Brazil and . their discussion 
.' B ^C .C X  y u o f i t l X O i l
158. supra page 77 paras. 2.18 and 2.19
159* supra page 91-92 para. 4*15
160. ibid.
161. see my discussion on the Australian displacement in this Section.
162. supra note 48 page 59 Table B.
165# supra note 10 page 314 Table 5*
I64. ibid.
- Price Undercutting
The Australian complaint presented the same argument as in the
French Assistance to Wheat and Wheat Flour exports case, that is
to assist in.bringing precision to the interpretation of equitable
165
share,price undercutting should be looked at .
Australia argued that the Communities *subsidies had resulted
in prices ' below those of other suppliers to the same
market* It is a technical argument concerning the nature of sugar
166sold on the world market • Australia sold its sugar in the form
of cane sugar which required further refining, whereas the Communities
sugar did not require such. The difference in the cost of refining
should have meant that the Australian sugar to . '_ , ...
importer should have been lower than the price of the Communities
167
white sugar* As discussed earlier , the Communities system did 
not result in the subsidized sugar being sold below world market 
price. So if there was no difference in prices to reflect these 
additional costs of production the Communities were 
©*0 ti> v|^ €‘/v/G^UM Australia also argued that since the
Communities was the largest exporter of white sugar it could 
manipulate the world market price. Once the Communities announced 
the Quota’s A and 3, for the incoming year the Importers could set 
the market price. Australia was able to show that in 1977 the
165. see supra note 10 pages 292-294 paras. 2 .7 to 2.12 and page 
299-300 paras. 2.26 to 2.28
166. supra
167. see my discussion in this Chapter Section C and H
Communities price for white sugar had on occasions dropped below
raw sugar prices and the margin in no cases covered the cost of 
168refining • The Communities on the price difference said there
was nothing unusual about this, for it happened when world market 
169prices were low . The Panel agreed with Australia that Community
exports to its traditional importers had expanded due to the small
170margin existing between the price of raw sugar and white sugar •
The Panel - agreed that the Communities surplus with its 
unlimited export refund could well depress the price on the world 
market^^•
Brazil presented similar arguments to Australia about how price
172undercutting occurred as a result of the Communities system •
Brazil stated that as a result it had lost sale opportunities in the
markets which had shown rapid expansion and those countries with
173which it had a special relationship , The reduced sales opportunities 
had arisen because Brazils cane sugar exports were replaced by the 
Communities white sugar ones. As a result the number of outlets 
had reduced from 52 in 1972-75 34 in 1977-78* With regards to
those countries with which Brazil had a special relationship (LAFTA 
countries) it adversely affected them^^.
168. supra note 10 page 291 para. 2.9
169. supra page 294 para. 2.12
170. supra page 318 para. 4*37
171• supra page 318 para. 4*38
172. supra note 11 page 79 para. 2.24
173* supra page 77 paras. 2.18 and 2.19
174* ibid
The Panel noted that the export refunds corresponded to the
difference between the intervention price at the f.o.b. stage and
175average spot quotations for white sugar on the Paris Exchange .
Erom 1975 to 1979 the refund exceeded the difference and so the 
Panel found the premium for white sugar had diminished and at times
had been quoted at prices lower than those quoted for raw sugar •
't
The Panel was not prepared to go any further and say that as a 
result of price undercutting the Communities had increased their 
share. This was due to the 1979 trade figures which showed that 
Brazil exports to the United States had doubled. Brazil had sold 
all it could and so was not affected by the aggressive exports of 
the Communities.
In comparing both the Australia and Brazil complaint with the French
Assistance case this price undercutting is not of the same magnitude
due to an alteration in the domestic stabilization scheme. The
price undercutting on wheat flour was in excess of 40 per cent points
but the point is that price undercutting occurred. The Panels in
both complaints y'Q— : not prepared to state that this could
177have led to an increase in the Communities exports. A problem for 
Australia and possibly Brazil was that although they were prepared 
to outline their special arrangement contract prices,doubt was 
placed on those because it was 4 ^ rebates had occurred.
w  h-e, /q,
\ Australia’s special arrangement with Japan*the contract
175* supra page 95 para. 4*28 
176. ibid
177* supra note 10 page 319 para, (g) and supra note 11 page 97 
para. (f).
price yi not reflect the actual transaction price. Therefore the 
Panel was correct not to place too much emphasis on price under­
cutting affecting the traditional importers of sugar from Australia 
and Brazil.
- Special Factors
In comparison with the French Assistance case in which the only 
special factor discussed was the International Wheat Council the 
. complaints by Australia and Brazil appear very complex. I 
consider the special factors which surface in the Reports to tied 
sales, the International Sugar Agreement and the possibility of 
other Contracting Parties exporting sugar by subsidization. Intern- 
woven with this has to be a discussion on the desirability of 
facilitating the satisfaction of world requirements. The Panel 
in the Australian complaint were not as structured on special factors 
as in the Brazil one. The reason for this I presume is the effect 
of the tied sales in conjunction with the International Sugar 
Agreement. I intend to approach the special factors in the same 
manner as in the Brazil complaint &
Our concern with the International Sugar Agreement only dates back 
to 1968. The 1968 International Sugar Agreement is an intergovernmental
c o m m o d i t y  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  a  s h o r t  l i f e  s p a n  a n d  is r e n e g o t i a t e d  
a f t e r  a n  i n t e r v a l  of  5 y e a r s .  T h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S u g a r  A g r e e m e n t  
is a i m e d  i n t e r  a l i a  a t  b r i n g i n g  w o r l d  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  c o n s u m p t i o n  
i n t o  a  c l o s e r  b a l a n c e  a n d  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  s t a b l e  p r i c e  f o r  s u g a r  
w h i c h  w i l l  b e  r e m u n e r a t i v e  t o  p r o d u c e r s ,  b u t  w h i c h  w i l l
n o t  e n c o u r a g e  f u r t h e r  e x p a n s i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  
I t  /, a l s o  M  A J  ‘o v o b j e c t i v e s  t o  r a i s e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  i n  s u g a r ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g  
o f  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  P e m e m b e r i n g  t h a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S u g a r  
A g r e e m e n t  o n l y  o p e r a t e d  i n  t h e  w o r l d  f r e e  m a r k e t  S o  j o  a c h i e v e  s u c h  
o b j e c t i v e s  -vt* - A  ci <\ . V I :  ; , s y s t e m  o f  e x p o r t  q u o t a s
c o u p l e d  w i t h  a  p r i c e  m e c h a n i s m  a n d  b a c k e d  b y  a  m i n i m u m  a n d  m a x i m u m
H no
stock provision • The 1968 system was suspended in 1972 owing
t o  , r i s i n g  p r i c e s  o n  t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t ,  w h e n  t h e  b a s i c  e x p o r t
IS -jnn
t o n n a g e s w e r e  r a i s e d  a n d  t h e  r e s e r v e  s t o c k s  r e l e a s e d  •
I n  t h e  r e n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S u g a r  A g r e e m e n t  i n  1 9 7 3
a n d  1977 t h e r e  w a s  n o  o n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of  p r i c e  r a n g e ,
supply and procurement |^ as in the 1968 Agreement ^ c £-
180
i m p o r t e r s  a n d  e x p o r t s  b e i n g  u n a b l e  t o  a g r e e  • T h e  1 9 7 4  A g r e e m e n t  
p r e s e r v e d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S u g a r  O r g a n i z a t i o n  b u t  l i t t l e  e l s e .
T h e  f i r s t  p o i n t  t o  b e  m a d e  b y  t h e  P a n e l  i n  A u s t r a l i a ' s  c o m p l a i n t
s p e c i a l  f a c t o r s  c o n c e r n e d  m a r k e t  s h a r e .  T h e  P a n e l  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t
178* s u p r a  n o t e  1 2 3  p a g e  14*
179* supra note 10 page 304 para. 3*20
180. J.E. Nagle supra note 2 page 105.
trade in sugar was modified by the International Sugar Agreement
181
starting operation in 1978 • Australia ' ' \ had agreed to
limit its exports in accordance with that Agreement, whereas the
182Communities ^  ^  , . Thus the Panel considered
18^
1977 an abnormal year in trade in sugar . Since exporting nations 
pursuant to the Agreement had agreed to limit their exports at a
1 s A
level of 80-85 per cent of basic export tonnage in 1978, in 1977 
they sold heavily. Further importers brought heavily because of 
the possible affect of rising prices which would occur in 1978 
(especially the United States )• In the Brazil complaint the 
Panel ^ ^ 4  *e ic\ lrS o  the same point about 1977^^ being abnormal. Yet 
the Panel did note that the world market exports continued unabated 
in 1978 and 1979187wi  t U   ^ b o c A  H l l
The following table shows net world exports of sugar from 19&9 
1983 to assist in understanding the point made by the Panel.
TABLE 3/
181. supra note 10 page 309 para# 4«13
182. supra page 3^0 para. 4#14
183. supra page 304 para. 3*21 
184* ibid
185. supra page 296 para. 2.16
186. supra note 11 page 92 para. 4#16
187. supra page 92 para. 4.17
TABLE 5
World Sugar Net Exports 
(million metric tons, raw sugar)
Period Total net exports
1969-1976 21.28
1977 28.00
1978 26.7
1979 24.5
1980 26.4
1981 26.5
1982 27.5
1983. 26.5
Source: supra note 10 page 296 para. 2.16 and 
I. Smith "Prospects for a New Inter­
national Sugar Agreement". Journal 
World Trade Law. Table 1 p310> 1983-
Table 3 shows us that 1977 was more representative of sales-fV«*-~1977 
to 1 9 8 3  than 1 9 6 9 -1 9 7 6  . k . ! . ' ■ — T h e I f
operating . the International Sugar Agreement in 1978 was a 3 P©r 
cent decrease IvK exports. Therefore the trade figures of 1977 should 
have been used to analyse market share.
The second point implied, by the Panels, about the International 
Sugar Agreement was in weighing the measure of the obligation
Australia and Brazil had already agreed what was for them an 
equitable share. The Panel said Australia in 1978 had a world market
share of 8.1 per cent, yet pursuant to the International Sugar
Agreement, Australia had agreed that its world free market share
would he less than this percentage. Therefore why should Australia
complain against the Communities when they have exceeded 4 ~ h iC, ,
undertakings Surely the Communities had not interfered with
188share hut other International Sugar Agreement producers . The
same arguments were repeated hy the Panel in the Brazil complaint 
189
as well • No comparison is possible with the French Assistance
case because France belonged to the International '■‘/heat Council
along with Australia, therefore equal weight: . ; was given to both
even though Frances share of world exports was slightly less than
190what it should have been on a historical trading basis .
Taking account of my earlier discussion on the Havana Charter and
191 inegotiations towards the General Agreement  ^ intergovernmental >
commodity agreements were to be another pillar in the liberalisation
of agricultural trade. The extent to which the International Sugar
Agreement regulated trade on the world free market was in 1973, 80
per cent * -That sugar which amounted to 85 per cent of total world 
192
gross exports • By 1981-82 the International Sugar Agreement
188. supra note 10 page 312 to 3*13 para. 4*23
189. supra note 11 page 92 para. 4*17
190. Chapter 3 Section 3 page 74*
191• see Chapter 1 Sections B and E and especially Chapter 2
Section D p 77“59 where the 1934/55 Working Party consider
that to meet world requirement in an effective and economic
manner commodity agreements accommodate government intervention 
in meeting these requirements of economic liberalism.
192. J.S. Nagle supra note 2 page 105
regulated less than 50 per cent of that sugar. The Communities in
1931981-82 accounted for 50 per cent of world free exports ^  which
194was 75 pei* cent of total non members supplies to that market ♦
The Communities share in the world free market had risen from 7<»8 
per cent in 1969-1975 (7 year average) to 22.8 per cent in 1978^^.
Thus in light of these statistics it was not unrealistic that 
traditional exporters should break ranks with the International 
Sugar Agreement from 1'976 onwards . Simplistically problems with 
this commodity agreement emanate from the Communities not joining.
If the Panel attached weight against members of the International 
Sugar Agreement for breaking their obligations then surely it 
should consider why the Communities did not join.
The absence of the Communities from the 1968,1973 and 1977 Inter­
national Sugar Agreement was publically understood to be dissatisfaction 
with the method of Intervention. The Communities argued against 
an export quota system to Intervene on the world free market on the
grounds that it failed to stabilize prices ? Ihis is ironic when
you consider their domestic common sugar policy is based on a quota
system. The Communities wanted a buffer scheme. \  Z B  was
generally understood that the Communities were dissatisfied with
196its export quota - which was based on historical production • Smith
193* supra note 11 page 92 para. 4*7 
194* supra note 10 page 295 Table 1.
195* supra note 10 page 295 Table 1.
196. I. Smiths supra note 184 p104 (1981) and "Elements of an 
International Agreement" F.O. Lichts International Sugar 
Report. Special Edition 19779 p25 at 28. J.E. Nagle supra 
note 2 page 104.
understood the Conmnmities were offered an export quota of 2.1
million tonnes which he considered not unreasonable in relation to
197their past performance • The offered export quota was close to
198
the 1976-1977 Communities exports and therefore took account
of ' changes to the common sugar policy in 1974* By the Communities
refusal to accept an export quota it meant instability for other 
199sugar exporters • If commodity agreements are the only real method
to accommodate a satisfaction of world requirement then a refusal
of a major exporter to join must mean that the commodity agreement
will not achieve its purpose. This is what has happened to the
sugar commodity agreement. I consider the Panel unfairly places an
extra burden on Australia and Brazil. The weight in a balancing
Zpo
situation should go to members of a commodity agreement#.
--v.i-v-. A ; /'' ' ’ ' My reasons for stating that an unfair
burden was placed on Australia and Brazil is because it is at odds 
with the purposes of economic liberalism. The General Agreement in 
trying to achieve a liberalization of agricultural trade accommodates 
government intervention within Article XVI: 3 and Article 10. The 
International Sugar Agreement also accommodates government inter­
vention by proposing pricing, supply and procurement mechanism. So 
by the Panel only supporting the intervention in the General Agreement 
it allows destabilization to occur from that";measure;
197• I* Smith supra note 184 p104« We also see that the negotiations 
towards a new International Sugar Agreement were not rigid to 
historical patterns -per se, but reflected changing production 
patterns.
198. supra note 11 page 84 Table 3*
199* The Communities did however give an undertaking to operate
parallel restrictions on its exports in accordance with those 
accepted by the developing countries to the International Sugar 
Organization.
200. see my earlier discussion in Chapter 3 Section B page 73 where 
the weight was equal due to both belonging to the International 
Wheat Council.
that is o fUa/ farmers income, employment and
standard of living, destabilization to achieve the "full use of 
resources" by countenancing one form of intervention. The Panel 
should weigh heavily against destabilflation. This would mean the 
Panel should not have regarded Australia and Brazil's share of 
sugar exports as fixed and rigid^M^- .
201The Panels discussion on tied sales related to displacement and
202price undercutting • In ' those discussions on price under­
cutting tied sales were used to redress the balance of the argument 
that the Communities were not increasing its share unfairly by 
export subsidies. The Panel did not enter into a weighing of tied 
sales as a special factor explicitly. The main objection from the 
Communities to this form of sale was that it protected the Australian
exporters from free competition on the most favoured nation principle
2 0 3of the General Agreement. 'Aside from the obvious reply that the 
complaint was against the Communities export subsidy policy of sugar 
the point was that the Communities were no more than half hearted 
exporters of sugar. 3y this I mean the common sugar policy was the 
only method by which the Communities could generate surpluses Without
201. supra note 10 pages 312 to 313 para. 4«23
202. supra page 315 para. 4*28
203. It could be argued that the Communities Mediterranean Policy 
constituted a special arrangement similar to tied sales. The 
Communities by entering in bilateral relationships with Lebanon, 
Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, expected for the preferences given to 
their markets reciprocal preferences. This could have taken 
the form of sugar imports from the Communities because all 
those countries changed their sugar trading patterns on the 
implementation of that policy in 1976,
that intervention, Communities producers could only compete in odd 
years against traditional exporters of sugar. So international 
trade in sugar by the Communities had nothing to do with free 
competition, Further trade in agricultural products has never been 
internationally on the most favoured nation principle. So the 
Communities objection had no validity, I consider the Panel were 
not sure how to deal effectively with these tied sales as a special
■TGiAJ&f C^S
factor. Phis is seen by the contradictory treatment A  tied sales
y Expressly, the Panel considered that the Communities
subsidized sugar exports could affect those tied sales under
Article XVT :1^^. As I mentioned earlier, internationally those
tied sales were insignificant in absolute terms and the only
major contract was to Japan for 2 mil lion tons (raw value) annually
The Australian tied sales were principally to those countries with
which it had Commonwealth ties, except for Japan. Tt was unlikely
that the Communities would penetrate this market^as they were based
S o
on the importation of raw sugar and/twould have sugar refineries . 
they would not wanted os ed. Australia, by the entry of the United 
Kingdom into the Communities, lost . ^  „ market of around 350-400 
thousand tons annually or raw sugar. Th^h displacement was met by 
the internal adjustment measures of the Communities. The loss of
204* supra note 10 page 315 para. 4*28
205. see my discussion in this Chapter Section D page 104where I 
analyse the significance of all Australia's tied sales. 
Details of the Japanese sales are mentioned by J.E. Nagle 
supra note 2 page 122.
that market was made up by additional sales to its Commonwealth 
205A
links and Japan . If the tied sales accommodated the loss of the 
United Kingdom market as I suggest then how do I weigh them? In 
thia. situation of an oversupply of sugar, the ^
excluded ; specifically from those markets just
because they were tied sales but rather because of £ p & C ia/ f'M&Si 
Further the Communities have been able to increase their exports to 
other markets c\ -fo- j’f’i $  (? ec viojj sz IA Kj© <0 s Uv s 1. Theref ore 
I would consider v tied sales should be given no weight. at all#
The last special factor considered by the Panel was the possibility
that other Contracting Parties were subsidizing, sugar, yet a complaint
was only levelled at the Communities. I understand that Australia
could have subsidized their tied sales exports by charging instead
of the contract price a discounted price (similar to the world market 
206
price) # The Panel were obliged to consider the 1954/55 Working 
Party "Understandings" that other Contracting Parties may have 
utilised export subsidies in their share of exports. This consideration
must be one of the prime ' 'I i . the Panel not being
prepared to find against the Communities * A ” :
’• 1. . C ' ,  . V  v _  .   ■ ;  .  _  .
It would have been unfair on the Communities to find against them 
for an increase in sales due to their system of support when other 
Contracting Parties utilized,different systems of support. However
205A. supra note 10 page 311 Table 4«
206. see J.E. Nagle supra note 21 page 106 discuss Japan and Canada
concern about price movement.
it still does not deal with the problem of resolving the generation 
of surplus by the Communities common sugar policy which led to it 
dispose of that surplus by export subsidies.
The Special factor which I consider did not receive discussion by
the Panels was the one of "satisfying world requirements in the most
effective and economic manner" from the 1954/55 Working Party
recommendations. We have in the sugar subsidy debate clear evidence
that production surpluses are continuing, no internal adjustment
measures have been taken by major sugar exporters and a failure of
the International Sugar Agreement to bring about corrective measures
due to the hon-roembership of the Communities. In this situation
the negotiations for the International Trade Organization^^ and
206B
the 1954/55 Reveiw Session favoured the argument that the 
utilization of export subsidies should not be allowed to meet world 
demand if it was creating difficulties. This is in line with the 
principles of economic liberalism that export subsidies are an 
inefficient allocation of the worlds resources. However those 
negotiations were directed to an expansionary market and not a 
stable or diclining market as now with sugar. If the negotiations 
show that Contracting Parties were harsh against export subsidies in 
an expansionary market then logically it should be harsher in the 
present sugar market. This would mean that this special factor 
should be weighted against the Communities should the liberalization 
of agriculture still be an aim of GATT.
206A. see my discussion in Chapter 1 Sections B and E.
206B. see my discussion in Chapter 2 Section D pages 57—59 and 
Section E.
G. The Balancing of the Obligation
The Panels application of Article XVI: 3 and Article 10 have been 
extensively discussed with respect to these two complaints since it 
is the only indication of whether GATT still hopes to achieve a 
liberalization of agricultural trade internationally. Since I consider 
the norm is a broad statement capable only of resulting in diplomatic 
compromises I now weigh the measures of the obligation to see whether 
it U C* ,c-b)e c>-f s ^ o  K
Firstly, with respect to the Australian complaint, in weighing the 
measures of the obligation I shall follow the methodology of the 
French Assistance case rather than the defacto application of 
Article 10 by the Panel which has no legal basis. I consider that 
the Communities system of subsidies had contributed to the increase 
in their exports but whether it was an unfair share required further 
examination since the world market share figures could not support 
Australia obtaining a finding. In considering price undercutting I 
found that Australia could not show substantial price undercutting 
by the Communities.tf^evident*- that Australia was discounting on 
its tied sales so it was not effected by such a practice. In the 
element of special factors the membership of Australia to the 
International Sugar Agreement I consider was weighted incorrectly 
by the Panel, the tied sales I considered should have been 
neutral, the possibility of other Contracting Parties subsidizing
sugar was correctly weighed by the Panel and lastly the 
satisfaction of world requirements should have been weighted 
against the Communities. The special factor elements prime 
weighting should be on the possibility that other Contracting 
Parties are subsidizing sugar* Since the norm is a hortatory 
one, the satisfaction-ofWorld requirements, should go against 
Australia. The other elements of special factors I consider 
would hot balance the negative weight. Therefore I consider 
there is not sufficient support for a finding that the Communities 
have increased their market share unfairly*
•
With respect to the Brazilian complaint the analysis of weighing 
of the measure is simpler* In the world export trade market 
share Brazil had clear and sufficient evidence (except for 1979) 
that the Communities increase in their exports by subsidies 
was a reversal of trade figures* The regional and individual 
market displacements caused a lot of problems for me to weigh 
simply because the Panel did not present sufficient statistics 
to discuss their conclusions* a *. 0 n  this displacement -L~
i _ should be left open I then move to the i
elements* The element of price undercutting would be on the 
positive list for Brazil since Brazil sold on the world free 
market. The weighing of special factors elements only includes
the International Sugar Agreement, the possibility of other
N
Contracting Parties subsidizing and satisfying world requirement. 
The International Sugar Agreement was incorrectly weighed and 
should count for Brazil as with the satisfaction of world 
requirements. These two elements should, I consider, balance 
with the possibility of other Contracting Parties subsidizing.
So in total I would consider the Communities system of 
subsidized sugar exports had resulted in them having an inequitable 
share of the world export trade.
Assuming .in weighing "the measures of the obligation
j then why have the Panel found in Brazil* s
complaint that the Communities share is equitable. In my
opinion it has to do with something outside the application of 
the norm and goes back to the Code on Subsidies negotiations.
As I mentioned earlier, the Communities have made it quite
207clear that the Common Agricultural Policy is not negotiable • 
Since it is not negotiable it can be expected that if the Panel 
found that the system had to be changed the Communities would 
block the adoption of the Panel Report at the GATT Council 
of Ministers. This would have resulted in no action arising
207* see my discussion in Chapter 4 Section B pages 84 and 83
from the Panel Report at all let alone any further diplomatic
negotiations. This would result in a similar stance of the
United States in the Working Party Report on Unmanufactured 
208Tobacco • Hence I consider the Panel must have considered 
their finding of the Communities share equitable would lead to 
discussions and consultations. The application of Article 10 had 
nothing to do with the finding. I now move on to a short 
discussion on the effect of the system which gave rise to the 
points for diplomatic discussion and consultation.
H. The Effect of the System
The Communities system it was argued by Australia and Brazil "caused
or threatened to cause serious prejudice" to their interest and also
affected the world sugar market to the detriment of other Contracting 
209Parties • Since the Communities system did not control production 
or marketing of sugar because ofi (a) the price structure applied 
to Quota A and B; (b) the price assurred for excess production to 
domestic consumption up to a set limit; and (c) the freedom of
208. see my discussion in Chapter 3 Section C pages 7 8 - 8 0  where the 
United States stance was one of not accepting at all the norm 
of Article XVI:3 in consultations.
209. supra note 10 page 299 para. 2.26 and supra note 11 page 78 
para. 2.22
producers to produce more than Quota A and 3 it generated surpluses.
From the alteration in 1974 to the oommon sugar policy, production
increased from 1975 1977 hy 135 P©** cent whereas consumption
210declined by 9 per cent • The alteration in 1974 to the Communities 
policy on sugar was a result of the world shortage and a concern 
about security of supply for sugar.
Quota A production level was lifted and Quota 3 was expanded to
211145 per cent of Quota A . Further the production levy was abolished
from 1975 1977 and the intervention price was increased. So
the Communities had set a production target of 13*25 million tons,
212
with a consumption level of 10.3 million tons for 1975 • '^ he
Commission of the Communities in order to assist the world shortage
of sugar, due to the nature of su^ar beet, proposed no restrictions
on Quota C sugar but in the event of the shortage coming to an end
213a Quota C would be restricted by production controls . These 
changes did not flow into actual production levels untin 1977 because 
of climatic conditions. The reason why the Communities had to 
encourage its own higi cost production of sugar beet rather than 
rely on importing sugar goes back to the world shortage. The shortage 
particularly in the United Kingdom occurred because of the diverting 
away of shipments by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement producers
210. I. Smith: ”FEC Sugar in an International Context”. Journal 
World Trade Law 1981 p95 at pp98 Table 1.
211. I. Smith: "The European Community and the ’World Sugar Crisis”. 
Trade Policy Research Centre Staff Pager No. 7 p10 (1974)•
212. ibid.
213. ibid.
214onto the world free market to get higher prices. Also because
215of the world shortage it led to panic buying in the United Kingdom .
216Smith states that the Communities overreacted to a temporary crisis •
Thus the overreaction was put at the doors of traditional suppliers
O / q Iq  iong term arrangements n  A A  decided to seek higher prices. I
understand that the putting of the blame back onto those traditional
suppliers is an oversimplification. With the entry of the United
Kingdom into the Communities in 1973 the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
producers (excluding Australia) were uncertain about their future.
Britain under the Treaty of Accession had agreed to safeguard the
interest of those producers but by 1974 these had not been translated
217into specific committments on price and quantity • So when it
came to renegotiate the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in 1974 the
United Kingdom was only able to put forward unrealistic proposals
218in terms of price to those producers • Thus because of the 
uncertainty of the Communities market to those producers they 
diverted shipments.
219Australia in its arguments under Article XVI: 1 for more
consultation because of the prejudice it had suffered argued on
220general grounds. Brazil , in detailed argument, argued that the 
Communities had depressed
214* Smith supra note 184 P97 and 98 (1981)«
215* ibid.
216. ibid.
217* I. Smith supra note 184 page 3«
218. ibid.
219• supra note 10 page 299 para. 2.26
220. supra note 11 page 78 para. 2.22
world prices and diminished its export earnings. The Communities *
221
reply wag that it could not he responsible for world market prices ,
and in the case of Brazil its calculations were unfounded and 
222irrelevant •
The Panel could only consider whether the surplus which received
the export refunds depressed world prices since that was the subject
of the complaint. The only way the Panel could ensure this was to
consider the method by which the Community sold that surplus onto 
223the world market . If the Communities sold this sugar in terms
of normal commercial practice then it could not have depressed the
world price. The Communities sold that sugar in 2 ways: tender
224and periodic sales . The periodic sales method was determined
by taking into account the situation on the world market, the
Community intervention price, transport costs, trade expenses and
225quotations on the world market, and fixing the refund • Under
the tendering method tenders.were invited with the refund being
226determined on the minimum tender price • The periodic sales 
should have been the normal commercial transaction with the tender 
sales the exception. Under the periodic sales the Communities 
would have fixed the refund to make surplus Quota B sugar compete 
on the world market. That would be the difference between the 
intervention price and the world price. V/here with the tender
221. supra note 10 page 299-300 para. 2.27
222. supra note 11 page 79 para. 2.23
223* supra note 10 page 316 para. 4«33 to 4«34 and supra note 11
page 94 para. 4-24 to 4*23
224- supra note 10 page 303 to 304 paras. 3«15 to 3*17 and supra note 
11 page 83 to 84 paras. 3*15 to 3*17
225. ibid.
226. ibid.
sales exporters make an artificially low bid in order to price
undercut other exporters. The Communities suld substantially all
227
of the Quota B sugar under the tender sales method • Therefore
the Panel was only left to say the inevitable that the system had
no element in its application which would prevent it from obtaining
228
a more than equitable share • Thus the surplus.. exported with
229
the refund constituted serious prejudice in depressing world prices . 
The intervention of the Communities was on a vast scale and 
certainly outside the financial budgets of traditional exporters 
of sugar.
Although Australia and Brazil could only complain about the 
subsidized sugar, the Quota C sugar of the Communities must have 
been of concern to them. The Communities system was generating 
what is regarded as high cost surplus yet it was able to dispose 
of Quota C sugar without support and at n e  risk f o roduoers.
I consider that the Communities were only able to dispose of 
Quota C sugar t?rv occasions of short fall in world production without 
support. This would have occurred in 1973 to 1975> 
when the prevailing world market price  ^ . equivalent to
the cost of production „ v  . . How could the disposal be
achieved without support in a situ ation of where the world market 
price was below the cost of production,
227. supra note 10 page 3^6 and 3^7 para. 4*33 and Table 6, and
supra note 11 page 94 para. 4«24
228. supra note 10 page 316 para. 4«35> and supra note 11 page 94
para. 4*26.
229. supra note 10 page 3"!9 para, (g) and (h), and supra note 11 
page 97 para, (f) and (g).
To show how the disposal of Quota C sugar could occur, in the latter 
situation I will utilise the prices from the system in 1973 and 1978* 
If we take the cost of production, transport and marketing of 
Quota C sugar as being the equivalent of the intervention price, 
it is a highly conservative figure, it will allow me to prove a 
point. In 1978 the intervention price was around US$ 612 per 
tonne of white sugar. If the producer got a 10 per cent profit 
margin from such a sale it would reduce the intervention price to 
US^ 558 per tonne. This figure of US^ 55° per tonne „ in 1978 
represents all the cost of production, transport and marketing for 
Quota G sugar. The world market price in 1978 was US$ 206 per tonne. 
, X f  the Communities producers pushed all or part of their cost 
for Quota C sugar onto Quota's A and B sugar then they would be able 
to dispose of this sugar.. Similarly with 1973* if the cost of 
production, transport and marketing was around 233*4 units of account 
and the world market price was 69 units of account it is the only 
way such sugar be disposed of. The Communities Quota C sales in 
1973 were 282,000 tonnes and in 1978 858,000 tonnes. It can be the 
only explanation for such disposal of high cost production. Even 
if only part of the total costs are pushed across onto Quota's A 
and B reductions in
receipts from the "Unsubsidized" exports so long as it did not 
represent a sizeable proportion of their total production. The 
Panels could only consider the complaint as between the parties and 
not all Contracting Parties to the General Agreement. The Panels
agreed that the system had no legal limits to the size of production
but only economic ones. The Panels did discuss Quota C sugar 
230generally but were unable to make any conclusion on that sugar 
production since it received no export subsidy^ - f o .
I. Summary
At the start of this chapter I stated that I hoped to show a system
which links commodity surpluses with export subsidies, I consider
that this link has been made out with the Communities common sugar
policy. We saw the operation of a system designed and developed to
satisfy autarkic policies. The inhibitators of the system were
price controls rather than production controls. The result .
v, the increasing generation of sugar beet production which
s:l " ; ■ . required export
subsidies to dispose of :KW&surplus /. The effect of the subsidy 
1
destabilize O. ^  Gr\traditional sugar produeers « ' i
1 j . „• j p_7 The common factor between the
generation of such surpluses and the need for export subsidies was 
the Communities intervention. This intervention is accommodated within 
the provisions of the General Agreement and the Code on Subsidies.
230, supra note 10 page 315 para. 4*29, and supra note 11 page 93 
para. 4*18
231. supra note 10 page 318 para. 4«33» and supra note 11 page 94 
para. 4«24
The intervention of the Communities system was legitimate in terms 
of the provisions of Article XVI:3 and Article 10 according to the 
Panel. The Panel contend did its function. By this I mean that 
it examined the complaint, considered the measures for the obligation 
and finally, weighed that obligation. It could do no more under 
the General Agreement or Code on Subsidies. My discussion which 
,agrees ih t k  W 1& 1U  with the Panel1 s findings in the Brazil 
complaint follows the Panel's methodology and examined that process. 
With respect to "world export trade" I contended that the Panel's 
discussion on this definition was not thorough and could not justify 
their conclusions. With the "previous representative period" the 
Panels vacillated in using some periods against not using others.
Again there was no- justification for this fluctuating methodology.
The measure of the obligation I consider was approached in the 
Australian complaint in a defacto manner. The Panel's discussion 
on world market share revealed inconsistencies between the findings 
in Australian and Brazilain complaints. The discussion on 
displacement,especially Australian indirect displacement and Brazilian 
individual markets ,show the Panelk utilization of facts was either 
incorrect or insufficient information was presented for the findings. 
Special factors also revealed the Panelk lack of. thoroughness in 
the discussion on the International Sugar Agreement to justify 
their conclusions. My discussion, by its very nature, would not agree 
with all the Panels discussion but I am unable to get around the 
conclusion thatiP*» e A  i-ow M. 9* *» to-yUwvff
Only in the Brazilian complaint is it evident that the findings were
. not based on the measure of the obligation but orr pragmatic 
consideration of whether anything could be achieved should the Panel 
give a finding against the Communities system.
The Panel was effective in what it could do to achieve a liberalization 
of sugar trade with only one pillar of a stricture. It could not 
enforce a finding against the Communities, so pragmatically it went 
to Article XVT:1 and found serious prejudice had occurred to 
Australia and Brazil. This would result in more consultations and 
discussions. But for how long? There are no defined parameters for 
the discussion of serious prejudice under Article XVT:1 and with 
the general climate of increasing protectionism it is unlikely that 
the Communities would take a broad view for such discussion and 
consultation.
More can be drawn on the findings about the liberalization of 
international trade in agriculture. The obvious point is that the 
countries so far involved in push for liberalization of
international trade in agriculture at the GATT - \e.\/9 / , ' <
have only been industrialised countries, major temperate primary 
product producers and new industrialised countries. Developing/ 
less developed countries have not yet been participants in this 
" f S o u t S b "  • So the debate for greater liberalization currently 
encompasses only the North versus the North. / Hci. .‘offers 
hope for those South countries, GATT must achieve a significant 
before the competitiveness of such t r a d e t h e m .
v)
Another point is that the regulation of agricultural trade is not
totally within the GATT system. The International Sugar Agreement 
is under the auspices of the United Nations Committee on Trade and 
Development. So the intended structure of the Suggested Proposal 
for the International Trade Organisation is now fragmented under 
various international agencies. A final point which might be 
drawn is that the provisions of Article XVI:3 of the General 
Agreement and Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies have not received 
support from the major trading nations.
The Panel’s in their finding on Article XVI: 3 and Article 10 have 
shown concern with the aims of the General Agreement but it has not 
resulted in the identification of the purpose for the Articles.
The Panels! showed concern for raising the living standards for the 
Communities producers but did not show the same concern for 
Australia and Brazil's producers. The Panels1 did not concern 
itself with satisfying the world requirements for sugar because 
they were unable to affect any change. As for concern that sugar 
production should be the most effective and economic use of resources 
the Panel's countenanced the:C o ™ t y .  form of intervention 
against the intergovernmental commodity agreement. The lack of 
clarity and precision in the Articles which was supposedly to allow 
for flexibility of application and the dynamic movement of primary 
commodity tra.de has only resulted in the practice of export subsidies 
scheme being It must be discouraging for primary
producing nations which do not have the resources like the Communities 
to see such A  r e  vM q  • No longer does the
norm discourage such price stabilization schemes. The continuance 
of this disarray for liberalization of agricultural trade internationally 
and the discouragement of such schemes is disquieting. The final 
chapter considers the consultation process of GATT which resulted 
from the serious prejudice findings and also links the generation 
of sugar surpluses and export subsidies with restrictions on trade.
CHAPTER 6
The Sugar Subsidy Debate: Round Two
A. GATT Working: Party Reports
- The First Working Party Report
fk-■j
The Communities, after the adoption of both Panel Reports byAGA'TT
Council of Ministers, were under an obligation to do something about
the domestic stabilization scheme so not as to continue the serious
prejudice and uncertainty on the world sugar markets. The question
-f-h«s4 l^ o ^  Pd-'v—j 
was the extent to which it could satisfy/\ obligations. In
November 1980 the Communities outlined their proposals to a Working
Party, established pursuant to the Panel's finding and their obligation
2
under Article XVI:1 to discuss with Contracting Parties •
The Communities considered the Panels findings to , J o ^  that they
should alter those policies which had exported the surplus. with 
3subsidies . The Communities were neither prepared to consider
questions arising from the Panels conclusions nor allow examination
of its common sugar policy outside the rights and obligations arising
from the General Agreement^. Hence the consultations under Article XVI: 1
5
would proceed on this basis . Australia and Brazil were of course
1. European Communities - Refunds on Exports of Sugar Complaint by 
Australia. GATT 26th Suppl. BISID p290, and European Communities - 
Refunds on Export of Sugar Complaint by Brazil. GATT 27th Suppl.
BISID p69.
2. GATT: European Communities - Refunds on Exports of Sugar. Article 
XVT: 1 Discussions; Report to the Council. 20 February 1981 (L/5113)*
3. supra note 2 Annex- III page 16.
4. ibid.
5. ibid.
m . 1. Australia and Brazil were placing the
problems of international trade in sugar onto the Communities
and hence wanted the Communities to reduce total production, reduce
the production of Quota B sugar, limit funds available for subsidies
and remove the uncertainty in world sugar markets by joining the
£
International Sugar Agreement •
The Communities proposed to achieve a reduction of exports with
subsidies by: (l) fixing the intervention prices; (2) to co-operate
with other sugar exporting nations to seek ways of making the
world price more transparent and the method of determining offer
prices more objective; (3) a reduction for Quota B production
levels; and (4) all export refunds for sugar will be met by levies
7
from the producers • These proposals went back to the changes of 
the common sugar policy in 1974 to meet the world shortage. On the 
intervention price the Communities considered that since the 1974/75 
change the'intervention price had not kept pace with inflation and so it 
would not have stimulated production. The Quota B production level 
had been reduced to the 1974/75 level and so the Communities felt 
this did not stimulate production as well. Therefore the Communities 
considered the new element which would control production would be
Q
the production levy re-introduction on Quota B sugar • Australia, 
Brazil and other Contracting Parties considered these proposals 
were still open ended in respect of production and subsidies and
6. supra note 2 Annex II pages 13 and 14»
7. supra note 2 Annex III page 18 to 20.
8. ibid.
9serious prejudice would still continue . There was no questioning 
of the right of the Communities intervention policy.
The Working Party reported in February 1981 to the Council of
10
Ministers of GATT without coming to any definite conclusion.
- The Communities new regime
The Communities regulations which came into force in July 1981
differed in several respects from the draft proposal. Firstly,
the reduction in sugar production quota's was less than envisaged.
Quota A was not reduced from its 1974/75 level. Quota B production
for member states of the Communities was redistributed in favour
11of stronger producing nations • Quota B was marginally reduced
12
from 127*5 per cent to 123.5 per cent • There was also provision
for member states of the Communities to transfer up to 10 per cent
of Quota B sugar between producers under certain conditions. The
net result will be minimal short fall of production and stabilization 
13at a higher level . The second respect in which the 1981 Regulation 
differed from the draft proposal was in the co-responsibility levy; 
it was set at a lower level because the cost of exporting in 1981 
was going to be minimal with higfr prices on the world free market.
The levy was initially set at 2.0 per cent of the intervention price 
but thereafter could rise through steps to 39*5 per cent of the 
intervention price^. Smith^ doubted whether the co-responsibility
9. GATT European Communities - Refunds on Export of Sugar. 
Communication by Australia, 9 September 1981 (L/5185).
10. I. Smith "GATT: EEC Export Refunds Dispute" Journal World
Trade Law, 1981 p535*
11. GATT supra note 9 p6 and I. Smith supra note 11 p541•
12. ibid•
13. ibid.
14* I. Smith supra note 11 p535 and supra note 9 p8.
15. T. Smith supra note 11 p535-
levy would actually ever cover the export refunds. When crop
estimates for 1981/82 were known in April 1981 world market prices
plummetted from 21.38 U.S. cents per pound then,to 11.5 U.S. cents
per pound in September 1981. Australia calculated that the
Communities would have export availability entitled to a subsidy
16
at 3*7 million tonkin 1981/82 (in 1978 it was 2.7 million tons)
The total expenditure for the export of this would be 950 million
EUA (635 million EUA in 1978, 685 million EUA in 1979) of which the
production levies would only cover initially 405 million EUA and
a further 181 million EUA by an additional levy of 74 cent
in 1982/83. The Communities would have to provide 364 million 
17EUA . The co-responsibility levy did not generate a;, decrease . 
of. the- _ . production surpluses. In fact in 1981/82 production
planting increased in the Communities by 10 per cent overall and 
17 per cent in France^.
The last difference concerned the intervention price and the tender 
price. The intervention price was increased by 8.5 per cent in 
1981/82, the highest increase since 1974/75* So the subsidy required 
for 1981/82 was 279.99 ECU per tonne.This was 60 per cent of the 
intervention price and greater than the world price. In 1978 the
19subsidy required was 236 ECU per tonne and 1979 276 ECU per tonne .
This increase between the tender price and the intervention price 
is what the Panels based their finding of serious prejudice on.
16. supra note 9 page 8.
17. ibid.
18. supra page 9*
19. supra page 4*
We see that the Communities regulations had the effect of 
increasing the gap, so serious prejudice would still continue.
The Communities new regime carried a howl of protests from Australia,
20Brazil and other Contracting Parties (including the United States) •
These Contracting Parties claimed the new regime would have a
21similar effect as the 1974/75 Communities Regime • The Council 
of Ministers of GATT agreed to set up another Working Party to 
review the situation.
- The Second Working Party Report
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of GATT in agreeing to
review the situation of the serious prejudice caused by the
Communities system stated that it was to include "any element
22bearing on the matter relating to sugar" • Mo longer was the 
review to proceed upon the basis of Article XVT and Article 10 
findings.
fK, e
The Communities took the position if /) was going to be a general 
review then . • the sugar interventionist policies of other
Contracting Parties would have to be examined simultaneously if 
it was going to allow a general examination of its own interventionist 
scheme*^. Accordingly it produced in three questionnaires^ detailed
20. see supra note 9 and European Communities - Refunds on Exports 
of Sugar Documents L/5186 and L/5189.
21. ibid.
22. GATT Council of Ministers 150 p22.
23. GATT Working Party - Sugar Report to the Council. March 1982 
(L/5294) p82.
24* supra note 24 Annex I, II and III.
questions about the nature of the sugar policy of Australia, Brazil 
and the United States. The Community raised questions specifically 
about the nature and effect of those countries internal programs in 
relation to the world export trade.
oc 26
In Annex I the Community asked Australia why its export production
in 1980-81 exceeded their average tonnage between 196l-79t k°w it
could be justified if domestic consumption remained stable, the
effects of Australias long term contract prices on the world market
price and why Australia's internal sugar regime effected imports
27of sugar. In Annex II the Community questioned Brazil's regime
28
of sugar. The Community specifically asked whether the Brazilian 
domestic price of sugar was above the export price and if so was 
there not a similarity to the common sugar policy, why Brazil was 
moving into bilateral long term contracts for sugar exports and
whether it used other export measures to obtain a larger share of
29 30the world export market. In Annex III the Community in
questioning the United States centered on their agricultural waiver,
its new import quota regime and the bilateral contract between the
United States and the U.S.S.R.
The Communities in 1981/82 had stockpiled 2 million tonnes and it 
considered that it had attempted to do its fair share to stabilize
25. ibid.
26. supra Annex I p11.
27. supra Annex II p12.
28. supra p12-14.
29* supra p15.
30. supra Annex III p15-17«
the world market. By the vigorous nature of its question I think the
Communities approach was correct. In attempting to reduce world
production a concerted approach required all intervention policies of
Contracting Parties to be declared. The Communities question implied
that it too was interested in agricultural liberalisation as long as
the terms to achieve it were fair for all Contracting Farties. So no
complaint can be levelled at the Communities for trying to effect a
liberalisation of sugar through the General Agreement. Unfortunately
the Chairman of this Working Party did not agree with the Communities
31approach and adopted a restrictive view to the mandate • He
considered the review should continue the work on the Australian
and Brazilian complaints and if the Community wished to examine both
Australian and Brazilian sugar policy they should launch a complaint
under the normal procedures. This position was steadfastly supported
by Australia, Brazil and the United States. Australia, amongst others
was after the Communities to change the world sugar market problems
by accepting morally that its intervention system changes in 1974/75
was the heart of the problem. It went on to blame the Communities
for unilaterally blocking progress on achieving an overall solution
32
to the over production •
Since a general review was impossible to achieve the Working Party
had to report that no consensus on anything to discuss was possible.
Therefore the Council of Ministers closed the Working Party and the 
33complaints .
31. supra note 24 page 47 para. 19*
32. supra page 90 para. 32.
33* GATT Activities in 1982 page 69. A further complaint was
filed in April 1982 by a group of ten sugar producing nations, 
requesting consultations with the Communities. The consultation 
has led to no change from my above discussion on the Second 
Working Party Report.
B. Restriction in Sugar Trade
IT now d is cue s an example 'of the type of restrictions that have resulted 
from the Communities intervention system.
Sugar producers in the United States claimed that the sugar surplus
generated by the Communities and the effect of their exporting such
output had depressed world prices. The effect of this on the
United States domestic producers was that the world market price
fall had led to a fall in domestic prices in the United States such
that it threatened their income, standard of living and employment.
The domestic producers of sugar in the United States received
support from the Commodity Credit Corporation whom found it could
34not support the domestic producers since it had run out of money .
The United States government lodged a complaint under Article 10
35of the Code on Subsidies but their domestic producers wanted
36immediate retaliation against the Communities •
The United States Sugar Act of 1971 controlled the domestic
production and import of sugar to protect the growers and the
37consumers interest • Imports were controlled by quotas to make 
up the internal deficit. The Sugar Act 1971 ceased in 1974 when the 
United States pursued a policy of "free trade” for sugar. .
34* United States Senate: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
International Trade on the Committee of Finance, 97th Congress 
Second Session. February 11th 1983*
35* supra page 126.
36. EEC: Memorandum No. 128 ”EEC and U.S. Views of CAP: Myth and 
Reality” 1.12.1982 Appendix page 1.
37. J.E. Nagle. Agricultural Trade Policies, 1976, page 107.
The United States domestic producers called for protection and a 
abandonment of a "free trade" approach in 1982. By the use of the 
term "free trade" the United States purchased its deficit of sugar 
off the world free market and applied the International Sugar 
Agreement on a defacto basis. It instituted a quotas system only 
to members of the International Sugar Agreement on a percentage 
share of their market averaged from 1975 to 1981^, from 1982 for 
future imports of sugar.
The result is that restrictions on entry have been erected to the 
United States sugar market. It will force the Communities, which 
prior to 1982 had exported sugar to the United States, to sell its 
surpluses onto a world market already dominated by itself. The 
continual sale of its surplus will not only continue to depress 
world prices, increase competition for reducing markets but cause 
more prejudice. This will result in further detriment to the 
traditional sugar producers because they do not have the available 
resources to compete on any terms with the Communities. So I 
consider I have made out the link between the generation of 
surpluses and its disposal by export subsidies which results in 
restrictions on trade in that commodity.
38. I. Smith "Prospects for a New International Sugar Agreement" 
J.W.T.L. 1983 page 308 at page 3 1 4 *
C. Summary
This final chapter shows another side to the often repeated statements 
that GATT cannot deal effectively with a liberalisation of agricultural 
trade. V/e saw in the last chapter that the Panel in the sugar 
subsidy debate took a pragmatic view towards the Communities system 
and by finding serious prejudice allowed the Contracting Parties 
to enter into consultations and discussions. The First Working 
Party Report defined the parameters for the discussion and the 
extent to which the Communities were prepared to move. After the 
implementation of the new regime with its continuance of serious 
prejudice to Contracting Parties ?the Communities showed that it , 
willing to enter into the discussions. At the Second 'Working Party 
the Communities clearly offered the Contracting Parties an 
opportunity for a review of all intervention policies in the trade 
of sugar internationally to set up a framework to resolve the 
problems. This was the opportunity that the Contracting Parties 
should have seized in order to get a limitation on interventionist 
policies. The opportunity could have given rise to a liberalisation 
of sugar trade internationally especially for those traditional 
exporters whom, were dependent on sugar in toto. Thus GATT was 
effective in the utilization of one pillar of the s t r u c t u r e  f r o m  
the Suggested Proposals for a Charter to get discussion on internal 
adjustment measures. I do consider this would not have led to a 
liberalisation of sugar trade internationally since the International 
Sugar Organization ..-as required for the structure to be complete.
Yet if GATT was able to effect internal adjustment measures I do
consider it would have provided for the Communities to join the 
International Sugar Agreement.
This opportunity was missed because of the attitude of the Contracting 
Parties towards the obligation and the findings. Australia, Brazil 
and the United States consider Article XVIs3 of the General Agreement 
and Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies to have normative value, 
whereas my discussion has shown that it is only a hortatory 
statement. As a result of this those Contracting Parties considered 
the serious prejudice finding by the Panels should result in the 
Communities bearing the entire responsibility for the problem of 
sugar trade. Those Contracting Parties could not see why they 
should discuss their internal policies when the responsibility for 
the problem lay with the Communities.
The restrictions by the United States on its imports from 1982 
onwards clearly arose out of the Communities common sugar policy, 
which generated high cost surplus^<and required export subsidies 
to dispose of them. But those restrictions I contend are not 
attributable to the ineffectiveness of GATT in toto. The inability 
of Contracting Parties to understand the scope of Article XVI: 3 
of the General Agreement and Article 10 of the Code on Subsidies 
led to those restrictions. GATT attempted to bring resolution to 
the sugar trade but until governments are prepared to discuss their 
internal measures and make adjustments, or conclude intergovernmental 
commodity agreements that type of restriction will inevitably occur 
again.
